THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR THE BEST INTEREST AND PROTECTION OF S.C

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed August 13, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-00263-CV
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THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR THE BEST INTEREST AND PROTECTION OF S.C.
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On Appeal from the County Probate Court No. 3 as a Mental Illness Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MI-08-50228
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Richter, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers
        S.C. appeals the trial court's judgment granting the State's application for court-ordered temporary mental health services.   See Footnote 1  In one issue, S.C. contends that he was “denied assistance of counsel during a significant stage of the commitment process.” The facts giving rise to the State's application are known to the parties and we do not recount them here. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        As S.C. acknowledges, an attorney was appointed to represent him during his commitment proceedings. Nevertheless, he argues that he was “effectively denied the assistance of counsel” because the trial court allowed him to “act as his own attorney during cross-examination of the State's sole witness” without making “the required determination that Appellant was capable of making a knowing waiver of his right to counsel.” In response, the State argues that the trial court was not required to determine whether S.C. waived his right to counsel because he was represented by appointed counsel and his counsel was “never excused by the court from his obligation to represent the Appellant.” We agree with the State.
        The record demonstrates that S.C.'s appointed counsel, public defender Michael McLelland, was present throughout the hearing on the State's application. At the beginning of the proceeding, the trial judge told S.C., “Mr. McLelland will help you. He is an expert.” After the State questioned the doctor who examined S.C., the trial judge explained to S.C., “Now is the time for your attorney to ask Dr. Shupe any questions. If you have any questions you want to ask Dr. Shupe, please whisper them to him.” Nevertheless, S.C. elected to question the State's witness himself, and without the assistance of his appointed counsel. S.C. also elected to give his testimony without assistance.
        The trial court appointed counsel to represent S.C., and S.C. did not ask the trial court to waive his right to counsel. S.C. does not cite to any authority to support his argument that, even though he did not waive his right to counsel, the trial court was nevertheless required to determine that he was capable of making a knowing waiver of that right. Accordingly, S.C. presents nothing for us to review. See, e.g., Wolfe v. C.S.P.H., Inc., 24 S.W.3d 641, 647 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.) (issue waived if appellant fails to support contentions by citations to appropriate authority). And in the absence of appropriate authority, we cannot conclude, under the facts of this case, that the trial court failed to make a determination that it was not asked to make.
 
 
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
 
080263F.P05
 
Footnote 1 This appeal and its companion, case number 05-08-00373-CV, which we issue simultaneously, involve the same person but relate to separate incidents.