LESTER WADE MANNING, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion filed December 20, 1989
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-89-00006-CR
............................
LESTER WADE MANNING, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F88-84118-LQ
.................................................................
O P I N I O N
Before Justices Howell, Baker and Burnett
Opinion By Justice Howell
        Lester Wade Manning was convicted by a jury of the offense of murder. Punishment was assessed at life. Appellant claims in two points of error that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We overrule his point and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
        The record reflects that on June 26, 1988, appellant went to the house of a neighbor and told her that he planned to be out all night. The neighbor thought this was odd, since appellant did not usually come over and speak with her much. He told her that the deceased was going out; she was surprised at this, because the deceased did not usually go out. Appellant waited at the neighbor's house for Wendell Clark, the deceased's son; when Wendell did not come, he left, driving the deceased's taxicab; she was also surprised at this, since appellant usually did not drive the deceased's cab unless the deceased was with him. She did not see him again until 5:21 a.m. the next day, when he came to her house and asked her to call the police. He told her that he had come home, the deceased would not answer the door, and the back door was open; he did not want to enter the house. She noticed that appellant was wearing different clothes from those he had worn the previous night. She also testified that when she had last seen the deceased, he was alive and nothing appeared wrong with him. In addition, she testified that she had known the deceased approximately fifteen years; in that time, she had not known him to be a person who picked fights.
        Dr. Charles Petty, chief medical examiner for Dallas County, testified concerning the autopsy performed on the deceased. He testified that the deceased had suffered numerous injuries. Included in the list of injuries was a slash across the throat which was approximately five and one-half inches long which cut the right carotid artery and jugular vein, and cut the air passage leading from the mouth and nose to the lungs. There were also a series of slashing wounds to the chest which parallelled the wound across the throat. In addition, there was a stab wound to the chest which penetrated the left lung and caused bleeding into the left side of the chest. The bones of the left forearm were broken at their midpoint. In addition, there were multiple rib fractures on both sides. Dr. Petty testified that the blood alcohol level of the deceased was .06, the equivalent of drinking two to three beers. He concluded that the cause of death was the wound to the throat. The stab wound to the chest could also have been fatal, but did not have time to be fatal because of the wound to the neck. He testified that the deceased would not have maintained consciousness more than fifteen to thirty seconds at the most after his throat was cut. He characterized many of the wounds, including the broken arm, as "defensive wounds". He testified that the cutting wounds were consistent with being inflicted by a knife. In all probability, Clark's blood would have gotten on the assailant when he cut Clark's throat. In addition, the pattern of the wounds were inconsistent with the complainant falling backwards during a struggle. Dr. Petty testified that in his experience, wounds of this sort come from intentional infliction; thus, the death was classified as a homicide.
        Mike Black, a physical evidence detective with the Dallas Police, testified that he received a pair of shoes and socks belonging to appellant. The officer who had taken them had noticed blood on the shoes and socks when he checked appellant for weapons. Officer Black also testified that he collected two door facings containing blood smears so that he could check for fingerprints. He found a fingerprint in the blood; however, another officer analyzed the print.        Benjamin Armstrong, a detective with the Dallas Police, testified that he analyzed the fingerprints found in the blood on the door facings. The print had been made by appellant.
        Bob Alexander, a detective with the Dallas Police, testified that he investigated the murder of Jimmie Clark. Three days after the offense, appellant came to his office and asked him when he would get his shoes and socks back. Officer Alexander told him that they would be tested to see whose blood was on them. Appellant told him it was Clark's blood. Appellant then gave four inconsistent stories concerning what had happened on June 26. In his first two versions, he claimed that he was not present at the time Jimmie Clark died. In his third version, he claimed that he entered the house and saw Clark fighting with a woman. He knocked a knife out of Clark's hand; the woman picked up the knife and stabbed Clark. In his final version, he claimed that Clark had a knife and was fighting with a woman who had a nightstick. He grabbed Clark to prevent him from using the knife; when he did so, the woman hit Clark on the forearm with the nightstick. Clark then attacked appellant, who pushed the knife back at Clark so that Clark cut himself. He then struggled with Clark until they fell on the floor; it was at this point that Clark accidentally stabbed himself. Officer Armstrong also testified that he did not believe that any of the stories given by appellant represented the entire truth. Finally, he testified that he saw appellant immediately following the murder; at that time, he noted that appellant had no apparent injuries.
        Shelly Dennis, a Dallas Police officer, testified that she came to the scene of the offense on June 26, 1988. She said that when appellant was told that Clark, his roommate, was dead, he showed no emotion. When Officer Dennis questioned him about his lack of reaction, he "had a smirk on his face."
        Appellant testified on his own behalf at the punishment phase of trial. He admitted killing Clark, but claimed that the killing was accidental.
        In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court's inquiry is limited to determining whether, evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Marroquin v. State, 746 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In circumstantial evidence cases, this standard is not met if the evidence does not exclude a reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant. Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
        In the present cause, appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to show that he knowingly and intentionally caused Clark's death, and that he inflicted the fatal wound on the complainant. We disagree. Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies on circumstantial evidence. Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Clark suffered numerous knife wounds in addition to the injury which killed him. There is no evidence that anyone other than appellant wielded the knife; indeed, appellant admitted having killed Clark. In addition, Dr. Petty testified that it would not be possible for all the injuries to be inflicted accidentally, and that it was his opinion that the killing was intentional. Many of the wounds on Clark's body were characterized as defensive. Compare Semento v. State, 747 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (evidence of killing, together with evidence of defensive wounds, sufficient to support finding of intent). Appellant gave several false stories to neighbors both before and after the offense, and to police following the offense. Finally, immediately after the offense, when police told him that his roommate had been murdered, he showed no emotion, but "kind of smirked." Under the circumstances present in this case, we conclude that the evidence supports no reasonable conclusion other than that appellant had the intent to kill Clark. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.
        In addition, we reject appellant's claim that the evidence is insufficient to show that he inflicted the fatal wound to Clark. The record reflects that appellant took the stand at the punishment phase of trial and admitted killing Clark. Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, evidence from the punishment stage is to be considered in deciding the question. Daughtrey v. State, 544 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Appellant's second point of error is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
                         
                                                  
                                                  CHARLES BEN HOWELL
                                                  JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90        
890006F.U05
 
 
File Date[12-20-89]
File Name[890006F]