ERNEST HOWARD AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, Appellants v. WELLS FARGO BANK, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO WELLS FARGO BANK MINNESOTA, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR ITLA MORTGAGE LOAN SECURITIZATION TRUST 2002-1, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed November 2, 2009
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-00437-CV
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ERNEST HOWARD AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, Appellants
V.
WELLS FARGO BANK, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO WELLS FARGO BANK MINNESOTA, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR ITLA MORTGAGE LOAN SECURITIZATION TRUST 2002-1, Appellee
 
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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 08-1560-C
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice O'Neill
        Purchaser/appellee Wells Fargo Bank, successor by merger to Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A., as trustee for ITLA Mortgage Loan Securitization Trust 2002-1, filed a forcible detainer suit against appellant Ernest Howard involving certain real property after a foreclosure sale. Appellant, appearing pro se, asserts he failed to receive proper notice under Texas Property Code section 24.001, and the property was inadequately described in the petition. Because the facts are well-known to the parties we do not recite them here. Further, all issues are well-settled in law; therefore, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.         In his first issue, appellant claims Wells Fargo failed to give him proper notice under section 24.001 of the property code. Wells Fargo contends he waived his argument. We agree with Wells Fargo.
        Initially, we note a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Strange v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676- 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). On appeal, as at trial, the pro se appellant must properly present his case. Id. The rules of appellate procedure require appellant's brief to contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). An issue on appeal unsupported by argument or citation to legal authority presents nothing for the court to review. Strange, 126 S.W.3d at 678.
        In his brief, appellant referred to his notice claim in two sections: briefly in the Statement of the Case and again under Issues. He failed to mention or further elaborate on his claim in the Summary of the Argument or Argument section. Therefore, based on appellant's failure to present a clear, concise argument supported by authority or record citations, we conclude he waived his first issue. His first issue is overruled.
        In his second issue, he contends Wells Fargo failed to describe the property at issue in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 741. Appellant never raised this issue to the trial court. In fact, he failed to file any answer in the case, but rather first appeared at a hearing in a justice of the peace court and then appealed the adverse decision to the county court where he again appeared. During the trial before the court, he failed to make any argument against the forcible detainer action, failed to question Wells Fargo, and failed to enter any of his own evidence. Rather, when the court asked if he had anything to say, he responded “No, your honor.” Once the trial court announced in favor of Wells Fargo and gave appellant two weeks to vacate, he thanked the court and agreed to vacate the property by April 18, 2008.
        Relying on Granberry v. Storey, 127 S.W. 1122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), appellant asserts he has not waived his rule 741 argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. Appellant's argument is misplaced. Granberry stands for the opposite proposition and concludes “an objection to the judgment . . . that the description of appellee's complaint of the premises in controversy was sufficient” should be made by “an exception” in the trial court and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 1125; see Thompson v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 05-08-00142-CV, 2009 WL 1139993, *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas April 28, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mitchell v. Citifinancial Mortgage Co., 192 S.W.3d 882, 883 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“Appellants did not complain about the sufficiency of the property description to the trial court. Therefore, appellants have not preserved any alleged error.”).
        However, even if we assumed the issue was preserved, we would still reject appellant's argument. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 741 provides that a complaint for forcible entry and detainer “shall describe the lands, tenements or premises, the possession of which is claimed, with sufficient certainty to identify the same . . . .” Tex. R. Civ. P. 741. This Court has concluded a street address is sufficiently certain to identify a premises made the subject of a detainer action. See Mitchell, 192 S.W.3d at 883; see also Thompson, 2009 WL 1139993 at *2.
        Wells Fargo's complaint described the premises by the following legal description: LOT 6, BLOCK 13/8605 OF THE WOODS, THIRD SECTION, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF RECORDED IN VOLUME 76006, PAGE 645, MAP RECORDS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS. The complaint also identified the “Property” as the same location where appellant could be served with process. Specifically, it stated “Defendants reside in Dallas County, Texas and may be served with process at 7210 Lost Canyon Drive, Dallas, TX 75249 ('Property'),” which sufficiently identified the property. See Mitchell, 192 S.W.3d at 883; see also Thompson, 2009 WL 1139993 at *2.
        Appellant does not contend he was misled or confused by Wells Fargo's identifying information. In fact, his only argument is the property description was not sufficiently incorporated into the complaint, and we have resolved this claim against him. Thus, we conclude both the address and the legal description set forth in the complaint sufficiently identified the premises for purposes of rule 741. We overrule appellant's second issue.
        Having overruled appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
                                                          JUSTICE
 
080437F.P05