BEVERLY KIRKPATRICK, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

REVERSE and RENDER and Opinion Filed April 17, 2007
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-06-01275-CR
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BEVERLY KIRKPATRICK, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court
Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 23337-86
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Wright, and FitzGerald
Opinion By Justice Wright
        Appellant appeals her conviction for falsely holding herself out as a lawyer. After the jury found appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at six years' confinement. In a single issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. Because we conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to show appellant falsely held herself out as a lawyer, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render a judgment of acquittal.
        To support appellant's conviction, the State was required to show that appellant, with intent to obtain an economic benefit for herself, held herself out as a lawyer, and that she was not licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or a foreign country. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.122 (Vernon 2003). To meet this burden, the State produced evidence showing that with the intent to obtain an economic benefit for herself, appellant sent a letter representing that she was Jon G. Burt, an attorney at law, and that appellant was not licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or a foreign country. Appellant does not dispute that she included a letter purportedly addressed to her and written by Jon G. Burt, an attorney, with papers she sent to Warren Samuelson, the dam safety program coordinator for the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. Nor does appellant dispute that she is not licensed to practice law. Rather, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient because including a letter addressed to herself, falsely purported to be written by an attorney, in a packet of papers does not constitute holding herself out as a lawyer. We agree.
        The statute does not define the phrase “holds himself or herself out as a lawyer.” Thus, we interpret undefined terms by their plain meaning and within the context in which they are used. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Ex parte Manrique, 40 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.). “Herself” is a pronoun defined as “identical female one.” Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 567 (1985). Thus, by its plain language the statute requires a person to in some way claim or present herself as a lawyer.
        Here, appellant forged a letter in the name of her attorney, Jon G. Burt, using Burt's letterhead. At the time, Burt represented appellant in a related civil property dispute. Appellant sent a package containing the forged letter to Samuelson at the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. The letter, purportedly sent to appellant by Burt, requests Samuelson to write a letter to Tom Snow, the court mediator, telling Snow that any changes to a dam must be approved by an engineer. The letter did not represent that appellant was Jon G. Burt, as alleged by the State in its indictment. Rather, appellant falsely claimed to have received a letter from Burt addressed to herself. Because she did not claim to be Burt, nor represent that she was an attorney, we cannot conclude the evidence shows appellant falsely held herself out as a lawyer. In making this conclusion, we are not suggesting that individuals may only violate the statute if they use their real name.   See Footnote 1  Rather, our conclusion is that to falsely hold oneself out as a lawyer, a person must in some way claim or present herself as an attorney regardless of what name she uses. We sustain appellant's sole issue.
        Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render a judgment of acquittal.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          CAROLYN WRIGHT
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
061275F.U05
 
Footnote 1 We are mindful of Gordon v. State, 2003 WL 22838732 (Tex. App.-Eastland, 2003. pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication), in which the Eastland court addressed Gordon's claim that trial counsel was ineffective by allowing him to plead guilty when his conduct did not meet the elements of falsely holding oneself out to be a lawyer. We express no opinion on the correctness of the case but conclude it is factually distinguishable. Gordon wrote a letter directly to one of his creditors and signed the name of the attorney representing him at the time. Id. at * 3. In contrast, appellant wrote a letter to herself using Burt's name and then forwarded it to Samuleson. Because Gordon is factually distinguishable, we conclude it is not applicable in this case.