RODNEY HUDSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM as modified; Opinion issued August 5, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-01618-CR
No. 05-07-01619-CR
No. 05-07-01620-CR
 
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RODNEY HUDSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F05-73528-KV, F05-73666-IV, F06-85954-V
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OPINION
Before Justices Wright, Bridges, and Mazzant
Opinion By Justice Mazzant
        Rodney Hudson waived a jury and pleaded guilty to retaliation, injury to a child, and aggravated sexual assault. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment for the retaliation, five years' imprisonment for the injury to a child, and thirty years' imprisonment for the aggravated sexual assault. In three issues, appellant contends his guilty pleas were involuntary,   See Footnote 1  the trial court erred in failing to pronounce his guilt in each case, and the judgments should be modified to reflect the correct sentencing date. We affirm the trial court's judgments as modified.         In his first issue, appellant asserts his guilty pleas were involuntary because he believed the judge would defer adjudicating his guilt and place him on probation. During the plea hearing, the trial judge properly admonished appellant both orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Appellant testified that he understood the charges, the punishment range for each offense, and that the judge could assess punishment anywhere within the punishment range. Appellant testified that he freely and voluntarily waived a jury trial and wanted to plead guilty in each case because he wanted to receive probation. Appellant's signed judicial confessions and stipulations of evidence were admitted without objection. The trial judge passed the case for a presentence investigation report and sentencing.
        During the sentencing hearing, appellant again testified that he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty to each of the offenses. Appellant testified that he did not necessarily believe he deserved to be placed on probation, but he was asking for probation so he could “prove” himself to the court and society. Nothing in the record shows that appellant believed he would receive probation. The fact that appellant received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his pleas involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). We conclude appellant's guilty pleas were voluntary. We resolve appellant's first issue against him.
        In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial judge failed to orally pronounce his guilt in each case before assessing punishment. The State responds that the trial court did not err by failing to orally pronounce appellant's guilt in each case.
        After the trial judge heard testimony during the punishment hearing, he orally pronounced the sentence in each case without expressly stating the court found appellant guilty of each offense. However, the trial court's written judgments recite that the court found appellant guilty of each offense. A written judgment is valid even in the absence of an express oral pronouncement of guilt by the trial court. See Villela v. State, 564 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). We resolve appellant's second issue against him.
        In his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court's judgments should be modified to reflect the correct date the sentences were imposed. The trial court's written judgments recite the date the sentence was imposed as “November 15, 2007.” The reporter's record shows the sentencing hearing was held on November 15, 2007, after which the trial judge sentenced appellant to five, ten, and thirty years' imprisonment for the offenses. However, on November 19, 2007, the trial judge held another hearing to “formally sentence” appellant to five, ten, and thirty years' imprisonment for the offenses. Thus, the written judgments are incorrect. We sustain appellant's issue.
        We modify the trial court's judgment in each case to show that November 19, 2007 is the date the judgments were entered and the date the sentences were imposed. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). We also modify the judgments to show the time credit is from January 12, 2006 to November 19, 2007. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          AMOS L. MAZZANT
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
071618F.U05
 
Footnote 1 The trial court's certification recites that appellant waived his right to appeal the guilty plea in each case, but reserved the right to appeal the punishment portion of the open pleas. Because appellant's waivers were entered before appellant knew what the punishment would be, the waivers are ineffective. See Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).