ALISHA DAWN ALDRIDGE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued August 11, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-00777-CR
............................
ALISHA DAWN ALDRIDGE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F06-68452-W
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OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Whittington, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Morris
        A jury convicted Alisha Dawn Aldridge of murder. Now on appeal, she contends the evidence against her is legally and factually insufficient and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting her videotaped statement into evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Factual Background
        Appellant shot the deceased, her boyfriend of seven years, in the head with a shotgun. The nature of the wound indicated that the deceased had been shot at an extremely close range. When an officer approached appellant at the scene, she immediately asked whether she could see the deceased and whether he was alright. She told the officer she had not meant to hurt the deceased. Rather, she had just tried to scare him. Appellant told the officer that the deceased had lunged at her and the gun had fired. Afterward, the officer gave appellant her Miranda   See Footnote 1  warnings and continued to get information from her at the scene. She told the officer that when appellant started pushing her, she warned him that he “better not” come near her or she would shoot him. She said that the deceased had never been violent to her until that morning. The shotgun used in the offense belonged to appellant's father. That morning, appellant said, she took it from a closet and loaded it with one shot from the shells her father kept in a separate drawer.
        A little while later, the officer questioned appellant at the police station. At the time, she was under arrest for an unrelated offense. The officer first told her that the deceased had died. Appellant got onto the floor and cried for a long time before she was able to compose herself enough to speak. Eventually, she calmed herself. The officer again gave appellant the Miranda warnings, and she indicated that she wanted to talk. Appellant told the officer that she had slept the night before the offense, though she had not slept the previous night. She admitted that she had snorted methamphetamine on that previous night as well. She told the officer that she had been suicidal a couple of weeks before the offense and that she was supposed to be taking medication but was not taking it.
        Appellant repeated her claim that she had accidentally shot the deceased when the deceased lunged at her. She told the officer that she had a worse temper than the deceased. She also told the officer she loaded the shotgun just to scare the deceased. She claimed she had to load the gun to make the deceased believe her threat because he thought she lied about everything. According to appellant, she told the deceased that if he pushed her again she would shoot him, and he told her she should go ahead and put him out of his misery. At the time of the shooting, appellant and the deceased were living at appellant's parents' house. The parents were out of town when the offense occurred.
        Throughout the videotaped exchange, appellant is relatively composed, but obviously upset about the fact that she has killed her boyfriend. She interrupts the questioning often to express her shock and dismay. Nevertheless, she is able to explain to the officer the circumstances of the shooting at her parents' home and her efforts to try to get the deceased to stop using methamphetamine.
        A firearm and toolmark examiner testified for the State. She stated that the shotgun involved in the offense has a medium trigger pull. It requires between six and a half and seven pounds of pressure to fire the gun. The gun is manufactured to avoid an accidental discharge. To fire the weapon, the person operating it must “cock it, place it off safety, point it, and then pull the trigger.” When asked if the gun could discharge by accident, the expert testified that in her opinion, “the only way that that firearm is going to fire a cartridge or a shot shell is if the trigger is pulled to the rear and held.”
Discussion
        In her first two issues, appellant complains the evidence against her is legally and factually insufficient. She specifically contends the evidence fails to show she acted knowingly or intentionally in firing the shotgun. When reviewing challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The jury, as sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, is free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either side. See Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
        In a factual sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence to determine whether it is so weak that the jury's verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether, considering conflicting evidence, the verdict, though legally sufficient, is nevertheless against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A clearly wrong and manifestly unjust verdict shocks the conscience or clearly demonstrates bias. See id. In a factual sufficiency review, we may substitute our judgment for the jury's on the issues of the weight and credibility to be given to witness testimony only to a very limited degree. See Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
        Here, appellant claimed she accidentally shot the deceased when he lunged at her. The deceased's gunshot wound indicated that he was shot at an extremely close range. To fire the weapon, appellant had to have already loaded the gun, cocked it, and switched the safety to the off position. Her claim of an accidental firing is contradicted by the firearm expert's testimony that the trigger required at least six and a half pounds of pressure to fire the shotgun. The jury was entitled to disbelieve appellant's claim that the shooting was accidental. After reviewing all the record under the appropriate standards, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's murder conviction. We resolve appellant's first two issues against her.
        In her third issue, appellant complains the trial court abused its discretion in admitting her videotaped statement into evidence because she had not voluntarily waived her rights under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 before giving the statement. She claims in particular that her statement could not have been voluntary because at the time she gave it she was distraught, under the influence of methamphetamine, suffering from a lack of sleep, and not taking her medications, which caused her to feel suicidal. Appellant did not testify in support of these claims at the suppression hearing. The interrogating officer was the only witness called at the suppression hearing, and he testified he believed appellant voluntarily waived her rights and wanted to talk.
        At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of witnesses as well as the weight to be given their testimony. Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial judge may decide to believe or disbelieve any or all of a witness's testimony. We may not disturb any fact finding that is supported by the record. See id.
        After reviewing the record in this case, and the videotaped statement in particular, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. On the videotape, appellant does not appear overcome by fatigue or intoxication. She is obviously distraught about causing her boyfriend's death, but she is able to calm herself and clearly converse with the officer about the details surrounding the offense. She does not claim to be suicidal at that time. Appellant's third issue is without merit, and we resolve it against her.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JOSEPH B. MORRIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070777F.U05
 
Footnote 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 536 (1966).