ANDREW THURL PETERS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed July 2, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-01202-CR
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ANDREW THURL PETERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MA06-73468-F
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OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Richter, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers
        A jury convicted Andrew Thurl Peters of driving while intoxicated. During the punishment phase, appellant pleaded true to a prior driving while intoxicated conviction. The trial court assessed punishment at 360 days' confinement in the county jail, probated for twenty-four months, and a $1300 fine. In a single issue, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.   See Footnote 1  We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
 
        At about 1:15 a.m. on August 12, 2006, Christopher Pruitt was driving in the middle lane heading south on Interstate 35. Pruitt testified he saw headlights coming behind him in the same lane “very fast.” Pruitt was traveling at approximately 65 mph, and estimated the car behind him was traveling almost 100 mph. Pruitt moved to the left lane to get out of the way, but the other vehicle also moved to the left and rear-ended Pruitt's car. Pruitt's vehicle spun around a few times, hit a light pole, and ended up in the grassy area off the shoulder. Pruitt was not injured in the accident. Pruitt got out of his car and looked for the vehicle that hit him. Pruitt saw a dark-colored Range Rover stopped on the highway. Pruitt never saw the driver of the Range Rover.
        Dallas firefighter Joe Arocha responded to the accident scene and saw a Range Rover in the inside left lane on the highway. He saw appellant sitting in the driver's seat of the Range Rover. While Arocha was waiting for police officers to arrive at the scene, appellant got out of the Range Rover, approached the fire trucks, and said something. Other firemen told appellant to get back into his vehicle and wait for the police. Appellant walked back toward his vehicle, then jumped over the concrete barrier and ran across the northbound lanes and into a parking area. Arocha ran to the Range Rover intending to move it safely out of traffic. The keys were in the ignition, so Arocha got inside and started the engine. One of the other firefighters yelled that another vehicle was coming towards them. Arocha jumped out of the Range Rover moments before another vehicle hit one of the fire trucks that blocked off the accident scene.
        Officer Burt Smiley responded to the scene after the fire trucks had arrived. Smiley was told that the driver of the Range Rover had run across all of the northbound lanes of traffic and into a parking lot. Smiley drove to that location and saw appellant standing near some cars. He was swaying back and forth. Smiley returned appellant to the accident scene, where both Pruitt and Arocha identified him as the driver of the Range Rover. Smiley testified that he believed appellant was intoxicated because he had an unsteady balance and did not appear to have the complete use of his mental and physical faculties.
        Officer D. Cupid testified she talked briefly with appellant at the accident scene. Appellant said he was coming from a club, but did not remember the name of the club or provide any further details. Appellant said he was going home and he did not have anything to drink that night. Cupid observed that appellant had bloodshot eyes, an unsteady balance, and a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. Cupid, who is certified to give standardized field sobriety tests, tried to administer the tests to appellant, but appellant refused to perform them. Cupid believed appellant had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to alcohol consumption.
        Officer Terrance Hopkins testified that he responded to the accident scene with Cupid and saw a Lexus that had been rear-ended by a Range Rover. Hopkins discovered that appellant was the registered owner of the Range Rover. When another officer returned appellant to the accident scene, Hopkins could tell that appellant was intoxicated. Hopkins smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on appellant's breath and observed that appellant had “very red, bloodshot eyes,” an unsteady balance, and slurred speech. After appellant refused to perform any field sobriety tests, he was transported to the jail. Hopkins, who is certified to give standardized field sobriety tests, observed appellant in the intoxilyzer room at the jail. Hopkins believed appellant had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to alcohol consumption. A videotape of appellant in the intoxilyzer room at the jail was played to the jury.
Applicable Law
 
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A review of the evidence for legal sufficiency does not involve a re-weighing of the evidence or a substitution of the jury's judgment. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
        The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). “Intoxicated” means not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, or a combination of two or more of those substances or any other substance into the body. Id. § 49.01(2). Among other things, evidence of intoxication may include: (1) slurred speech; (2) bloodshot eyes; (3) the odor of alcohol on the person or on the breath; (4) an unsteady balance; and (5) a staggered gait. See Cotton v. State, 686 S.W.2d 140, 142 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). The uncorroborated testimony of an arresting officer is sufficient to prove the element of intoxication. See Annis v. State, 578 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Watkins v. State, 741 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd).
Discussion
 
        Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient because no one saw him operating the vehicle and that the witnesses were not credible. The State responds that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
        There was evidence that, after appellant's Range Rover rear-ended Pruitt's Lexus, the Range Rover eventually came to a stop and appellant got out of the vehicle and ran from the scene. Arocha positively identified appellant as the person he saw sitting in the driver's seat of the Range Rover and the person who fled the accident scene. Arocha also found keys in the ignition of the Range Rover and started the engine to move it safely off the highway. Both Cupid and Hopkins testified appellant had bloodshot eyes, unsteady balance, and his breath smelled of an alcoholic beverage. Cupid and Hopkins, who are certified in administering field sobriety tests, determined that appellant did not have the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to alcohol consumption. See Watkins, 741 S.W.2d at 549. And the videotape shows appellant had slurred speech, swayed back and forth, refused to perform any tests, and answered “none” to all of the officer's questions.
        We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction for driving while intoxicated. See Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92; Watkins, 741 S.W.2d at 549; Cotton, 686 S.W.2d at 142. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
071202f.u05
 
Footnote 1 Appellant asserts the State did not offer evidence that he was intoxicated at the time he was driving, he was actually the driver, or that the vehicle was drivable.