GINNY LEE THRAP, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued May 29, 2009
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-01458-CR
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GINNY LEE THRAP, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F07-59829-UV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Richter, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Morris
        In this case, Ginny Lee Thrap appeals her conviction for robbery. Appellant contends her guilty plea was involuntary and the trial court erred in failing to afford her the right of allocution. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.
        In her first issue, appellant contends her guilty plea was involuntary because she was laboring under the false impression that she would receive probation and treatment for her longstanding heroin addiction. When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). If the trial court properly admonished a defendant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See id.
        Here, the record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant both orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon 2009); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). During the plea hearing, appellant testified she understood the charges in the indictment and understood the punishment range for the offense, in light of the added enhancement paragraph. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32(a); 29.02(a) (Vernon 2003). Appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was admitted into evidence. Appellant testified she had taken fifteen Xanax pills and used heroin on the day she committed the robbery. She stated that she wanted to apologize to the complainant for robbing her while using a stun gun. And she admitted to her numerous prior felony and misdemeanor convictions, but asked the trial judge to place her on probation with drug treatment so she could take care of her young daughter.
        Nothing in the record shows appellant believed she would necessarily receive probation. The fact that appellant received greater punishment than she hoped for does not render her plea involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). We conclude appellant entered her guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. We resolve appellant's first issue against her.
        In her second issue, appellant contends the trial court failed to ask, before pronouncing the sentence, whether she had anything to say regarding why punishment should not be pronounced against her. Appellant asserts she did not have the opportunity to state any reasons to prevent the sentence from being imposed. Article 42.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that before sentencing, the trial court shall ask a defendant whether she has anything to say as to why the sentence should not be pronounced against her. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.07 (Vernon 2006). Appellant did not complain about not being asked to say why the sentence should not be pronounced either at the time the sentence was imposed or in her motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). By failing to bring this issue before the trial court by proper objection or motion, she has waived any perceived error. See id.; Tenon v. State, 563 S.W.2d 622, 623-24 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). We resolve appellant's second issue against her.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JOSEPH B. MORRIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
081458F.U05