GWENDA MOORE, Appellant v. RICHARD COFFEY, Appellee

DISMISS; Opinion Filed June 15, 2009.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-09-00479-CV
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GWENDA MOORE, Appellant
V.
RICHARD COFFEY, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 330th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-07-19969-330-Y
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Lang, and Fillmore
        The Court has before it appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Appellee asserts that appellant's notice of appeal was untimely. Appellant's May 29, 2009 response to the motion to dismiss states that she never saw the final judgment until January 29, 2009, when she paid for a copy of it. Her June 4, 2009 response does not address the timeliness of her notice of appeal, but appears to seek affirmative relief from the trial court's judgment. For the reasons below, we conclude we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
        The documents before the Court reflect that the trial court's judgment was signed on December 17, 2008 and no timely motion for new trial was filed. Therefore, appellant's notice of appeal was due by January 16, 2009. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on May 1, 2009, well outside both the thirty-day period for filing the notice of appeal and the fifteen-day extension period allowed by rule 26.3. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3.
        Moreover, nothing in appellant's response reflects that she had neither notice or actual knowledge that the trial court had signed the judgment within twenty days after the judgment was signed on December 17, 2008. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a). She merely stated that she did not receive a copy of the judgment until January 29, 2009. Moreover, nothing in either the documents before us or appellant's response indicates she followed the procedure set out in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306 A. 5, which is required to obtain the benefit of rule 4.2(a). Nor does appellant's notice of appeal satisfy the requirements for a restricted appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(d)(7), 26.1(c).
        Because appellant's May 1, 2009 notice of appeal is untimely as to the December 17, 2008 judgment, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997). Accordingly, grant appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal.
        We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
                                                          
                                                          PER CURIAM
 
 
 
090479F.P05