HUMBLE WOODS, L.L.C., Appellant v. PETROHAWK ENERGY CORPORATION AND EAGLE GEOPHYSICAL, INC, Appellees

VACATE and REMAND in part, AFFIRM in part; Opinion issued October 23, 2007
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-06-01623-CV
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HUMBLE WOODS, L.L.C., Appellant
V.
PETROHAWK ENERGY CORPORATION AND
EAGLE GEOPHYSICAL, INC, Appellees
 
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On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 199-01572-06
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whittington, Wright, and FitzGerald
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        In this suit, we must determine whether the trial judge properly dismissed Humble Woods, L.L.C.'s lawsuit against Petrohawk Energy Corporation and Eagle Geophysical, Inc. for want of subject matter jurisdiction. In five issues, Humble claims the trial judge erred in dismissing Humble's claims (i) for conversion and injunctive relief against Petrohawk and Eagle, (ii) for tortious interference with a contract against Petrohawk for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (iii) against Eagle when Eagle filed no motion to dismiss; and (iii) against Petrohawk when Petrohawk's actions violating the temporary injunction coupled with Humble's motion for sanctions gave the trial court subject matter jurisdiction. We conclude the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Humble's claims for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and conversion against Petrohawk and Eagle. However, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Humble's claim for tortious interference with contract against Petrohawk. Therefore, we vacate that portion of the trial court's final judgment dismissing Humble's claim for tortious interference with contract and remand it to the trial court for further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
        Petrohawk sought to perform an oil and gas geophysical seismic survey on real property located in Louisiana. When Humble, the surface owner of the land, refused to permit any survey, Petrohawk sought to obtain the permission of eighty percent of the alleged owners of the outstanding mineral servitude as provided for under Louisiana law. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31:175 (2000). Humble then filed suit against Petrohawk, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. In its original petition, Humble alleged there were no outstanding mineral servitude owners and requested the court determine the rights of the parties with respect to the property. Humble later filed a supplemental petition seeking a temporary restraining order and a second supplemental petition suing Petrohawk and Eagle for conversion and Petrohawk for tortious interference with contract. Following the filing of Humble's second supplemental petition, Petrohawk filed a motion to dismiss. In the motion, Petrohawk alleged it owns an interest in the Louisiana property as do several “persons or entities not parties to” the suit, yet “Humble claims it is the owner of the minerals.” Petrohawk argued that because the core issue in Humble's lawsuit was the ownership of a mineral servitude, the Collin County District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The trial judge agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.
        A motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the functional equivalent to a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the trial court's authority to determine the subject matter of a cause of action. Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied); Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Anderson v. City of San Antonio, 120 S.W.3d 5, 7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied). See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000) (plea to jurisdiction is dilatory plea by which party challenges trial court's authority to determine subject matter of action). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002). In performing this review, we do not look to the merits of the plaintiff's case but consider only the pleadings and evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).
        “Texas courts may not adjudicate title to realty in another state or country; they do not have subject matter jurisdiction over property outside the state.” Trutec Oil & Gas, Inc. v. W. Atlas Int'l., Inc., 194 S.W.3d 580, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing Holt v. Guerguin, 106 Tex. 185, 189, 163 S.W. 10, 12 (1914)); see Miller v. Miller, 715 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Texas courts are without power or jurisdiction to adjudicate title to land in another state); Kelly Oil Co., Inc. v. Svetlik, 975 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) (same). A mineral servitude is “the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31:21 (2000). The general prohibition against determining rights in real property located in other states or countries extends to rights in oil and gas leases in other states or countries. See Trutec, 194 S.W.3d at 583 ; Kelly Oil, 975 S.W.2d at 764; Miller, 715 S.W.2d at 788-89. It follows that the prohibition also extends to mineral servitudes. See CLK Co. v. CXY Energy Inc., 719 So. 2d 1098, 1108-09 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring breach of contract claim alleging failure to convey mineral royalty interest to be filed according to real property venue statute, i.e., suit required to be filed in parish where property was situated), writ denied, 738 So. 2d 573, 573-74 (La. 1999).
        In this case, Humble initially sought a declaration of the relative rights of the parties and a temporary injunction preventing Petrohawk from performing seismic testing. In a supplemental pleading, Humble sued for conversion, alleging Petrohawk and Eagle “illegally trespassed and obtained entry” on Humble's land and, after “illegally obtain[ing] access to [Humble's] property . . . seized and converted valuable proprietary information lawfully belonging to [Humble].” Throughout its pleadings, Humble alleges there are no mineral owners other than Humble and that Petrohawk has not met the statutory requirements of Louisiana law with regard to obtaining permission to test from eighty percent of all mineral owners. In its motion to dismiss, Petrohawk alleges Humble “claims it is the owner of the minerals” under the property at issue in Louisiana while “Petrohawk claims that the true owners of the minerals are numerous other individuals and corporations who are not before the Court.”
        Whether Humble is entitled to injunctive relief or may proceed on its conversion claim depends on whether Humble owns more than twenty percent of the mineral servitude or whether the owners of the mineral servitude are, as Petrohawk alleges, “numerous other individuals and corporations.” Thus, the validity of Humble's claims hinges upon the existence and ownership of mineral servitudes in Louisiana. Because this involves an adjudication of title to realty in another state, the Collin County trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Humble's conversion claim or its claim for injunctive relief. And because Humble sought a determination of the parties' property rights, it follows that the trial court also lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Humble's request for declaratory judgment. We overrule Humble's first and fifth issues.         We reach a different conclusion, however, with Humble's claim of tortious interference with contract. According to Humble's second supplemental petition, Humble had contracted with a Louisiana attorney for representation in (i) general legal issues, (ii) an appeal in which Petrohawk was a successor in interest to the original defendant, and (iii) negotiations between Humble and Petrohawk related to an oil and gas lease on certain land. In February 2006, Petrohawk hired the same attorney to represent Petrohawk in a case in which Humble was not involved. The attorney continued to represent both Humble and Petrohawk until he withdrew from representing Humble on June 1, 2006. Thereafter, Humble sued Petrohawk for tortious interference with contract, alleging that Petrohawk induced the attorney to “breach his fiduciary duty . . . and withdraw from representation of [Humble].” This claim does not involve title to foreign property nor does it rely on a determination of realty ownership and rights. Therefore, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. We sustain Humble's second issue.
        In its third and fourth issues, Humble argues the trial court acquired subject matter jurisdiction when Petrohawk violated the court's injunction and that the trial judge erred in dismissing Humble's claims against Eagle when Eagle did not file a motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we decline to address these issues.
        To present an issue to this Court, a party's brief shall contain, among other things, a concise, nonargumentative statement of the facts of the case, supported by record references, and a clear and concise argument for the contention made with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Bare assertions of error, without argument or authority, waive error. See Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer, 943 S.W.2d 477, 486 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied). See also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (appellate court has discretion to waive point of error due to inadequate briefing). When a party fails to adequately brief a complaint, it waives the issue on appeal. Devine v. Dallas County, 130 S.W.3d 512, 513-14 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.); Howell v. T S Commc'ns, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
        Humble's third and fourth issues do not contain citation to legal authority, legal analysis, or a discussion to support the claims made therein. These issues fail to analyze, argue, or discuss how a court without subject matter jurisdiction could issue a valid injunction. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (judgment is void when it is apparent that court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of parties, no jurisdiction of subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter judgment, or no capacity to act as court). Nor do these issues address how the same court could subsequently acquire subject matter jurisdiction from the violation of the void injunction. In sum, Humble failed to provide us with argument, analysis, or authorities that make the appellate complaints under issues three and four viable. See Howell, 130 S.W.3d at 518. By failing to adequately brief these two complaints, Humble waived them. See Sullivan, 943 S.W.2d at 486 (concluding appellant had waived points not supported by argument and authority). We overrule Humble's third and fourth issues.
        Having concluded the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Humble's claim for tortious interference with a contract, we vacate that portion of the trial court's final judgment dismissing Humble's claim for tortious interference with a contract and, without addressing the merits of the claim, we remand it to the trial court for further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
061623F.P05