IN THE MATTER OF S.G.V., A JUVENILE

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed July 25, 2008.
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00821-CV
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IN THE MATTER OF S.G.V., A JUVENILE
 
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On Appeal from the 304th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. JD-50159-W
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Bridges, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        On November 13, 2000, the trial court adjudicated S.G.V., a child, delinquent for committing two counts of aggravated sexual assault, one count of indecency with a child, and one count of injury to his four-year-old cousin. The trial court committed S.G.V. to the custody of the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) for a determinative period of forty years, with possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) Institutional Division. After a hearing on March 8, 2007, the trial court ordered S.G.V. transferred to TDCJ for completion of his sentence. S.G.V. appeals and argues in three issues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay records from TYC, abused its discretion in ordering the transfer, and did not conduct the transfer hearing within sixty days of TYC's request. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at the hearing are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's order.
        We review the trial court's decision to transfer appellant under an abuse of discretion standard. In re T.D.H., 971 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.). When deciding this issue, we review the entire record to determine if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. If some evidence supports the trial court's decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Id. We do not substitute our discretion, and reverse only if the trial court acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. Id.
        In making its decision, the trial court may consider: (1) the experiences and character of the person before and after commitment to TYC; (2) the nature of the penal offense and the manner in which the offense was committed; (3) the abilities of the person to contribute to society; (4) the protection of the victim of the offense or any member of the victim's family; (5) the recommendations of TYC and the prosecuting attorney; and (6) the best interests of the juvenile and any other relevant factors. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(k) (Vernon Supp. 2007); In re R.G., 994 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). Evidence of each listed factor is not required, and the trial court need not consider every factor. See In re R.G., 994 S.W.2d at 312. Further, the trial court may assign different weights to the factors it considers, and it may consider unlisted but relevant factors. Id.
        At a transfer hearing, “the court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, professional consultants, or employees of the Texas Youth Commission, in addition to the testimony of witnesses.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(d); In re F.D., 245 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). The transfer hearing is a “second chance hearing” after appellant has already been sentenced to a determinate number of years. It is not part of the guilt/innocence determination, and need not meet the extensive due process requirements of an actual trial. F.D., 245 S.W.2d at 113 (juvenile has no right of confrontation at a transfer hearing because it is dispositional rather than adjudicative in nature); In re D.S., 921 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
        Appellant's first issue challenges the trial court's admission, over his hearsay objection, of the summary report prepared by Leonard Cucolo and the TYC master file for appellant. Appellant argues Cucolo did not testify he was an employee of or affiliated with TYC and the documents were not authenticated as business records of TYC.
        The family code expressly authorizes the trial court to consider written reports of professional consultants or employees of TYC in addition to testimony of witnesses. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(d). The record contains several letters on TYC letterhead designating Cucolo as the agency's representative for the hearing and identifying him as its court liaison. Because the legislature has determined such reports may be considered in transfer hearings, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in overruling appellant's objections. See In re S.M., 207 S.W.3d 421, 424-25 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); In re D.L., 198 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied). We overrule appellant's first issue.        
        Appellant's second issue argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering his transfer to TDCJ. The record indicates appellant was able to complete the sex offender treatment program during his time at TYC. In 2005, appellant was initially classified at the highest level in TYC's classifications for academic, behavior, and correctional therapy, and he was transferred to another dorm and considered for release. However, his progress steadily declined thereafter. Appellant had 152 documented incidents of misconduct and had been placed in the security unit 24 times. The incidents included possession or use of a prescription medication not prescribed for him, attempted escape, possession or use of contraband tattooing supplies, and assault on a student. Appellant's caseworker noted that due to appellant's unwillingness to control his negative behaviors and his seeking of negative attention from his peers, he was unable to demonstrate consistent progress with the resocialization program. Cucolo testified TYC had attempted to work with appellant, but he no longer demonstrated a desire to improve. Appellant's behavior was beginning to disrupt the treatment of other students at TYC. In the opinion of TYC and the psychologist who evaluated appellant, he would pose a significant risk to the community if released.
        Appellant's psychologist testified he was at low or medium to low risk of repeating sexual violence and noted that his offenses during TYC were not of a sexual nature. However, he indicated appellant was at risk of seeking negative peer approval, and had low self-esteem and a need for acceptance. Appellant testified he was remorseful about what he did to his younger cousin and was determined to get better. Appellant's mother testified about her willingness to help appellant if he were released on parole. The victim's grandmother testified the victim, who was four at the time of the sexual assault, was ten or eleven and doing well physically and psychologically.
        Although appellant presented evidence of his progress and support from his family, there was other evidence of his deteriorating behavior, TYC's recommendation for transfer, and his continuing risk of following bad influences after release. Considering this and other evidence in the record, we conclude there is some evidence supporting the trial court's decision. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the transfer. See In re D.T., 217 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); In re J.L.C., 160 S.W.3d 312, 314 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). We overrule appellant's second issue.
        Appellant's third issue is not adequately briefed, Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h), but appears to claim the transfer hearing was not held within 60 days after the trial court received the referral request. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(h). The record indicates TYC's request was dated December 27, 2006, but was initially file-stamped with a date of January 8, 2006. At some point, the file-stamp was modified by striking 2006 and writing 2007 in its place, and initialed.   See Footnote 1  The transfer hearing was conducted on March 8, 2007. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court stated the hearing was being conducted within 60 days of TYC's request for a transfer hearing. Appellant's counsel, who is also counsel on appeal, stated on the record that it was his understanding the request “was filed back in [the] early part of January.” We overrule appellant's third issue.
        We affirm the trial court's order.
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
JIM MOSELEY
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE
 
 
 
 
070821F.P05
 
Footnote 1         Appellant asserts in his brief on appeal that this modification was made sometime after his June 11, 2007 request for preparation of the record. We have reviewed the record and find no support for this assertion.