JAMES O'DELL WALTON, Appellant v. 203RD DISTRICT COURT, DPD CITY HALL POLICE DEPARTMENT, HONORABLE THOMAS B. THORPE, D. WINFIELD, LESLIE McFARLANE, CHRISTINE EASON, CATHERINE ZILAHY, JOHN CREUZOT, and JOHN NATION, Appellees

AFFIRMED; Opinion issued April 13, 2007
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-06-01460-CV
............................
JAMES O'DELL WALTON, Appellant
V.
203RD DISTRICT COURT, DPD CITY HALL POLICE DEPARTMENT,
HONORABLE THOMAS B. THORPE, D. WINFIELD, LESLIE McFARLANE,
CHRISTINE EASON, CATHERINE ZILAHY,
JOHN CREUZOT, and JOHN NATION, Appellees
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 193rd District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 06-05231-L
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Lang-Miers, and Mazzant
Opinion By Justice Mazzant
        James O'Dell Walton was convicted of burglary of a building in 1990 and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. See Walton v. State, 05-90-01012-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 4, 1991, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Appellant is still confined on that sentence. On June 1, 2006, he sued the 203rd District Court (the court in which he was convicted); the Honorable Thomas B. Thorpe (the judge presiding over appellant's trial); “DPD City Hall Police Department” (which appears to be the City of Dallas Police Department); assistant district attorneys D. Winfield, Leslie McFarlane, Christine Eason, and Catherine Zilahy; and his trial and appellate defense attorneys John Creuzot and John Nation. The trial court determined appellant's claims against these defendants were barred by limitations as well as judicial immunity, official immunity, governmental immunity, and res judicata, and the court dismissed the suit as frivolous. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in dismissing his suit. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        Appellant is representing himself, and his brief is not a model of clarity. Much of it deals with the facts of his underlying conviction or issues other than the reasons why the court dismissed the suit as frivolous. However, appellant does present some arguments relevant to the dismissal of his suit.
LIMITATIONS
        Appellant sued appellees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging their actions resulted in his wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Section 1983 does not contain a limitations period, so the courts apply the state statute of limitations. Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-86 (1980); Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006). In Texas, the limitations period for a personal injury lawsuit is two years. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Appellant's section 1983 cause of action accrued when appellant knew or had reason to know of the injury forming the basis of his claim. Price v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 431 F.3d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2005); Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1993). Appellant knew or should have known he had been wrongfully convicted and imprisoned when he was convicted and imprisoned in 1990. Appellant's claims, filed in 2006, are outside the two-year limitations period.
        Appellant asserts his claims are timely, arguing the limitations period is tolled during his imprisonment. However, imprisonment does not toll the running of the limitations period. Slack v. Carpenter, 7 F.3d 418, 419 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.001(a) (Vernon 2002) (legal disabilities tolling limitations are being younger than eighteen years of age and being of unsound mind). The trial court did not err in determining appellant's claims against all appellees were barred by limitations.
DISMISSAL AS FRIVOLOUS
        Inmate litigation, such as appellant's lawsuit, is subject to chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.002 (Vernon 2002). The trial court may dismiss a frivolous claim. Id. § 14.003(a)(2). A claim is frivolous when the realistic chance of ultimate success is slight or when it has no arguable basis in fact or law. Id. § 14.003(b)(1), (2).
        In this case, appellant's claims were barred by limitations. Thus, they had no arguable basis in fact or law and had no realistic chance of ultimate success. We hold the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's claims as frivolous. Because limitations supports the trial court's dismissal of appellant's claims as frivolous, we do not address appellant's other arguments because they are not necessary to the final disposition of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (opinion must address issues necessary to final disposition of appeal).
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          AMOS L. MAZZANT
                                                          JUSTICE
 
061460F.P05