ROBERT WAYNE JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion filed December 20, 1989.
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-89-00081-CR
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ROBERT WAYNE JONES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F83-93073
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OPINION PER CURIAM
Before Justices Stewart, Thomas and Kinkeade
        Robert Wayne Jones was convicted in a bench trial of murder for which the trial court assessed punishment at forty-five years' confinement. In his sole point of error, Jones contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We disagree and affirm.
        Annie Cotton testified that she was playing kickball with her three children and two friends around dusk on August 10, 1983. Her brother, Ricky Mayberry, was sitting on a nearby car and watching them play. Her daughter kicked the ball into a neighbor's yard and Cotton chased it. As she went to get the ball, which had rolled up against the steps of the building next door, someone pushed her down. She did not see who had done it, but when she got up she saw Jones. She knew Jones from having seen him in the neighborhood. She began to walk away, back to her yard. Her back was to Jones for about three seconds.         Cotton's brother got off the car and walked over to Jones. He asked Jones why he had pushed his sister. Cotton turned and saw Jones's hands move downward toward Mayberry's chest, but she did not see him touch Mayberry. She did not see any kind of weapon in Jones's hands. She saw Mayberry stagger away from Jones and fall down. He hit his head on the sidewalk as he fell face down. When she reached him, she turned him over and saw a bleeding wound in his chest and an injury to his forehead. There was a woman in the yard with Jones and Mayberry, but the woman was not close enough to have stabbed Mayberry. After her brother fell, Jones fled. She did not see him again until trial.
        The medical examiner testified that Mayberry died as the result of a stab wound to the chest. The wound was made with a knife or some similarly narrow and sharp object. The knife pierced the heart at a downward angle. On cross-examination, the medical examiner testified that "hypothetically" the injury was consistent with someone falling onto the ground and landing on some sharp object which was standing upright. However, to account for the downward angle of the penetration, the body would have had to fall head first.
        Jones alleges that the evidence is insufficient because no one saw him stab Mayberry. The standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Marroquin v. State, 746 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Garrett v. State, 682 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985). In a circumstantial evidence case, that standard of proof necessarily requires the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis, except the guilt of the accused, since a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not a rational finding if the evidence supports an inference other than the guilt of the accused. See Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
        The evidence showed that Jones was the only person close enough to Mayberry to have stabbed him, that Jones's hands moved toward Mayberry's chest in a downward motion, that Mayberry was wounded in the chest by a knife thrust at a downward angle, and that Jones fled after Mayberry staggered away and fell. Although the medical examiner conceded that the wound could have been caused by falling on some sharp object, there was no evidence that there existed a sharp object upon which appellant fell.         The State must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of Jones's guilt in order to sustain the conviction based upon circumstantial evidence. See Johnson v. State, 673 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A reasonable hypothesis, however, is one consistent with the facts proved and the circumstances; a supposition out of harmony with the evidence will not merit an acquittal. See Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1073 (1984); Vaughn v. State, 607 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Jones's hypotheses that someone else stabbed Mayberry or that Mayberry fell on some sharp object are out of harmony with the facts and circumstances proved.
        The State is not required to prove to a moral certainty that the circumstances presented actually exclude every hypothesis; it must only exclude reasonable hypotheses raised by the evidence. It is enough that the conclusion of guilt is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Marmon v. State, 704 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 1985, pet. ref'd). We conclude that the evidence amply supports the trial court's conclusion that Jones stabbed Mayberry, causing his death. Accordingly, we overrule Jones's point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          PER CURIAM
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90.
 
890081.U05
 
 
File Date[12-20-89]
File Name[890081]