& 05-91-01610-CR

Affirmed and Opinion Issued May 13, 1992
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
Nos. 05-91-01609-CR & 05-91-01610-CR
............................
JESSIE LEWIS JONES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
..............................................................
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F90-54820-QU & F91-62550-LU
..............................................................
OPINION
Before Justices Thomas, Maloney, and Kaplan
Opinion by Justice Maloney
        Jessie Lewis Jones appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver (F91-62550-LU) and the adjudication of his deferred probation for possession of cocaine (F90-54820-QU). Appellant entered a plea of guilty in Cause Number F91-62550-LU and a plea of true to the allegations in the State's motion to adjudicate in Cause Number F90-54820-QU. He entered each plea under the terms of a plea bargain agreement. The court followed the plea bargain agreement. It found appellant guilty and assessed a ten year sentence in each cause and a $2000 fine in Cause Number F91-62550-LU.
        Appellant's attorney filed briefs concluding that the appeals are wholly frivolous and without merit. The briefs meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the records demonstrating why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
        Appellant's attorney delivered copies of his briefs to appellant. We advised appellant that he had the opportunity to examine the appellate records and the right to file pro se briefs. Appellant has not filed pro se briefs.
        Appellant raises two arguable points of error. He contends the trial court's assessment of a sentence and a fine constitutes appellant's imprisonment for debt, and appellant has a right to appointed counsel of his choice. We affirm.
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
        In the first arguable point of error, appellant contends he was indigent and the trial court's judgments unconstitutionally require his imprisonment for debt. Appellant alleged that the judgments order his imprisonment until he pays his fine and court costs.
        The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment prohibits imprisonment of an indigent person for failure to immediately pay a fine. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971); U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A court may not imprison a defendant because he is too poor to pay a fine. Ex parte Minjares, 582 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (op. on reh'g).
        The trial court sentenced appellant to ten years' confinement and assessed a $2000 fine. Appellant has not shown he has completed his ten year sentence. He is not imprisoned due to an inability to pay the fine, restitution, or costs. The sentence does not violate appellant's right to equal protection of the laws.
        We overrule the first arguable point of error.
INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOOSING
        In the second arguable point of error, appellant contends he requested a particular appointed attorney. He maintains the trial court arguably erred in not appointing his requested attorney.
        An accused's right to select his own counsel cannot be manipulated to obstruct orderly court procedure or to interfere with the fair administration of justice. Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). A court has no obligation to search for an attorney who meets with the approval of the accused. Solis v. State, 792 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). If a defendant is dissatisfied with his appointed counsel, he bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to a change of counsel. See Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 784 n.3.
        Nothing in the records even suggest that appellant was displeased with his appointed counsel. That the court did not appoint appellant's requested attorney is not error.
        We have carefully reviewed the records filed in this case and counsel's briefs. We agree that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find nothing in the records that might arguably support the appeal.
        We affirm the trial court's judgments.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          FRANCES MALONEY
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
911609F.U05
 
 
 
File Date[05-12-92]
File Name[911609F]