SHELDON SCOTT KELLEY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed May 6, 2010.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-08-01081-CR
............................
SHELDON SCOTT KELLEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 401-81647-06
.............................................................
OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Moseley, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Lang
        A jury convicted Sheldon Scott Kelley of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and the trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment, probated for ten years, and a $1000 fine. In one issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
Applicable Law
 
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
        In a factual sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether (1) the evidence supporting the conviction is too weak to support the fact-finder's verdict or, (2) considering conflicting evidence, the fact-finder's verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We may only find the evidence factually insufficient when necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Id. Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact- finder's determination concerning what weight to give to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
        The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally and knowingly possessed, with the intent to deliver, cocaine in an amount of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2009). To do so, the State had to prove appellant exercised actual care, control, or management over the cocaine and knew it was contraband. See Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The control over the contraband need not be exclusive, but can be jointly exercised by more than one person. See id. at 831. Links between appellant and the contraband may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). However, no set formula of facts exists to dictate a finding of links sufficient to support an inference of knowing possession. See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 830. It is the logical force of the evidence, and not the number of links, that supports a fact-finder's verdict. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Evidence Presented
 
        On January 27, 2006, several McKinney narcotics detectives executed a search warrant on a house on Bonner Street. When the officers entered the house, appellant and Gerald Arnold Jones were the only individuals inside. Officers found cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and weapons inside the house. Appellant and Jones were arrested.
        Detective Christopher Grollnek testified that the Bonner Street house was a known “dope trap,” a house where traffickers sell drugs but do not live there. In such houses, as in this one, the front door will typically be barred and access will be made from a side or back door. Grollnek testified narcotics officers had been investigating the house for over one year due to federal cases being filed on three men who sold drugs from the house; Christian Nelson, Ronnie Hollins, and Gregory Arnold Jones. Appellant was neither named in the search warrant nor a part of the year- long investigation, and Grollnek had never seen appellant before.
        On the day officers executed the warrant, both Nelson and Hollins had left the house a short time before the tactical team arrived. Grollnek testified that the front door to the house was barricaded by metal bars from the inside, so officers entered the house through a side door. When officers stepped through the door, they entered a small room that contained a video monitor that showed scenes outside the house, a television set, a futon couch on the left side of room, and a regular sofa on the right side of the room. A walk-in closet that had no doors was directly across from the side-door entrance. In plain view inside the closet were shelves that contained drugs and paraphernalia, including thirty-nine grams of crack cocaine, two grams of powder cocaine, ninety- eight grams of marijuana, three digital scales with residue, sandwich baggies, a Pyrex dish with several “cooked up rocks,” a whisk, and cash totaling $123. An unloaded .22-caliber “long” rifle sat in a corner of the closet. The officers also found two loaded firearms under the sofa cushions: a .40-caliber Glock pistol and a .45-caliber Springfield pistol. Grollnek testified that both the futon and the sofa were in close proximity to the contents in the closet, anyone in the room could clearly see the closet's contents and easily access the closet, and the amount of drugs found was for more than personal use. There was no furniture, bedding, dishes, or food in the house, and there were no toiletries in the bathroom. There were no signs that anyone used the house except for the room next to the side door. Photographs of the room, closet, and drugs were admitted into evidence.
        Grollnek testified that just as officers were about to make entry, a van pulled into the driveway and a man got out and went to the side door. Someone from inside the house opened the door, then closed it when officers took the potential customer to the ground. Grollnek testified he believed appellant was the person who opened the door because appellant was nearest the door when officers entered, and appellant would not have had time to switch places with Jones, who was the only person in the house besides appellant. The officers had entered the house only a few seconds after the door had been opened for the potential customer. Grollnek testified that although he did not recall which person he encountered first, he wrote in a police report that appellant was the first person he encountered nearest the side door. Grollnek testified appellant was not the owner of the house.
        Detective Gerald Rutledge testified he provided initial surveillance of the house for about forty-five minutes before the tactical team arrived. Rutledge wore plain clothes and sat in an unmarked vehicle about one-hundred yards away from the house. Rutledge knew the house's side door was the primary entrance and exit point. He never saw appellant enter the house. About thirty minutes before the tactical team arrived, Rutledge saw Nelson and Hollins drive away from the house. A few seconds before the tactical team made their way to the side door, a van drove into the driveway. A man got out and knocked on the side door. The door opened slightly. From his vantage point, Rutledge could not discern whether appellant or Jones opened the door. When either appellant or Jones saw the officers approaching, he closed the door. The officers breached the door and entered the house. Rutledge testified he entered the house after the officers had secured it. Directly in front of the side-door entrance was a “little room” that had shelves. According to Rutledge, anyone entering the house would immediately see the contents of the closet and would know the house was a dope trap where drugs were sold.
        Officer Aaron Howell testified he was the first tactical team member who entered the house. As he led officers to the house, he saw a man standing outside at the side door. The door was partially open, and a man inside the house stood in the doorway. Howell ordered the man standing outside to get on the ground. At that time, the door closed, so the officers breached the door and went inside. Howell saw one man standing near the door. He ordered the man to get on the ground, then he went past him and located a second man. Howell testified he could not recall whether appellant was the first man or the second man. When Howell ordered the second man to get on the ground, he saw an open closet with it's light on. He could see the contents of the closet as soon as he came through the side door because the closet was directly in front of the side door and the closet did not have any doors on its hinges.
        Co-defendant Gregory Arnold Jones testified on appellant's behalf. Jones told the jury he had pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and has been indicted on federal charges for conspiracy to distribute narcotics. During his testimony, Jones said there were two doors on the closet that opened inward, and the doors were closed when the police arrived. He and appellant had been inside the house for only twenty minutes before the police had arrived. When they heard someone knocking on the side door, they did not open the door. As soon as they heard window glass breaking in the front of the house, they both got on the ground because they thought someone was shooting at the house. Police officers burst through the door and arrested him and appellant. According to Jones, appellant had nothing to do with the drugs found in the house, and appellant was “simply at the wrong place at the wrong time.” Jones testified the drugs found in the house belonged to him, but he did not sell drugs from the house and he did not know why the scales or baggies were in the house. Jones admitted there was no furniture in the house except for the futon and sofa in the room where the drugs were found. Appellant did not testify during the trial.
Discussion
 
        Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because three other people were responsible for the sale of, and in control of, the drugs found in the house. Appellant asserts that during the officers' year-long investigation of the house, no one saw him at the house or had any idea who he was. Appellant argues there is no evidence (1) he had exclusive rights to possession of the house, (2) knew there were drugs, paraphernalia, and firearms in the house, or (3) he was near the drugs found. The State responds that the evidence is both legally and factually to support appellant's conviction.
        The evidence presented shows several links between appellant and the narcotics found. The drugs found were in plain view, appellant was present in the room where the drugs were found, he was in close proximity to and could easily access the drugs, paraphernalia was also found in plain view and within easy access to him, he was in the same room where weapons were found, and the amount of drugs found was more than for personal use. Grollnek believed appellant was the person who opened the door for a potential customer, and appellant was the person who was nearest to the door when the officers entered the house.
        Appellant also contends the photographs taken of the closet and its contents contradict the conclusion that the drugs were in plain view and easily seen by or accessible to anyone in the room. Grollnek and Howell testified the closet did not have any doors affixed to its hinges, while Jones testified the closet had two doors and the doors were closed when the officers arrived. It was the jury's function to resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and the jury is free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either side. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979). The jury may draw reasonable inferences from the testimony. See Robertson v. State, 163 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (trier of fact draws reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict).
        We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine. We resolve appellant's issues against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          DOUGLAS S. LANG
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
081081F.U05