IN THE INTEREST OF V.D.P., A CHILD

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed February 28, 2005
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-04-00128-CV
............................
IN THE INTEREST OF V.D.P., A CHILD
 
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 03-20286-S
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Richter, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Richter
         Reynaldo Christopher Paniagua appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to his daughter, V.D.P. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
 
        Paniagua and his wife Cynthia were divorced in 1998. The final divorce decree appointed Cynthia sole managing conservator of their daughter, V.D.P. Paniagua was appointed possessory conservator with the right to supervised visitation with the child and the obligation to pay child support.
        In 2000, Cynthia married Ronnie Fernando Buentello. About two years later, the couple filed suit in Tarrant County seeking to terminate Paniagua's parental rights to V.D.P. and to allow Mr. Buentello to adopt the child. Paniagua, who was incarcerated, filed a response that included a general denial, request for appointment of an attorney, and motion for a bench warrant to appear at trial to contest the termination of his parental rights. The case was subsequently non-suited without prejudice by agreed order in 2003.
         The Buentellos later filed a second petition in Tarrant County, along with a motion to transfer the suit to Dallas County. Still incarcerated, Paniagua sent a “written answer” to the Tarrant County district clerk acknowledging notice of the second suit and requesting copies of his pleadings from the previous suit so that he could re-file them. The Tarrant County court subsequently granted the motion to transfer , and the district clerk sent Paniagua a copy of the transmittal letter that accompanied the pleadings provided to the Dallas County court. This letter showed that Paniagua's only filing in the second suit was his answer.
         When the date for final trial was set, Paniagua was given more than fifty days' notice . At the trial, only Cynthia testified regarding the petition for termination. She stated that Paniagua had used controlled substances during their marriage in a manner that endangered the health and safety of V.D.P. and that he had failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program. According to Cynthia, Paniagua had neither seen V.D.P. following the divorce nor provided for her support as ordered by court in the divorce decree. Cynthia further testified that Paniagua, who was currently incarcerated, had been convicted for burglary of a habitation, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery, all presumably committed to support his drug habit. She stated that Paniagua would not be eligible for release from prison until November 1, 2007. The trial court granted the petition for termination of Paniagua's parental rights .         The court then heard testimony from both of the Buentellos regarding the issue of adoption. Finding that the requirements for adoption had been met and that the adoption was in the best interest of the child, the court granted Mr. Buentello's application to adopt V.D.P.
        On appeal, Paniagua claims that the trial court violated his right of due process by terminating his parental rights without supporting evidence and by denying his right to be present during the proceedings. Paniagua also challenges the jurisdiction of the Dallas County court and the granting of Mr. Buentello's adoption application.
         I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
 
        A trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if the fact finder determines that a parent committed one or more of the acts contained in section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon 2002). Due process requires that each finding be based on clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(a) (Vernon 2002); In re K.C.P., 142 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.). “Clear and convincing evidence” means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (Vernon 2002).
        The petition for termination of Paniagua's parental rights alleged that he had committed several of the acts enumerated in section 161.001(1) and that termination was in the best interest of V.D.P. On appeal, Paniagua complains that there was no evidence to support the trial court's findings that he committed any of these alleged acts. Specifically, he contends that the trial court violated his right of due process because it “ mer ely accepted the allegations falsely alleged against him.” Paniagua appears to challenge only the legal sufficiency of the evidence; however, in the interest of justice, we will review the evidence for both legal and factual sufficiency.
        In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a termination finding, this court looks at all the evidence, in the light most favorable to the finding, to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). In doing so, we presume that the fact finder settled disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable fact finder could do so. Id. As a corollary, we disregard all evidence Dupree v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs,, 907 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the dispositive findings, we uphold the findings. Id. --that a reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved or found incredible. Id. Termination findings must be upheld against a factual sufficiency challenge if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002).
        Here, the trial court's order terminating Paniagua's parental rights found that he had committed all of the alleged acts. The trial court likewise found that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of V.D.P. Because Paniagua does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's best-interest finding, we will address only the finding that Paniagua committed one of the enumerated acts.
        We will first review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding that Paniagua engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon 2002). Cynthia's testimony indicated that Paniagua's use of controlled substances resulted in court- ordered treatment for substance abuse. From this, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Paniagua's continued involvement with controlled substances constituted a course of conduct that endangered the well-being of V.D.P. See Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987) (to constitute endangerment, a parent's conduct need not be directed at the child or result in injury to the child; specific danger to the child's well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone); In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty or instability endangers the child's well-being; therefore, drug use may establish an endangering course of conduct). Furthermore, the trial court could have inferred that Paniagua's course of misconduct continued with his failure to complete the court-ordered treatment program and with the commission of crimes that resulted in his incarceration. See In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (instability and incarceration can be part of a continuing course of conduct supporting termination under subsection E).
        After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding under subsection E. Cynthia's testimony about Paniagua's drug use presents more than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court's finding that Paniagua engaged in a continuing course of conduct that endangered the well-being of V.D.P. And, after hearing this uncontroverted testimony, the trial court--A reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Paniagua's drug use endangered the child. See Southwestern Bell Media, Inc. v. Lyles, 825 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (the fact finder may consider the facts and circumstances in connection with the testimony of each witness and accept or reject all or part of that testimony). As such, the court did not violate Paniagua's due process rights in finding that he had endangered the well-being of V.D.P.
        Because one of the grounds for termination is supported by the evidence, we need not conduct a sufficiency review of any other ground enumerated in the court's order. See Avery v. State, 963 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ) (when multiple grounds for termination are alleged and found valid, the termination order must be upheld if any of the grounds are supported by the evidence).
        We overrule Paniagua's first issue.
         II. PANIAGUA'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE PROCEEDINGS
 
        Paniagua argues that the trial court violated his right to be present at the trial proceedings. Specifically, he claims that the trial court failed to honor his request for a bench warrant so that he could be present at the final termination proceeding.
        It is well-established that litigants cannot be denied access to the courts simply because they are inmates. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984). However, an inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person in every court proceeding. Zuniga v. Zuniga, 13 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.). Instead, the inmate's right of access to the courts must be weighed against the protection of our correctional system's integrity. Jones v. Jones, 64 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.). Because a prisoner has no absolute right to be present in a civil action, it follows that the prisoner requesting a bench warrant must justify the need for his presence. Pedraza v. Crossroads Sec. Sys., 960 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).
        Here, there is nothing in the record before us that shows that Paniagua ever requested issuance of a bench warrant from the Dallas County court or that he filed any other pleadings with that court. The record clearly reflects that Paniagua knew that he would need to re-file his motion for issuance of a bench warrant in the second suit and that the suit had been transferred to Dallas County with only his original answer among the filed pleadings. Further, the record demonstrates that Paniagua received sufficient notice of the final hearing.         If an inmate fails to sufficiently justify the need for his presence at trial, a trial court does not have a duty to go beyond a bench warrant request and independently inquire into the necessity of an inmate's appearance. In re Z.L.T, 124 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 2003). Logically, neither is the trial court required to issue a bench warrant for an inmate who fails to request one or to otherwise notify the court of his desire to appear. See Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ) (holding that when an inmate makes the trial court aware of his desire to appear, the court must directly address the issue of his appearance in court). Because Paniagua did not make the court aware that he wanted to appear at trial, we cannot conclude that the trial court violated Paniagua's due process rights by conducting the trial without his presence.
        We overrule Paniagua's second issue.
III. PANIAGUA'S OTHER CHALLENGES
 
        Paniagua also challenges (1) the jurisdiction of the Dallas County court to terminate his parental rights and (2) the court's decision to grant Mr. Buentello's application for adoption. Although these are not properly briefed as issues, we will nevertheless address each challenge in the interest of justice. Jurisdiction
        Paniagua challenges the Dallas County trial court's jurisdiction over the suit to terminate his parental rights. The 325th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County became the court of continuing exclusive jurisdiction with respect to V.D.P. when it entered the final divorce decree and determined conservatorship of the child in 1998. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.001 (Vernon 2002). The Buentellos properly filed their petition to terminate Paniagua's parental rights with that court. However, according to the motion to transfer, the child's principal residence had been in Dallas County during the six-month period preceding the commencement of the termination suit. Nothing in the record before us controverts this six-month residency. We conclude that the transfer to Dallas County was proper. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.201(b) (Vernon 2002) (mandating transfer, upon timely motion, to county where the child at issue has resided for more than six months). As a result, the 255th Judicial District Court of Dallas County had jurisdiction over the suit to terminate Paniagua's parental rights. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.206(a) (Vernon 2002) (a court to which a transfer is made becomes the court of continuing exclusive jurisdiction and all proceedings in the suit are continued as if it were brought there originally).
Adoption
        Before granting the adoption, the trial court found that the requirements for adoption had been met and that the adoption was in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.016(b) (Vernon 2002). Paniagua presents two complaints concerning the court's decision to grant the adoption.
        First, Paniagua claims that Mr. Buentello has a criminal conviction and implies that this should have prevented the adoption. There is simply no evidence in the record before us that substantiates Paniagua's claim that Mr. Buentello has a criminal record. Accordingly, nothing before us demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the best interest of the child. See Green v. Remling, 608 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. 1980) (the trial court's judgment will not be disturbed unless that there was an abuse of discretion).
        Second, Paniagua claims that Mr. Buentello was not properly investigated prior to the granting of his application. Paniagua does not dispute that a social study was prepared and filed in this case as required by statute. Instead, he specifically contends that this study should have been prepared by a non-biased party.-- Because Paniagua points to nothing in the record to demonstrate bias in the preparation of the social study of Mr. Buentello, we cannot conclude Mr. Buentello was not adequately evaluated prior to the court's granting adoption.
        We overrule all of Paniagua's additional “issues.”
CONCLUSION
 
 
 
Having overruled all of Paniagua's issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARTIN RICHTER
                                                          JUSTICE
 
040128F.P05