ROBERT EUGENE ROBERTSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued September 17, 2010
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-10-00314-CR
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ROBERT EUGENE ROBERTSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F02-00529-S
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Francis
        Robert Eugene Robertson appeals the adjudication of his guilt for aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to imprisonment. We affirm. The background of this case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.
        Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 2009). Following the plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on ten years community supervision and assessed a $2500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated the terms of his community supervision. In a hearing on the motion, appellant pleaded not true to the allegations in the State's motion. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at twenty years in prison.
        Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to twenty years in prison because the sentence is not necessary to prevent the recurrence of his criminal behavior. Appellant asserts that because he has a mental illness and drug addictions, the trial court should have considered rehabilitation in assessing punishment, such as probation and inpatient treatment. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not support appellant's claims.
        Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant neither objected to the sentence nor filed a motion for new trial. Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review.
        Even if appellant had preserved error, however, his argument still fails. As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for the offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). In this case, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 22.021(e).
        We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the twenty-year sentence. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We resolve appellant's sole issue against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MOLLY FRANCIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
100314F.U05