AMY LOUISE JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed October 7, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-00050-CR
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AMY LOUISE JONES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F07-52548-QN
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OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, FitzGerald, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Lang
        Amy Louise Jones waived a jury and pleaded not guilty to theft of property valued at $1500 or more, but less than $20,000. After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at eighteen months' confinement in a state jail facility. In four points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The fact- finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
        In a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App.); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
        The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant unlawfully appropriated property valued at $1500 or more, but less than $20,000 with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). “Owner” means a person who has (1) title to the property, (2) possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or (3) a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. Id. § 1.07(a)(35).
        The Dallas police department's auto theft unit deploys a “bait car” to different areas in the city where auto theft is a problem. Officers leave the keys in the bait car's ignition, and devices inside the vehicle record the person who takes it. On May 17, 2007, appellant and a friend were arrested after they stole a bait car. Officer Barrick Culp testified he was not the owner of the vehicle, a 1995 Honda Accord, but the Dallas Police Department, City of Dallas owned it. Appellant was a passenger in the vehicle while her friend was the driver. Culp testified no one had permission to drive the vehicle except for an auto theft detective.
        Detective Noel Rendon testified the City of Dallas owned all of the vehicles in the bait car program. Rendon responded to the scene of appellant's arrest, took possession of the vehicle, and retrieved the videotape from recording equipment inside the vehicle. The videotape was played for the court. Rendon testified the auto theft unit uses the Kelley Blue Book to set the value of all of the vehicles used in the bait car program, and the vehicle appellant helped to steal was valued at more than $1500, but less than $20,000.
        In her first and third points of error, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show ownership of the vehicle was ever clearly established at trial. The State responds the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show ownership of the vehicle.
        The State presented evidence that either Culp or Rendon are within the statutory definition of owner based on a greater right to possession of the vehicle than appellant. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35). Both Culp and Rendon are Dallas police officers. The vehicle was used in the department's bait car program, and all of the vehicle in that program are owned by the City of Dallas. We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show both Culp and Rendon had a greater right to possession of the vehicle than appellant and were the vehicle's owner. See House v. State, 105 S.W.3d 182, 184 (Tex. App.-Hous. [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). We overrule appellant first and third points of error.
        In her second and fourth points of error, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish the value of the vehicle. Appellant asserts that because she objected to Rendon's testimony about the blue book valuation for vehicles, and there was no written documentation offered, the evidence is insufficient to show the vehicle's value. The State responds the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish the value of the vehicle.
        When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, we view all of the evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted. See Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Therefore, to the extent appellant relies on an allegedly erroneous evidentiary ruling to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, her complaint is without merit. “Value” is defined as the fair market value of the property at the time and place of the offense. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.08(a)(1). No one method of proving fair market value has ever been held to be exclusive, such as showing a retail price, or admitting testimony of an owner's opinion of value, or admitting testimony of a non-owner's “expert” opinion of value. See Keeton v. State, 803 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
        Rendon testified the Dallas police department uses the Kelley Blue Book to set the value of all of the vehicle in the bait car program, and the value of the vehicle was more than $1500, but less than $20,000. We conclude the evidence of value before the court supports appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's second and fourth points of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          DOUGLAS S. LANG
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
080050F.U05