MICHAEL REEVES, Appellant v. CRAWFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed November 7, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-01141-CV
............................
MICHAEL REEVES, Appellant
V.
CRAWFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 06-03095-L
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Whittington, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        Michael Reeves failed to appear for two hearings on his motion for new trial/motion to reinstate. The trial judge imposed a sanction against Reeves of $500 payable to Crawford Insurance Company. Reeves appeals the sanction order. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        The law is well established that to present an issue to this Court, a party's brief shall contain, among other things, a concise, nonargumentative statement of the facts of the case, supported by record references, and a clear and concise argument for the contentions made with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Bare assertions of error, without argument or authority, waive error. See Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer, 943 S.W.2d 477, 486 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied); see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (appellate court has discretion to waive point of error due to inadequate briefing). When a party fails to adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal. Devine v. Dallas County, 130 S.W.3d 512, 513-14 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.); Howell v. T S Commc'ns, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
        This Court, by letter dated February 19, 2008, notified Reeves that his pro se brief did not comply with the rules of appellate procedure and directed him to file an amended brief that complied with rule of appellate procedure 38.1. After the Court granted an extension of time for filing an amended brief, Reeves filed an amended brief which also fails to comply with the rules of appellate procedure. In his brief Reeves does not include authority, legal analysis or discussion of the law, nor does he discuss the relevance or application of any such law to the facts of this case. Reeves does not provide us with argument that is sufficient to make his appellate complaint viable. By failing to adequately brief his complaint, appellant has waived this appeal of the monetary sanction order.
        Even assuming we were to address appellant's complaint, we would affirm the trial court's order. A trial judge has inherent power to sanction to the extent necessary to deter, alleviate, and counteract bad faith abuse of the judicial process. In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997). “By rule, statute and their own inherent power, trial courts have broad authority to sanction litigants for specific misconduct.” In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 807 n. 4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). There is no prohibition against monetary sanctions. They are part of the court's inherent power to control the procedure of the cause. Drew v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 970 S.W.2d 152, 157 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
        We review a ruling on sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004). The test under an abuse of discretion review is “not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court's action, but 'whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.'” Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 839 (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)). We reverse the judge's ruling only if it was arbitrary or unreasonable. Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 839; Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242.
        Among the numerous findings in support of the sanction imposed, the trial judge found Reeves obtained two hearings but failed to appear for the hearings; Reeves did not provide the court or opposing counsel adequate notice of intent to cancel the hearings; Reeves did not move to continue the hearings; there is a direct relationship between the sanction and the offensive conduct; and, the sanction is no more severe than necessary. The sanction order states:
 
The Court has considered lesser sanctions, such as striking the Motion for New Trial/Motion to Reinstate. However, the Court notes two orders entered by other courts of Dallas County declaring [Reeves] to be a vexatious litigant and requiring [Reeves] to file bonds prior to proceeding. Thus, the Court concludes striking the Motion for New Trial/Motion to Reinstate would be ineffective and a monetary sanction is appropriate.
 
        Reeves supplies no argument, authority, or reference to the record to persuade us that the $500 sanction constitutes abuse of the trial judge's discretion. We conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing the monetary sanction.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
071141F.P05