ROBERT RAY SMITH, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed October 28, 2009.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-09-00168-CR
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ROBERT RAY SMITH, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 057571-397
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OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Lang
        A jury convicted Robert Ray Smith of theft of property valued at $1500 or more, but less than $20,000, and assessed punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail facility and a $10,000 fine. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. We affirm.
Background
 
        On December 13, 2007, Cody Williams, who resides in Grayson County, posted an advertisement on an internet sales site offering to sell his four-wheeler vehicle. A man who identified himself as “Robert” called Williams and discussed seeing the four-wheeler. Robert gave Williams his telephone number. During their conversation, Williams told Robert that he would not be home until after 6:00 p.m., and that Robert could come to his home anytime after that. Someone stole the four-wheeler from Williams's garage between 2:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. that same day. The person gained access to the four-wheeler by knocking a hole into the side of the garage. Williams reported the theft to the police.
        Five months later, Williams's four-wheeler was listed for sale on the same internet site Williams had used. Williams contacted the seller, Ryan Walker, and made arrangements to see it at Walker's home in Rockwall. When Williams viewed the four-wheeler, he checked the VIN number and verified that it was his property. Williams told Walker the four-wheeler VIN number matched the number for his four-wheeler that had been stolen from his garage five months earlier. Walker stated he had traded a motorcycle for the four-wheeler from a man he had met. Walker provided the man's telephone number, which was the same number Williams had for Robert from five months previous. Both Williams and Walker gave this information to the police.
        A detective determined the telephone number belonged to appellant. He created a photographic lineup that included a photograph of appellant and showed it to Walker. Walker identified appellant's photograph as the person he traded a motorcycle for the four-wheeler. The detective questioned appellant, who admitted the telephone number belonged to him. Appellant told the detective that he purchased the motorcycle from Walker and did not trade anything for it.
Applicable Law
 
        We review a challenge to the denial of a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).         A person commits theft if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2009). In addition to the elements of theft, the State is required to prove that the prosecution is being brought in the proper venue pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Ex parte Watson, 601 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The general rule provides that if venue is not specifically stated, the proper county for the prosecution of offenses is that in which the offense was committed. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 13.18 (Vernon 2005). The theft specific venue statute provides that where property is stolen in one county and removed by the offender to another county, the offender may be prosecuted either in the county where he took the property or in any other county through or into which he may have removed the property. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 13.08(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Article 13.08 attaches venue at the point where the accused takes control of the property with the requisite intent. See Stewart v. State, 44 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
        Venue in a criminal case need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 13.17 (Vernon 2005); Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Proof of venue may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, and the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Edwards v. State, 97 S.W.3d 279, 285 (Tex. App.-Hous. [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd). The evidence is sufficient if the jury may reasonably conclude that the offense was committed in the county alleged. See Rippee v. State, 384 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
Discussion
 
        Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to prove venue in Grayson County. The State responds that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict because the evidence is sufficient to prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence.
        The four-wheeler was originally taken from Williams's garage in Grayson County. Five months later, the four-wheeler was being sold by Walker in Rockwall County. The jury could reasonably conclude that appellant exercised control over the four-wheeler initially in Grayson County and then transported it to Rockwall County. Therefore, appellant could properly be tried in Grayson County. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 13.08; Stewart, 44 S.W.3d at 586-87.
        We conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict. We overrule appellant's sole issue.
        The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          DOUGLAS S. LANG
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
090168F.U05