JOSE ROSADO, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed July 31, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-01084-CR
No. 05-07-01085-CR
 
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JOSE ROSADO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-00380-IQ, F06-00382-IQ
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OPINION
Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Wright and Francis
Opinion By Chief Justice Thomas
        Jose Rosado waived a jury and pleaded nolo contendere to two aggravated sexual assault of a child offenses. After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at twenty-five years' imprisonment in each case. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the convictions. We affirm.
        The appellate standards of review announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) and Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), are not applicable where a defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere or guilty. See O'Brien v. State, 154 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). An appellate court will affirm the trial court's judgment if the State introduced evidence that embraces every essential element of the offense charged and that is sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2005); Wright v. State, 930 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.). The record shows the trial court conducted a full hearing on appellant's plea, passed the case for a presentence investigation report, and conducted a separate punishment hearing. At no time during the proceedings did appellant withdraw his nolo contendere plea. Thus, we conduct our review to determine whether there was sufficient evidence presented to establish appellant's guilt.
        To obtain convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child, the State was required to present evidence that showed appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the contact and penetration of the sexual organ of C.R., a child under the age of fourteen, by appellant's sexual organ and finger. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (Vernon Supp. 2007). The State may prove penetration by circumstantial evidence. See Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc). The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for sexual assault. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(a) (Vernon 2005); Tear v. State, 74 S.W.3d 555, 560 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd).
        C.R., appellant's eleven-year-old daughter, testified she lived with appellant and her mother until she was three years old, at which time she was removed from their home and placed with an aunt and uncle. C.R. testified appellant sexually abused her “many times” before she was removed from his home. Appellant would take C.R. into his bedroom at night and touch her “private places.” C.R.'s mother was awake and in the room each time appellant sexually abused C.R. C.R. testified appellant touched her “private place” with his finger “inside” her clothes, and he put his finger inside her private and “moved it.” Appellant “rubbed” the inside of C.R.'s private with his “private,” and made C.R. touch his private. Appellant told C.R. not to tell anyone or he would beat her. A few years after C.R., her twin sister, and her two brothers had been living with their aunt, C.R. told her aunt about the sexual abuse by appellant. C.R. testified she was about six years old when she told her aunt about the sexual abuse.
        Jacqueline Jackson testified C.R. and her siblings were placed in her home by Child Protective Services (CPS) after they were abandoned by appellant and Jackson's sister. While living with Jackson, C.R. and her siblings sometimes visited appellant at his home. Each time C.R. returned from a visit with appellant, C.R.'s “private” was “hurting,” C.R. rubbed her private area often, and C.R. had nightmares. Jackson testified she learned from another sister that “something” had happened between C.R. and appellant. After questioning C.R., Jackson contacted CPS. Jackson took C.R. to the hospital for a physical examination. Medical records of the examination were admitted into evidence.
        Deborah McGee testified one of her sisters was married to appellant. In 2002, when the sister was separated from appellant, the sister told McGee appellant had sexually abused C.R. McGee told Jackson, who had custody of C.R. and C.R.'s siblings. McGee testified C.R. is an honest and truthful child who does not get into trouble and is a good student.
        J.R. and N.R. are C.R.'s brothers. J.R., who was twelve years old at trial, testified that while he lived with appellant and his mother, appellant would come into the room where he and his siblings slept, remove C.R. from the bed, and take her back to appellant's room. Appellant did this “most nights,” and never took C.R.'s twin sister. After J.R. and his siblings went to live with Jackson, C.R. told J.R. what appellant had done to her when she went into appellant's bedroom. N.R., who was fourteen years old at trial, testified he saw appellant and his mother having sex on the living room floor while C.R. watched them. N.R. and his siblings slept in the same bed, which was separated from the living room by a “little wall thing.” At night, when he was supposed to be asleep, N.R. would look over the wall and see appellant and his mother having sex. C.R. was sitting on the couch watching them also. Sometimes C.R. fell asleep. Appellant would awaken C.R. and make her watch him. N.R. never saw appellant touch C.R., and N.R. never told anyone what he saw because he was afraid he would “get hit or something, getting in trouble.”
        Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient because: (1) C.R.'s testimony was not credible; (2) the physical examination showed no evidence of sexual abuse or intercourse; and (3) other witnesses' testimony was inconsistent and contradictory. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's convictions.
        Courts give wide latitude to testimony given by child victims of sexual abuse. See Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134. The trial judge heard C.R.'s testimony describing penetration. See id.; Luna v. State, 515 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). C.R. testified appellant put his penis and his finger in her vagina on more than one occasion. J.R. and N.R. testified appellant would take C.R. out of bed at night and take her into his bedroom. Jackson testified C.R. had nightmares and rubbed her “private” a lot each time she returned from visits with appellant. And McGee testified C.R.'s mother told her that appellant had sexually abused C.R. It was the trial judge's role to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The fact finder may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness's testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); McCray v. State, 861 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). Further, there is no requirement that the victim's testimony be corroborated by medical or physical evidence. See Garcia v. State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
        We conclude the evidence introduced embraced every essential element of the offense and is sufficient to support appellant's convictions. See Wright, 930 S.W.2d at 132. We overrule appellant's points of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          LINDA THOMAS
                                                          CHIEF JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
071084F.U05