REGINALD DEWAYNE MCAFEE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 21, 1989
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-88-01490-CR
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REGINALD DEWAYNE MCAFEE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F88-85070-JI
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OPINION PER CURIAM
Before Justices Whitham, Rowe, and Whittington
        Reginald Dewayne McAfee appeals his conviction for burglary of a habitation. Punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction, was assessed at fifty years' confinement.
        Appellant's attorney has filed a brief in which appellant's attorney has concluded that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). A copy of counsel's brief has been delivered to appellant and appellant has been advised that he would be given the opportunity to examine the appellate record and that he had a right to file a pro se brief. Appellant has filed a pro se brief in which he raises two points of error, claiming that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the taking of his fingerprints violated his constitutional rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
        The complainant testified that from August 17-24, 1986, he was out of town. When he returned, he realized that his house had been ransacked; approximately $14,000 worth of property had been stolen. Among the items stolen was a Hitachi video recorder. He gave serial numbers for all the stolen items to the police. He testified that he had not consented to anyone entering his house and taking his property.
        C. M. Rhodes, a Dallas police officer, testified that he went to the complainant's home on August 25, 1986 to investigate the offense. He determined that the probable point of entry into the house was a bedroom window. He found a palm print on the window; he "dusted" the window, and obtained the print. He identified State's Exhibit No. 1 as the print he obtained from the complainant's bedroom window.
        An employee of the 24-Hour Pawnshop testified that on May 28, 1988, he took in a Hitachi video recorder; the ticket was signed by Reginald Dewayne McAfee. He testified that when an item is pawned, the practice of the shop is to ask for identification. In addition, the person taking in the item asks for signatures in order to compare them with the signature on the identification.
        Thomas K. Elliott, a burglary detective with the Dallas Police Department, testified that he received information in June or July of 1988 that a stolen video recorder had been recovered at a pawnshop; the serial number matched that of the video recorder stolen from the complainant's house in 1986. Because the video recorder was pawned by someone giving the name Reginald Dewayne McAfee, he requested that Reginald Dewayne McAfee's prints be compared with the prints obtained at the time of the offense.
        Vernell Smith, a detective with the Dallas Police Department, testified that he took appellant's prints on the day of trial. The prints he took were made by the same person whose prints appear in State's Exhibit No. 1.
        In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court's inquiry is limited to determining whether, evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Marroquin v. State, 746 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).
        In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant claims only that the testimony of the fingerprint expert was not credible. However, the credibility of the witnesses is solely within the scope of the jury determination. The evidence shows that the complainant's house was broken into. Police obtained a palm print at the scene; the palm print came from appellant. Appellant pawned a video recorder approximately two years after the offense. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.
        In his second point of error, appellant claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the taking of his fingerprints by the State's expert. We disagree. The court of criminal appeals has held that the taking of fingerprints does not violate an accused's privilege against self-incrimination. Cassell v. State, 507 S.W.2d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Appellant's second point of error is overruled.
        We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel's brief and agree that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
        The judgment is affirmed.
 
                                                          PER CURIAM
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
 
881490.U05
 
 
 
File Date[11-21-89]
File Name[881490]