JASRICUS ASJUAN SANDERS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED; Opinion Filed April 25, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00734-CR
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JASRICUS ASJUAN SANDERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F06-88952-R
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OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        Jasricus Asjuan Sanders waived a jury and pleaded guilty to sexual assault of a child. The trial court assessed punishment at twelve years' imprisonment. In two issues, appellant contends his guilty plea violates due process and the trial court's judgment should be modified to show the charge was not an aggravated charge. As modified, we affirm.
        In his first issue, appellant argues his guilty plea was involuntary and violated due process because he denied committing the offense. The State responds the trial court's acceptance of appellant's guilty plea does not violate due process and is supported by sufficient evidence.
        When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). If the trial court properly admonished the defendant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See id.
        The record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). During the plea hearing, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictment and the punishment range for the offense, and was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty to the offense. Appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was admitted into evidence. During the punishment phase, the trial court heard testimony from S.S., appellant's fifteen-year-old cousin, who testified appellant penetrated her anus and vagina with his penis. Appellant admitted he penetrated S.S.'s anus and vagina with his penis, but only because she “came on to him.” According to appellant, he was intoxicated from smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol and “blacked out.” S.S. unzipped appellant's pants, pulled them down, then sat on his lap, causing his penis to penetrate her anus and vagina. Appellant further testified that on two other occasions when he was intoxicated, he and S.S. had sex.
        Appellant now asserts that because he denied the voluntary nature of the charged conduct, his guilty plea was involuntary. Appellant judicially confessed to sexually assaulting S.S., as well as testified he was guilty of the offense. Appellant tried to minimize his culpability by testifying he was intoxicated and blacked out when he had sex with S.S. on more than one occasion. Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of a crime. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04(a) (Vernon 2003). We conclude appellant's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. We resolve appellant's first issue against him.
        In his second issue, appellant contends the judgment should be modified to reflect the offense for which he was convicted was not an aggravated offense. The State agrees the trial court's judgment should be modified to reflect the offense for which appellant was convicted was not an aggravated offense.
        Appellant was indicted for and convicted of sexual assault of a child. The trial court's judgment recites appellant was convicted of “sexual assault, child/A-V.” Thus, the trial court's judgment is incorrect. We sustain appellant's second issue on appeal.
        We modify the trial court's judgment to reflect the offense for which appellant was convicted is sexual assault of a child. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JIM MOSELEY
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
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