VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL and INTER-UNIVERSITY MICRO- ELECTRONICS CENTER, Appellants v. MRT INC, d/b/a INTERNATIONAL MAGNETIC TECHNOLOGIES INC., THE ROSE GROUP, INC., HUBERT FLAMANT, AND ELISABETH FLAMANT, Appellees

REVERSE and RENDER in part, AFFIRM in part and Opinion Filed August 3, 2005
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-04-01553-CV
............................
 
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL and INTER-UNIVERSITY MICRO- ELECTRONICS CENTER, Appellants
 
V.
MRT INC, d/b/a INTERNATIONAL MAGNETIC TECHNOLOGIES INC., THE ROSE GROUP, INC., HUBERT FLAMANT, AND ELISABETH FLAMANT, Appellees
 
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 03-4733-H
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Richter, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Richter
        In this interlocutory appeal, appellants Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and Inter- University Micro-Electronics Center (IMEC) challenge the trial court's order denying their special appearances. Each appellant asserts that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas based upon either general or specific jurisdiction. We reverse the trial court's order denying VUB's special appearance and render judgment dismissing the cause against VUB for lack of personal jurisdiction. However, we conclude that the trial court has general jurisdiction over IMEC and affirm the trial court's denial of its special appearance.
BACKGROUND
 
         VUB is a private Flemish university located in Brussels, Belgium. IMEC is a private Belgian research and development center in the fields of microelectronics and information and communications technology. It has partnership agreements with several leading companies in the Texas semiconductor industry. IMEC also has charter agreements with several Belgian universities, including VUB. Under these agreements, IMEC (1) trains university professors in order to support university research in the area of microelectronics and (2) funds specific research projects performed at the various universities. Roger Vounckx, a VUB professor, participated in IMEC-funded research and the development of new technologies under IMEC's charter agreement with VUB .
        In 1995, Ivan Darius, chief technical officer of appellee International Magnetic Technologies, introduced Vounckx to appellee Hubert Flamant at a meeting in Belgium. At that time, Vounckx and Flamant discussed creating a new company to market new technologies. Less than a year later, Flamant created Rose Research, a now defunct Texas partnership located in Dallas County, for the purpose of marketing microelectronics technologies. Vounckx and Darius became the managing partners of the company. In addition, Vounckx served as chief technical officer. In April 1998, Vounckx asked VUB to reduce him to part-time status so that he could pursue his “second job” with Rose Research. VUB granted his request and reduced his salary accordingly .
        On several occasions, Flamant suggested ending the venture because of the company's lack of commercial success , but appellees continued to fund Rose Research based on the representations of Vounckx and Darius regarding the imminent marketability of various technologies. Shortly after funding for Rose Research was finally put on hold in 2001, Vounckx resigned his position with the company and returned to full-time employment with VUB.
        Claiming that Darius and Vounckx had made various misrepresentations that induced them to invest over $3 million in Rose Research, appellees sued Darius, Vounckx, VUB, and IMEC, for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. Both VUB and IMEC contested personal jurisdiction. In response, appellants filed over 3700 pages of documents obtained from both VUB and IMEC through the discovery process. After a hearing, the trial court denied both special appearances without explanation. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
 
THE LAW
 
 
 
        A Texas court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with constitutional guarantees of due process. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990). The long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that does business in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042. In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a nonresident does business in Texas if he commits a tort in whole or in part in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042(2). The broad language of the Texas long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) .
        Federal due process requirements mandate that the defendant must have purposefully established minimum contacts with Texas such that the nonresident could reasonably anticipate being sued in Texas. See National Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1995). Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is constitutional when:
1. The quality and quantity of defendant's business in Texas has conferred on Texas courts either:
 
        a. Specific jurisdiction, which is established when the defendant purposefully did some act or completed some transaction in Texas that gave rise to or was connected with plaintiff's cause of action; or
 
        b. General jurisdiction, which is established when the defendant had continuing and systematic contacts with Texas even if the cause of action did not arise from or relate to activities conducted with the forum state; and
 
2. The assumption of jurisdiction by Texas courts does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
 
BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795-96 (Tex. 2002).
Plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to bring nonresident defendant within provisions of the long-arm statute. Hotel Partners v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 847 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied). When a nonresident defendant challenges a trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction through a special appearance, it carries the burden of negating all bases for personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. 1985).          On appeal, the reviewing court conducts a factual sufficiency review of all the evidence before the trial judge on the question of jurisdiction. Hotel Partners v. Craig, 993 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, pet. denied). Once all factual disputes are resolved , the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's order denying a special appearance is de novo. BMC, 83 S.W.3d at 794.
                                         VUB
 
        In its sole issue on appeal, VUB argues that it is subject to neither specific nor general jurisdiction. We agree.        
        As evidence to support its special appearance, VUB filed the affidavits of Vounckx and VUB Rector Benjamin Van Camp and an excerpt from Vounckx's oral deposition. Vounckx and Van Camp each testified under oath that VUB was in no way involved in the formation, funding, or development of Rose Research and that Vounckx had acted in his individual capacity during his relationship with Rose Research.
         Specific jurisdiction : course of employment and agency
 
        Appellees' lawsuit claimed that Vounckx made misrepresentations to them on six separate occasions between February 1998 and November 2000:
1.
 
On February 15, 1998, Vounckx and Darius claimed that Rose Research would stay within its $1.8 million budget and that PhotonLink, a new type of information processor, was market-ready.
 
2.
 
On June 1, 1998, Vounckx and Darius described current VUB technology and represented that Rose Research had prototyped a millimeter wave technology in a written memo to Flamant.
 
         3.
 
On June 5, 1998, Vounckx met with Flamant and represented that the contents of the memo were true.         
 
4.
 
On February 15, 1999, Vounckx and Darius represented that Rose Research would generate revenue imminently if Flamant could secure additional funding.
 
5
 
On October 27, 1999, Vounckx and Darius represented that a newly developed DVD technology was ready to market and that the PhotonLink technology would generate revenue within months.
 
6.
 
On October 15, 2000, Vounckx and Darius represented that revenue generation was imminent.
 
 
Appellees also claimed that Vounckx breached his fiduciary duty with respect to his management of Rose Research. According to appellees, Vounckx was acting on VUB's behalf as an employee and/or agent when these torts were committed .
        Before a court may exercise specific jurisdiction, it must determine that the litigation has resulted from injuries to the plaintiff arising from or relating to the nonresident defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum state . American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002) . Thus, we must review the record for evidence that Vounckx committed these torts in Texas while he was acting within the scope of his employment with VUB or as VUB's agent in some manner.
Course and Scope of Employment
        As a general rule, an employer is liable for its employee's torts only when the tortious act falls within the scope of the employee's general authority in furtherance of the employer's business and for the accomplishment of the objective for which the employee was hired. Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2002). It is not enough that the employee is on the employer's payroll or clock when the acts are committed. See Moser v. Davis, 79 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.). To be within the scope of employment, the conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the authorized conduct. Minyard, 80 S.W.3d at 577. If an employee deviates from the performance of his duties for his own purposes, the employer is not responsible for what occurs during that deviation. Id.
        The record reflects that Vounckx was a member of VUB's Independent Academic Personnel at the time he became involved with the appellees in 1995. His university duties remained the same throughout the period of his relationship with the appellees: teaching, performing scientific research, and rendering services in the scientific fields of electronics and physics. As a researcher for VUB, Vounckx developed microelectronics technology.          The alleged misrepresentations and breach of fiduciary duty occurred while Vounckx was acting as managing partner and chief technical officer of Rose Research, which was formed to market technology. However, marketing was not within Vounckx's university job description. At the time Rose Research was created, VUB had no policy in place under which it would receive a pecuniary interest in the technologies developed by its researchers. Thus, any VUB researcher, whether actually employed by VUB or stationed at VUB on a government grant, was free to sell the rights to his technology in his individual capacity. In fact, the record reflects that other researchers associated with VUB assigned their rights in certain inventions to Rose Research in exchange for a percentage of net revenues derived from marketing the inventions. VUB was not a party to any of these agreements.
        The record shows that Vounckx initiated his relationship with appellees to market his technology. In his letter requesting that VUB reduce him to part-time status, Vounckx indicated that he had been involved in the formation of Rose Research to market the technology developed under his supervision at VUB. The record further reflects that, once Rose Research was formed, Vounckx acted within the course and scope of his Rose Research employment in marketing his own technologies and, later, in marketing other European developments as well.
        According to the record, VUB's only contact with Rose Research was through the 1996 consulting agreement between Rose Research and VUB. This agreement provided that VUB would provide scientific and technical assistance from its laboratory in Brussels to Rose Research in the field of electronics and information technologies. Pursuant to the agreement, VUB handed over the ownership of all technology, confidential information, and techniques developed in the process. In turn, Rose Research promised to reserve 25% of profits from commercializing the technology for further research in joint consultation with VUB . Thus, any duties performed by Vounckx in the course of his employment with VUB pursuant to this agreement would have been in the nature of research and technical assistance, and any duties performed in the course of his employment with Rose Research would have involved marketing-thus, Vounckx's references to wearing “two hats.”
        Appellees primarily attempt to support their assertion that Vounckx was acting within the course and scope of his employment by claiming that VUB promoted Vounckx because he obtained funding from Rose Research. Vounckx testified in deposition that “contract research with third parties” was the third and smallest factor in his promotion at VUB. The record clearly reflects that he is referring to the 1996 consulting agreement between Rose Research and VUB. The record shows that VUB received two payments for its performance under the consulting agreement. Those fees were paid by Rose Research to VUB's account in Brussels.
         According to appellees, VUB encouraged, promoted, and ratified any misrepresentations that induced appellees to continue funding Rose Research by including these activities in Vounckx's employment evaluation and promotion. But this is not the funding that VUB considered with respect to Vounckx's promotion. Appellees confuse their own funding of Rose Research to ensure its continued existence with the funding of VUB research through the consulting agreement. Thus, even if Vounckx's promotion was based in any manner upon the consulting agreement, this does not show that Vounckx was acting within the scope of his employment with VUB when he allegedly made misrepresentations to appellees that resulted in the funding of Rose Research.
        Appellees also assert that VUB's reimbursement of travel expenses and telephone bills shows that Vounckx was acting within the course and scope of his employment with VUB. Appellees refer us to a number of travel receipts and payment orders that were produced by VUB and attached as exhibits to their response to VUB's special appearance. The majority of these are written in Dutch and are entitled “Betalingsopdracht.” The remaining documents are written in either French or English. Those in English appear to be translations of the original Dutch documents and do not have signatures.         Although the payment orders for travel reimbursement contain the words “Dallas” and “Vounckx,” there is nothing to show that the travel was related to Rose Research. Several of the exhibits have such references as “Photonics in Computing” and “Collaboration IMEC VUB,” but nothing refers to Rose Research. And there are a number of payment orders that reflect other destinations in addition to Dallas, such as Chicago, Ottawa, Geneva, Zurich, and San Jose. Likewise, the phone bills reflect calls made by Vounckx to locations all over the world, and there is nothing to show nature of the calls made to the United States. The exhibits simply do not show whether Vounckx was being reimbursed for contacts made as a VUB researcher or as a Rose Research employee. If VUB reimbursed costs incurred while Vounckx was acting in the role of VUB researcher, this would do nothing to demonstrate that he was acting within the course and scope of his employment when he allegedly made misrepresentations to appellees and mismanaged Rose Research.         
        Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there is not sufficient evidence that Vounckx committed the alleged torts in Texas while he was acting within the scope of his employment with VUB. The record reflects that if any torts were committed they were committed in the context of marketing, which was clearly outside the scope of Vounckx's employment with VUB. We must now determine whether there is evidence of any other type of agency relationship between Vounckx and VUB.
 
Other agency relationship
        An actual agency relationship may be established by either an express or implied agreement between the agent and the principal. Coffey v. Fort Wayne Pools, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 671, 677 (N.D. 1998). It is essential to an agency relationship that the principal have the right to assign the agent's task and to control the means and details of the process by which the agent will accomplish the task. Walker v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 828 S.W.2d 442, 452 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied). Thus, if a person acts on behalf of-but not under the control of-another, then an agency relationship does not exist. Id. The fact of employment, standing alone, does not clothe the employee with the powers of an agent. See Duke v. State, 725 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd).
        There is no evidence of an express agency agreement between Vounckx and VUB with respect to funding and management of Rose Research . There is no evidence that VUB authorized or instructed Vounckx to approach appellees, to form Rose Research, to market technology developed at VUB, or to represent to appellees that he was acting on behalf of VUB. Thus, we must determine if an implied agency agreement existed between Vounckx and VUB by considering VUB's right to control Vounckx's dealing with appellees. See Coffey, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (the relationship between the alleged principal and agent is dispositive in determining whether an implied agency relationship existed).
         Because the underlying litigation resulted from Vounckx's alleged misrepresentations to obtain funding from appellees to sustain Rose Research and his alleged mismanagement of the company, we must determine whether VUB had the right to control Vounckx's conduct in the funding and management of Rose Research. We have reviewed the record and have found no evidence of such control by VUB. Indeed, VUB reduced Vounckx's role to part-time at Vounckx's request so that he could pursue his “second job.” There is no evidence that VUB educated, trained, or authorized Vounckx to manage Rose Research. There is no evidence that VUB had any control over Vounckx's day-to-day dealings with appellees or with Rose Research or that VUB was ever formally apprised of the details of his work in funding or managing Rose Research . The only contact that VUB had with Rose Research was the consulting agreement, which had nothing to do with the financing or management of Rose Research.
        On appeal, appellees' argument that VUB had the right to control Vounckx in his role at Rose Research rests solely on VUB's promotion of Vounckx. As we discussed above, the promotion was partially based on Vounckx's role in obtaining funding from Rose Research, not for Rose Research, through the 1996 consulting agreement. While VUB had control over Vounckx's research in the university's laboratory in Brussels pursuant to the consulting agreement, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that this control extended over Vounckx's performance in managing or financing Rose Research.
        Because the record does not show that Vounckx acted under the control of VUB, we cannot conclude that an actual agency relationship existed between Vounckx and VUB. Therefore, the record does not support appellees' assertion that Vounckx's contacts with Texas can be imputed to VUB based on the course and scope of his VUB employment or under some other agency principle. As such, VUB did not purposefully avail itself of this forum and could not have reasonably expected the call of a Texas court based upon Vounckx's conduct. See Guardian Royale, 815 S.W.2d at 228 (the nonresident defendant's contact must result from its purposeful contact, not the unilateral activity of the plaintiff or a third party). Thus, even if Texas could obtain specific jurisdiction over Vounckx as a result of his conduct, Vounckx's contact with Texas cannot be used as a basis for obtaining specific jurisdiction over VUB.
Specific jurisdiction : other contacts with Texas
 
        Appellees also contend that VUB's 1996 consulting agreement with Rose Research constitutes sufficient contact with Texas to establish specific jurisdiction. We disagree.
        When specific jurisdiction is asserted, the minimum contacts analysis focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Fisher Ins. Agency, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). Specific jurisdiction is established when the alleged liability arises from activity conducted within or “purposefully directed” toward the forum state. Blair Communications, Inc. v. SES Survey Equip. Servs., Inc. 80 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) .
        VUB signed the consulting agreement in Belgium, and its performance under the agreement took place entirely in Belgium. None of the appellees was party to the consulting agreement. And Vounckx did not sign on behalf of either VUB or Rose Research. The agreement contains a forum selection provision requiring disputes to be resolved in Brussels, Belgium.
        VUB could not have reasonably foreseen being haled into a Texas court based solely on the consulting agreement. See Guardian Royale, 815 S.W.2d at 227 (the concept of foreseeability is implicit in the requirement that there be a substantial connection between the nonresident defendant and Texas arising from actions or conduct of the nonresident defendant purposefully directed toward Texas). Merely entering into a single contract with a Texas resident does not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement . See Blair Communications, 80 S.W.3d at 729. And, appellees' alleged injuries are in no way related to the consulting agreement. See Coleman, 83 S.W.3d at 806. Accordingly, we do not agree that these “additional Texas contacts” establish specific jurisdiction.
        Having concluded that VUB is not subject to specific jurisdiction, we must determine if it is subject to general jurisdiction.
 
General jurisdiction
 
        In its response to VUB's special appearance, appellees did not contend that VUB's contacts with Texas were substantial, continuous, and systematic. Indeed, our review of the record shows that VUB was not generally present in Texas and, as such, was not subject to general jurisdiction . The record does not reflect that VUB (1) has ever been licensed or qualified to do business in Texas, (2) has any employees, offices, or bank accounts in Texas, (3) has a mailing address or a telephone number in Texas, (4) pays taxes in Texas, (5) owns real or personal property in Texas, (6) advertises in Texas, or (7) has a registered agent for service of process in Texas.         Instead, appellees argued to the trial court that “the intertwined, convoluted web of relationships” between IMEC and VUB and “the existence of an 'IMEC-VUB' hybrid entity” created an agency relationship between IMEC and VUB so that VUB was vicariously involved in and responsible for all of IMEC's contacts in Texas. Accordingly, we must determine whether there is evidence of an agency relationship between the two entities that would subject VUB to general jurisdiction.
        In its reply to VUB's special appearance, appellees listed the following general categories of documents as establishing an agency relationship between VUB and IMEC:
1.
 
Over-arching master agreements regarding VUB-IMEC collaborations;
 
2.
 
Agreements providing for joint ownership and valorization rights in certain jointly-developed intellectual property and related patents;
 
3.
 
Partnerships often involving other parties to conduct research and development; and
 
4.
 
Consulting agreements and similar arrangements whereby they share employees.
 
Appellees further cite to specific documents and deposition testimony . Having reviewed the documents and testimony, we cannot agree with the appellees that these establish that IMEC was VUB's agent in Texas.
        Nothing in any of these documents indicates that VUB ever established an agency relationship by exercising control over IMEC. Instead, the documents clearly establish that VUB and IMEC are two separate legal entities with clearly defined relationships pursuant to the written terms of each document. Accordingly, VUB did not purposefully avail itself of the Texas forum through an agency relationship with IMEC and could not have anticipated being haled into a Texas court as a result of IMEC's actions. See Guardian Royale, 815 S.W.2d at 227 . From the record before us, we conclude that VUB did not, as appellees claimed, establish sufficient minimum contacts vicariously through IMEC's activities to subject it to general jurisdiction.
        Having concluded that VUB is not subject to either specific or general jurisdiction, we sustain its sole issue.
IMEC
        In its sole issue on appeal, IMEC argues that it is subject to neither specific nor general jurisdiction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that IMEC is subject to general jurisdiction.
        The record shows that IMEC (1) has never been licensed or qualified to do business in Texas, (2) does not have any employees, offices, or bank accounts in Texas, (3) does not have a mailing address or a telephone number in Texas, (4) pays no taxes in Texas, (5) owns no real or personal property in Texas, (6) does not advertise in Texas, (7) does not have a registered agent for service of process in Texas, and (8) has never filed a lawsuit in Texas .
        However, the record also shows that IMEC executed multiple documents with Texas entities, including SEMATECH, Texas Instruments, Motorola, and Photronics. These agreements provided for the sharing of information, equipment, materials, and, in some cases, employees in the development and application of new technology. Some of the agreements were firm fixed-price contracts that provided for scheduled milestone payments to IMEC. Others were affiliation agreements that charged a program entrance fee and subsequent annual affiliation fees. IMEC's records reveal that its revenue from these agreements steadily increased over the years, from 320,898 Euros in 1996 to 11,070,315 Euros in 2003.
        The record specifically reflects that over forty documents, including contracts involving research projects and addenda modifying these contracts, were executed by IMEC and the Texas entities between 1994 and 2004 . SEMATECH was involved with IMEC on five projects, signing nine contracts and seven addenda between 1998 and 2004. The last contract terminated on January 31, 2005. Texas Instruments' association with IMEC began in May of 1994. TI signed thirteen contracts and four addenda. One contract does not terminate until 2006. Motorola signed a single contract in 2000 and an addendum that extended its affiliation with IMEC through the end of 2004. Photronics signed two contracts and four addenda. Its association with IMEC lasted over six years, from 1998 to 2004. At the time appellees filed suit in May of 2003, IMEC had at least one agreement in effect with each of the four Texas entities .
         Further, IMEC employees have traveled from Belgium to Texas on IMEC business approximately twenty-five times per year since 1999, and IMEC reimbursed them for their travel-related expenses. IMEC employees from IMEC's office in San Jose, California also travel to Texas three to six times per year.
Minimum contacts
        When an entity purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The partnership agreements indicate that IMEC expected to raise revenue from its activities in Texas, and the record reflects that it did, in fact, benefit from its relationships with the Texas entities. IMEC could have reasonably assumed that a Texas court might call. See General Electric Co. v. Brown & Ross Intern. Distributors, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
        A pattern of continuing and systematic activity will subject a foreign entity to general jurisdiction. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 359. Although not physically present in Texas, IMEC established extensive contacts with several Texas entities in joint research projects that spanned nearly a decade. These relationships, along with the repeated visits to Texas by IMEC employees, cannot be considered random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts. See CSR, Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1996). Because it deliberately engaged in continuous and systematic activities here, IMEC should be subject to general jurisdiction by Texas courts. See General Electric Co., 804 S.W.2d at 531.
Fair play
         In analyzing the requirement of fair play and substantial justice, we must consider: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 232. Only in rare cases will the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play and substantial justice when the defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state. Id. at 231. Thus, when such contacts exist, a defendant must present a compelling case that the existence of other factors would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Id.
        IMEC has not presented that rare case here. First, IMEC asserts that it would be unduly burdened by being forced to litigate here because all of its records are located in Belgium and a substantial number of them are written in Dutch. And it claims that the vast majority of its party and non-party witnesses are also located in Belgium and are not native English speakers. However, we note that IMEC has already produced a large number of documents during discovery. A significant number of these are in English. Also, the depositions and affidavits of Gilbert Deckerck, president of IMEC, and Johan Van Helleputte, vice-president for strategic development for IMEC, are in English. A number of the partnership agreements with Texas entities provide that all communication will be in English. And IMEC maintains an office in California. Thus, communication in English does not seem to impose an unreasonable burden on IMEC. Further, the record shows that IMEC employees travel on a regular basis to world-wide destinations and are compensated for their travel expenses. IMEC presents nothing to show that travel to Texas to defend the lawsuit would be unduly burdensome.
        Furthermore, Texas has an interest in resolving this dispute because appellees are Texas residents, one of the defendants is a Texas resident, the alleged misrepresentations were directed at appellees in Texas, and Texas partnership Rose Research was allegedly mismanaged. Additionally, appellees also sued Belgium resident Vounckx, who did not challenge the jurisdiction of Texas. We conclude that IMEC has not shown the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable under the facts of this case.
        Accordingly, we resolve IMEC's sole issue against it.
                 CONCLUSION
 
         Having sustained VUB's sole issue, we reverse the trial court's order denying VUB's special appearance and render judgment dismissing the cause against VUB for lack of personal jurisdiction. Having overruled IMEC's sole issue on appeal , we affirm the trial court's order denying IMEC's special appearance.
 
                                                          
                                                          MARTIN RICHTER
                                                          JUSTICE         
041553F.P05                 .