MICAH LEROY MERRITT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed October 28, 2009
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-01510-CR
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MICAH LEROY MERRITT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F07-23537-LR
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OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice O'Neill
        Micah Leroy Merritt appeals following the adjudication of his guilt for possession of fraudulent identifying information. In four points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding to an adjudication of guilt. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
 
        Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to possession of fraudulent identifying information. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.51(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Appellant also pleaded true to the two enhancement paragraphs contained in the indictment. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on community supervision for two years. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated the terms of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded not true to the allegations in a hearing on the motion. After hearing evidence regarding the violations, the trial court found all of the allegations true. The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of possession of fraudulent identifying information and assessed punishment, enhanced by two prior convictions, at ten years' imprisonment.
        In its second amended motion to adjudicate, the State alleged appellant violated the conditions of his community supervision by (1) committing a theft offense on March 23, 2008, (2) committing a theft offense on April 27, 2008, (3) committing a theft offense on May 7, 2008, (4) failing to report as directed, and (5) failing to attend the Safe Streets Program as directed.
        Carla Sora, a probation Supervisor, testified appellant was placed on community supervision on April 2, 2008. She had an initial interview with appellant on that date. According to the probation department's records, appellant was directed to report at 8:00 a.m. on May7, 2008, and had until 6:00 p.m. on that date to report. Appellant did not report at any time on that date. The records also show appellant was directed to attend the Safe Streets Program at 6:00 p.m. on April 23, 2008. Appellant did not attend the program.
Applicable Law
 
        Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in probation revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763-64. In order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
Abuse of Discretion
 
        In his points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision and proceeding to an adjudication of guilt because (1) the March 23, 2008 alleged theft occurred before he was placed on probation, (2) the State failed to establish that appellant was the individual who committed the thefts on April 27, 2008 and May 7, 2008, and (3) the State failed to establish that he failed to attend the Safe Streets Program. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant's community supervision and proceeding to an adjudication of guilt because there is ample evidence to show appellant violated the terms of his community supervision.
        The trial court heard testimony that probation department records show appellant failed to report and failed to attend the Safe Street Program as directed. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd.). Moreover, the evidence is sufficient to show appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by committing thefts on April 23, 2008 and May 7, 2008.
        We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating his guilt. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763. We overrule appellant's four points of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
081510F.U05