BONNIE KERL and EDWARD KERL, Appellants v. NOVASTAR MORTGAGE SVS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed August 14, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00229-CV
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BONNIE KERL and EDWARD KERL, Appellants
V.
NOVASTAR MORTGAGE SVS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the Dallas County Court at Law No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. cc-07-00850-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Richter and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Richter
        This is a forcible entry and detainer suit. After a trial de novo in Dallas County Court at Law No 4 (“County Court”), possession of a residence located at 1511 South Hampton Road in DeSoto, Texas (“Property”) was awarded to Novastar Mortgage SVS (“Novastar”). Representing themselves, Bonnie Kerl and Edward Kerl raise issues as to the validity of Novastar's notice to vacate and the property description contained in Novastar's Original Petition for Forcible Detainer (“FED Petition”). Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the County Court.
Background
 
        On December 19, 2002, the Kerls signed a promissory note payable to Novastar which was secured by a deed of trust on the Property. The Kerls defaulted and the note was accelerated. Novastar foreclosed and obtained the Property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. Pursuant to the deed of trust, once Novastar owned the Property, the Kerls became tenants at sufferance and could be evicted from the Property if they failed to leave after written notice to vacate. Novastar sent a notice to vacate to each of the Kerls at the Property. The record does not indicate whether the Kerls actually received the notice. Novastar then filed a forcible entry and deatiner (“FED”) suit in Dallas County Justice Court for Precinct 4, Place 1 (“Justice Court”) and received a judgment awarding it possession. The Kerls appealed the decision to Dallas County Court at Law No. 4 whereupon Novastar filed its FED Petition attaching copies of the substitute trustee's deed by which it obtained ownership, the note, the deed of trust, and the notice to vacate.
        The Kerls did not appear for trial and the County Court entered a default judgment awarding possession to Novastar. The Kerls now seek reversal and raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether Novastar's notice to vacate complies with the Texas Property Code   See Footnote 1 ; and (2) whether the FED Petition sufficiently describes the Property because the pleading itself only contains the Property's street address. Neither issue was raised in the trial court. The Kerls make no complaint as to entry of the default judgment.
Discussion
 
        Litigants choosing to appear pro se must comply with the applicable procedural rules and are held to the same standards that apply to licensed attorneys. Chandler v. Chandler, 991 S.W.2d 367, 379 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied). A pro se litigant is required to present his case properly on appeal, just as he is required to present his case properly to the trial court. Reynolds v. Wells Fargo, Nat Ass'n ex rel., Trustee for Freemont Inv. & Loan SABR 2005-FR1, 245 S.W.3d 57, 59-60 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.). In order to preserve error, an appellant must first raise the error before the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Brown v. Texas Bd. of Nurse Examiners, 194 S.W.3d 721, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
        The Kerls appealed the Justice Court's FED order to the County Court and then failed to appear at trial where the trial judge entered an order of possession to Novastar. Neither of the Kerls' issues were presented to the County Court and, accordingly, may not be adressed on appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. See Wells Fargo, 245 S.W.3d at 60 (where record contained no objection about a notice to vacate, any issue raised on appeal concerning the notice was not preserved). We overrule both issues.
Conclusion
 
        Having overruled both of the Kerls' issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARTIN RICHTER
                                                          JUSTICE
070229F.P05
 
Footnote 1 The Texas Property Code provides that a tenant at will or by sufferance is entitled to three days' written notice to vacate before the filing of a forcible detainer suit. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.005 (Vernon 2000). Notice may be given by regular, registered, or certified mail. Id.