LADARRON DEMOND EASTER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed December 19, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-00667-CR
No. 05-08-00669-CR
No. 05-08-00668-CR
No. 05-08-00688-CR
............................
LADARRON DEMOND EASTER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-72248-IT, F07-59454-PT, F07-71180-ST, F06-71788-ST
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OPINION
Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Morris and Francis
Opinion By Chief Justice Thomas
        LaDarron Demond Easter appeals following four convictions. In nine points of error, appellant contends the sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
        Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to: (1) possession of heroin in an amount less than one gram, (2) aggravated assault on a public servant, committed with a deadly weapon, a firearm, (3) possession with intent to deliver 3,4 methylenedioxy methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more, but less than 400 grams, and (4) possession with intent to deliver cocaine in an amount of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2008); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.112(a), (d), 481.113(a), (d), 481.115(a), (b) (Vernon 2003). The trial court assessed punishment at two years confinement in a state jail facility for possession of heroin, fifteen years' imprisonment and a $2000 fine for aggravated assault, and fifteen years' imprisonment for each possession with intent to deliver conviction.
        In eight points of error, appellant contends the sentence in each case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, XIV; Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 13. Appellant argues the sentence is grossly disproportionate because his negative behavior is due solely to his drug addiction, he demonstrated remorse for his actions, and his and his family's testimony shows a strong desire for rehabilitation. In his ninth point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to prison in each case because the sentences violate the objectives of rehabilitation in the penal code and the most appropriate punishment was rehabilitative probation. The State responds that appellant failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in assessing punishment within the statutory ranges that is neither cruel nor unusual.
        Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Even constitutional rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, may be waived. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723. Moreover, there is no evidence the sentences are cruel or unusual, and they are within the statutory punishment ranges for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32, 12.35 (Vernon 2003); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing appellant's punishment at two- and fifteen-year prison terms. We overrule appellant's nine points of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          LINDA THOMAS
                                                          CHIEF JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
080667F.U05