DANIEL CORONADO-CALDERON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM as modified; Opinion issued May 28, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00974-CR
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DANIEL CORONADO-CALDERON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F06-73951-WP
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Whittington, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        Daniel Coronado-Calderon waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years. The trial judge assessed punishment at seventeen years' imprisonment. In two issues, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary and the judgment should be modified to reflect the name of the prosecutor at the punishment hearing. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.
        In his first issue, appellant asserts his guilty plea was involuntary because he believed he would receive deferred adjudication probation. During the plea hearing, the trial judge properly admonished appellant both orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictment, the punishment range for the offense, and that the judge could assess punishment anywhere within the punishment range. Appellant testified he understood the registration requirements for sex offenders, and that the only type of probation the trial judge could assess was deferred adjudication probation. Appellant testified he freely and voluntarily waived a jury trial and wanted to plead guilty. The trial judge passed the case for a presentence investigation report and sentencing.
        Nothing in the record shows appellant believed he would receive deferred adjudication. The fact that appellant received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his plea involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). We conclude appellant's guilty plea was voluntary. We resolve appellant's first issue against him.
        In his second issue, appellant asserts the trial court's judgment should be modified to reflect the correct name of the prosecutor at the punishment hearing. The State agrees the judgment should be modified to reflect the name of the prosecutor at the hearing.
        The record shows Glen Fitzmartin represented the State during the plea hearing and Rachael Jones represented the State during the punishment hearing. The trial court's judgment recites Marcia Taylor was the prosecutor representing the State. Thus, the trial court's judgment is incorrect. We sustain appellant's second issue on appeal.
        We modify the trial court's judgment to reflect the attorney for the State was Rachael Jones. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070974F.U05