IN THE INTEREST OF M.W., A CHILD

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed January 7, 2010.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-08-01353-CV
............................
IN THE INTEREST OF M.W., A CHILD
 
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 07-20961-S
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Lang
        Appellant Carl Barrett (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order adjudicating parentage of M.W. and requiring Father to pay retroactive child support in the amount of $30,000, to be assigned to the Office of the Attorney General of Texas (the “OAG”). In three issues on appeal, Father asserts (1) the award of retroactive child support is not supported by valid pleadings or by the evidence and (2) “[t]he retroactive child support being payable to the [OAG] is error because there is no evidence to support the award to the [OAG].” For the reasons below, we decide against Father on his three issues. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. The trial court's order is affirmed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 
        On December 3, 2007, the OAG filed in the trial court a “Petition for Confirmation of Non- Agreed Child Support Review Order” for the benefit of M.W. “pursuant to Texas Family Code Chapters 231 and 233.” Attached to that petition was a proposed “Child Support Review Order” that set Father's current monthly child support at $535 per month and obligated Father to pay retroactive child support in the amount of $24,000 for the four-year period from November 27, 2003, to November 27, 2007.
        A hearing on the requested confirmation of the child support review order was held before an associate judge on January 17, 2008. The OAG, Father, and the mother of M.W., Melody Wallace (“Mother”), appeared. At the conclusion of that hearing, the associate judge signed a “Temporary Order Confirming Non-Agreed Child Support Review Order.” The associate judge, in relevant part, (1) set Father's current child support at $373.49 per month and (2) crossed out a provision in the temporary order titled “Retroactive Child Support as to Carl Barrett” and wrote the word “Reserved” next to the title of that provision. Mother filed a “Notice of Appeal from Associate Judge's Hearing” that same day, seeking review in the trial court of the “amount of monthly child support” Father was ordered to pay.
        Mother's appeal of the associate judge's order was heard by the trial court on March 6, 2008. In an order dated May 2, 2008, titled “Additional Temporary Orders in Suit Affecting the Parent- Child Relationship,” the trial court increased Father's current monthly child support to $453.06.
        A hearing on the reserved issue of retroactive child support was held by the trial court on July 2, 2008. The OAG, Father, and Mother appeared. Mother requested the trial court to consider retroactive child support for a period of more than four years. She testified that when she found out she was pregnant with M.W. she knew that the respondent, Carl Barrett, was the father and told him of her pregnancy. She testified that when M.W. was a year old, she talked to Father again about the child and asked him if he “wanted to be involved in her life.” He responded negatively and did not offer any financial support.
        Gladys Wallace, M.W.'s maternal grandmother, testified that when M.W. was between three to six months, she saw Father at a gas station and approached him about his paternity of the child. While pointing to her vehicle, she told him that “his baby was in the car.” She claims that Father “shrugged it off,” and the conversation ended. Gladys Wallace testified the second time she approached Father about M.W. was when M.W. was “around three or four” years old. She stated that while she, M.W., and Mother were standing in line at a restaurant, she noticed Father standing to the right of them. She told Father, “there's your little girl.” According to her testimony, he responded, “I know, ” but did not say anything further.
        At the hearing, Father refuted Mother's and Gladys Wallace's testimony. He admitted to being M.W.'s father, but testified that he did not know of his paternity until August 23, 2007, which was sixteen years after M.W. was born. He denied ever being approached by Mother or Gladys Wallace about his paternity prior to the filing of the action.         
        Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court found that Father “knew that he had a child prior to the time for filing” and ordered “some amount of retroactive support prior to the four year statute.” On July 30, 2008, pursuant to a July 10, 2008 request by Father, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusion of law. Subsequently, the trial court signed an “Order Confirming Non-Agreed Child Support Review Order (After Hearing)” dated September 4, 2008. That order set Father's current child support at $525 per month and stated in relevant part:
        It is FOUND that retroactive child support should be ordered for the period between 7/13/1991 and 11/28/07 in the amount of $30,000, as of 11/28/07, and that the retroactive child support is assigned to the [OAG] pursuant to Texas Family Code Chapter 231.
 
(emphasis original).         Father's motion for new trial was heard and denied. This appeal timely followed.   See Footnote 1 
 
II. CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
 
        In three issues, Father contends the trial court erred in ordering retroactive child support. In his first issue, Father asserts that “the retroactive child support is error because there are no valid pleadings to support the order.” In his second issue, Father contends that “the retroactive child support order is error because there is no evidence to support the order.” In his third issue, Father slightly modifies the central contention in the first two issues, arguing the retroactive child support order is in error “because there is no evidence to support the award” and there are “no pleadings to support the award to the Attorney General.”
A. Standard of Review
 
        A trial court's order for child support, including an award for retroactive support is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d 717, 727 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet denied). A trial court abuses it discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding principles or rules. Downer v. Aquarmarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985); In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d at 727. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court's and may not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992).
        When challenges to the factual or legal sufficiency of the evidence are raised on appeal, factual and legal insufficiency are not independent grounds of error, but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). The trial court has not abused its discretion if some evidence exists to support the judgment. Id. (citing Worford, 801 S.W.3d at 109). Under the “some evidence” standard, the reviewing court may only consider the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment and “disregard entirely that which is opposed to it or contradictory in its nature.” Worford, 801 S.W.3d at 109; Niskar, 136 S.W.3d at 753-54.
         Additionally, when the trial court makes findings of fact, and the parties do not challenge them, the findings are binding on the appellate court unless contrary evidence is established as a matter of law or if there is no evidence to support the findings. McGalliard v. Kuhlman, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). Under the “no evidence” or “matter of law” standard, the reviewing court must disregard all evidence contrary to the trial court's findings. Id. If the record demonstrates “any evidence” that would support the judgment, the trial court's judgment must be upheld. Id
B. Applicable Law
 
1. Retroactive Child Support
        Section 160.636 of the Texas Family Code provides that upon a finding of parentage in a paternity action the trial court may order retroactive child support. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.636(g) (Vernon 2010). In making an award for retroactive child support, the trial court “shall apply the child support guidelines provided by this chapter” and “consider the net resources of the obligor during the relevant time period.” Id. §§ 154.009(b), 154.131(b). Moreover, the trial court is also required to consider whether (1) the mother had made previous attempts to notify the obligor of his paternity,(2) the obligor had knowledge of probable paternity, (3) the order will impose an undue hardship on the obligor, and (4) the obligor provided actual support prior to the filing of the action. Id. §§ 154.131(b)(1)--(4). Section 154.131 does not bind the trial court to the listed factors, but merely guides the trial court in determining the amount of retroactive child support. Garza v. Blanton, 55 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).         The family code also presumes the amount of retroactive support “that does not exceed the total amount of support that would have been due for the four years preceding the date of petition” is “reasonable and in the best interest of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.131(c) (Vernon 2010). However, this presumption may be rebutted with evidence that the obligor “knew or should have known” that he was the father of the child and “sought to avoid the establishment of a support order to the child.” Id. §§ 154.131(d)(1)-(2). The statutory language vests the trial court with discretion to award retroactive support and the amount of that support. In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d at 727.
2. Child Support Review Order
        Chapter 233 of the Family Code enables the OAG to take “expedited administrative actions... to establish, modify, and enforce child support and medical support obligations....” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 233.001 (Vernon 2010). A child support review order issued pursuant to Chapter 233 and confirmed by the court “constitutes an order of the court and is enforceable by any means available for the enforcement of child support obligations under this code.” Id. If the trial court issues a child support order not agreed to by all the parties, a party may request a hearing on “the petition for confirmation of a non-agreed child support review order.” Id. § 233.023. The timely request for a hearing “stays confirmation of the order pending the hearing.” Id. §233.025. Section 233.025 also notes that the “petition for confirmation and the child support review order constitute sufficient pleading” for any issue that is addressed in the petition or order. Id. After the hearing, if the court finds that the order should be confirmed, the trial court “must immediately sign a confirmation order and enter the order as an order of the court.” Id. §233.027. Upon signing the confirmation order, “the child support review order becomes a final order of the court.” Id. 
C. Application of Law to Facts
 
        In his first issue, Father contends the trial court erred in awarding retroactive child support because “there are no valid pleadings to support the order.” However, Father does not point to any deficiencies in the pleadings, nor does he cite any statutory or case law authority in support of his argument. He simply states that “it is hornbook law that to obtain retroactive child support one must plead it...and the absence of such notice constitutes a due process violation.”
        The purpose of pleading is to give the adversary party notice of each party's claims and defenses as well as the relief sought. See Perez v. Briercroft Services Inc., 809 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1991). The Texas Family code has established that the “petition for confirmation and the child support review order constitute sufficient pleading” for any issue that is addressed in the petition or order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 233.025 (Vernon 2010). In this case, the child support review order provided for retroactive support and the petition for confirmation of non-agreed child support included a request for retroactive child support. Consequently, there is sufficient pleading to support the award of retroactive child support. We decide Father's first issue against him.
        In his second issue, Father contends that there is “no evidence to support the order.” He argues that the trial court's order of $30,000 was an abuse of discretion because it was more than a “slight deviation” from the guidelines. Father also asserts that “final judgment set the support at $373.49 for 48 months” which “would be $17,927.52 and not $30,000.00" Although Father claims that the final judgment set support at $17,927.52, he does not cite to the record or otherwise support his argument. Moreover, he also does not explain why the evidence is legally insufficient to support the $30,000 order. He cites no legal authority that addresses the issue.
         Father does not contest the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. His only attack is on the alleged legal insufficiency of evidence to support the $30,000 retroactive child support and the prospective child support of $525.00 per month. The trial court's unchallenged findings that support the award provide, (1)Mother had made several attempts to notify Father of his paternity, (2) retroactive child support would not pose an undue burden, (3) Father has not provided any actual support prior to filing of the action, (4) Father knew or should have known of his paternity, and (5) Father sought to avoid the establishment of support obligation to the child. Because Father did not contest the findings of facts and conclusions of law, we disregard any contrary evidence and review the record for “any evidence” that supports the award. See McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 696-697.
        The record demonstrates at the hearing on the issue of retroactive child support, Mother testified that she contacted Father about her pregnancy and his paternity before the child was born and when the child was a year old. She also testified that Father stated he did not want to support the child. Gladys Wallace, M.W.'s grandmother, testified that she saw Father twice after M.W. was born and approached him about his paternity. According to Gladys Wallace, when M.W. was between three to six months old, she approached Father about his paternity, but he“shrugged it off” and ended the conversation. She again approached Father when M.W. was “three or four” years old. At that time, Father acknowledged his paternity, but did not offer any support. Father also admitted that he did not provide any monetary support to the child prior to the filing of the action. He stated that he only began providing support after the action was filed and he was “ordered” by the court to pay support. In addition, the record contains Father's financial statements, tax returns, deposit records, and gross receipt summaries as evidence of Father's financial affairs. Father's tax returns demonstrate that his adjusted gross income increased between the years of 2004 and 2007. Further, the financial statements show his net monthly income to be $6047.47. Based on the record, we conclude evidence exists that supports the child support award.         Within his explanation of his second issue, Father raises a separate argument. Citing Section 154.009 of the family code, Father contends the retroactive child support order was barred because he had been previously ordered to pay $373.49 in the “Temporary Non Agreed Child Support Review Order.” The record reflects no complaint to the trial court by motion, objection, or otherwise about previously ordered child support. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Accordingly, we conclude that Father did not preserve this argument, and we do not address its merits. Id. We decide Father's second issue against him.
        In his third issue, Father, once again, contends there is “no evidence to support the award.” He argues the trial court erred in awarding child support because “there is no evidence in this record to establish that [Mother] has applied for or has received financial services from the Department of Human Resources.” However, contrary to Father's position, the record demonstrates Mother received government assistance and that she filed a form with the OAG to seek child support.
        Father also contends in his third issue that there are “no pleadings to support the award to the Attorney General.” The family code provides a “petition for confirmation and the child support review order constitute sufficient pleading” for any issue that is addressed in the petition or order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 233.025 (Vernon 2010). The petition requested retroactive support and alleged that it was filed by the OAG pursuant to the Texas Family Code Chapter 231, which allows the assignment of rights when a parent has applied for child support services. See id. § 231.104. Therefore, the pleadings and the evidence were sufficient to support the award. We decide Father's third issue against him.
 
 
III. CONCLUSION
 
        We conclude that the trial court did not err in confirming the non-agreed child support review order because the evidence and pleadings support the award. We decide all three issues against Father and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          DOUGLAS S. LANG
                                                          JUSTICE
 
081353F.P05
 
 
Footnote 1 Both the OAG and Mother are named as appellees in this appeal.