LARRY LEE DOUGLAS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and opinion filed November 15, 1989.
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-89-00068-CR
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LARRY LEE DOUGLAS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
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On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F88-87202-VJ
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OPINION PER CURIAM
Before Justices McClung, Lagarde and Ovard
        Larry Lee Douglas was convicted in a bench trial of the offense of credit card abuse. Punishment, enhanced by two prior convictions, was assessed at forty years' confinement. Appellant claims in two points of error that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
        Four witnesses testified for the State. Stephen Salazar, an area supervisor at Sears, testified that on September 1, 1988, appellant and another individual indicated an interest in purchasing a VCR. Appellant did the talking about wanting to purchase the recorder. Salazar prepared a sales ticket for the item. Appellant gave David Robertson as his name. After writing up the ticket, Salazar took the men to a cashier, gave her the sales slip, then left the area.
        Tabitha Loudermill testified that on September 1, 1988, she was a cashier at Sears. On that date, she ran the cash register on a purchase of a VCR. She identified State's Exhibit No. 1 as the sales slip from the VCR purchase. She identified State's Exhibit No. 2, a Sears credit card, as the card that was used to pay for the VCR. She testified that appellant presented the card to her. She also testified that appellant was holding the VCR at the time he presented the card. However, the person with appellant signed the sales slip. She became suspicious because the person misspelled the last name of the cardholder.
        Melvin Brown, a floor supervisor at Sears, testified that on September 1, 1988, Tabitha Loudermill brought a sales slip for a VCR to him. He identified State's Exhibit No. 1 as the sales slip she brought. He identified State's Exhibit No. 2 as the credit card she brought to him along with the slip. He decided to call the people to obtain some "credentials". He believed that neither appellant nor his accomplice was the cardholder; one had presented the card while the other signed, and the signer misspelled the name of the cardholder. When they came into the office, appellant asked his accomplice who the cardholder was.
        Anna Interrante testified that at approximately 10:00 a.m. on September 1, 1988, she lost a Sears credit card when her purse was stolen from her car. She identified State's Exhibit No. 2 as her credit card. She also testified that she had not consented to appellant's using her credit card.
        Stephen Brownfield testified on appellant's behalf. He said that on September 1, 1988, he went to Sears with appellant. He had seen appellant driving down the street, and asked appellant to take him to Sears. Brownfield testified that he was going in to "pass a credit card"; he told appellant nothing about the card. He told appellant he was going to Sears to purchase something. He testified that when he and appellant arrived at Sears, he told the salesman that he wanted to buy a VCR. He carried the VCR to the cash register. He personally presented the card to the sales clerk. The clerk then rang up the sales. He also said that he dropped the card at some point; appellant picked it up and put it on the counter. Brownfield testified that he signed the sales slip. He also testified that he had already entered a plea of guilty to credit card abuse. On cross-examination, he claimed that appellant said nothing to the salesperson about buying a VCR. He also said that the sales clerk did not go to the cash register with him; he carried the VCR himself. He testified that he dropped the card as he was climbing a flight of stairs with the VCR; the sales clerk was not with him at the time.
        Finally, appellant testified on his own behalf. He said that on September 1, 1988, he gave a ride to Brownfield to Sears. Brownfield told him nothing about what he wanted to buy at Sears; when he went to the VCR department, it was the first appellant knew what Brownfield was shopping for. Appellant testified that he did not talk to the sales clerk about the VCR. When Brownfield was carrying the VCR to the cash register, he dropped the card; appellant then picked it up. He never noticed that anything was amiss with the card. When he and Brownfield were stopped by store personnel, he asked Brownfield who the owner of the card was. On cross-examination, he said that he never touched the VCR.
        Appellant argues in his two points of error that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for credit card abuse, either as a primary actor or as a party. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court's inquiry is limited to determining whether, evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Marroquin v. State, 746 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Limuel v. State, 568 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).
        In order to prove the offense of credit card abuse, the State must show that (1) a person (2) with intent to fraudulently obtain property or service (3) presents or uses a credit card (4) with knowledge that the card was not issued to him and (5) with knowledge that it is not used with the effective consent of the cardholder. Ex parte Mathis, 571 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.31(b) (Vernon 1974). In addition, a party is liable as a party to an offense if he solicits, encourages, directs, aids or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that appellant discussed the purchase of the VCR with the salesperson; although appellant and Brownfield denied that appellant engaged in any such discussion, their testimony is directly contradicted by that of the salesperson. Appellant gave a false name to the salesman. In addition, their contention that appellant picked up the card when it was dropped en route to the cash register, when no one was around, was contradicted by the testimony of the salesperson, who testified that he was with appellant and Brownfield until they arrived at the cash register. Appellant also gave a false name to the salesperson. Cf. Jiminez v. State, 750 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1988, pet. ref'd) (evidence of false name given to authorities probative of guilt of burglary). Appellant was the person who gave the card to the cashier. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to show at the very least that appellant was a party to the offense of credit card abuse. See Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Appellant's points of error are overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.                
                        
                                        PER CURIAM
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
 
 
File Date[11-15-89]
File Name[890068F]