VICTOR L. DIBBLES,FROM A DISTRICT COURT APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS
 
NO. 05-88-01171-CR
 
VICTOR L. DIBBLES,FROM A DISTRICT COURT
 
        APPELLANT,
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
 
        APPELLEE.OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
 
 
 
BEFORE JUSTICES HOWELL, BAKER, AND OVARD
OPINION BY JUSTICE BAKER
JUNE 19, 1989
        In a bench trial, Victor L. Dibbles was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and, because of two prior felonies alleged for enhancement purposes, received a twenty-five year sentence. He appeals, contending that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We overrule these points and affirm the trial court's judgment.
        In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence as the search of appellant incident to arrest was a result of an illegal detention. The facts show that two Dallas police officers were on routine patrol at approximately 10:30 p.m. in the evening. The officers were parked in their car on one street watching a "crack house" on another street. The officers testified that the area was known for drug activity and that they had personal knowledge that crack was sold from that particular house. One of the officers observed an individual, later identified as appellant, standing in one place on the sidewalk about ten or fifteen feet from the crack house. As cars pulled up to the curb next to the crack house, appellant went to each car and talked to the occupants. At this time the officers were approximately two hundred yards away from appellant. They saw appellant go back and forth to cars at least three times before they decided to approach him. Based on the fact that one of the officers had made an arrest for crack possession at that very location and that the area was one of high drug activity, the officers believed that appellant was selling crack.
        The two officers approached appellant in their marked squad car as he was talking to the occupants of a car. When appellant saw the officers, he turned around, reached inside the waistband of his pants, and threw something into the high weeds behind him. The officers got out of their car, and as one watched appellant, the other searched the weeds but found nothing. While they were detaining appellant, they ran a computer check and learned that appellant had outstanding warrants for no insurance, no operator's license, and violation of state insurance laws. Because these were violations of city and state laws, the appellant was arrested. Appellant was then patted down for weapons at the scene of the arrest and taken to jail where he was strip searched. During this search, a vial of a powdery substance fell out of appellant's pants. This substance was later identified as cocaine.
        Appellant argues that the evidence on the motion to suppress fails to show specific articulable facts that would allow the officers to detain appellant for the particular purpose or for the specific offense of narcotics trafficking. He asserts that the detainment was illegal, and therefore the later search at the jail was an illegal search. He also argued that the computer check was a pretext in order to arrest him and that for these reasons, the trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress. We disagree.
        The appellant did not file a written motion to suppress, or if one was filed, we do not find it in the record before us. The statement of facts reflects that when the evidence on the motion to suppress was completed, appellant's counsel conceded that there was probable cause to approach appellant. Appellant also conceded that a police officer may approach any person on a public way and speak to him and that the police have a right to detain an individual for investigatory purposes. However, appellant argues that they must have determined from articulable facts that such a person might be engaged in narcotics trafficking before such detention is proper.
        In our view, appellant's concessions at the time of trial render moot any arguments as to whether the police had sufficient reasonable suspicion to approach and detain appellant in the first place and whether they had a right to detain him for investigatory purposes in the second place, because these concessions establish that the standards required under Terry v. Ohio have been satisfied. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-27 (1968).
        Appellant argues that the computer check was a pretext in order to arrest him. Appellant did not make this objection at the time of trial and therefore has failed to preserve it for review. See Bennett v. State, 742 S.W.2d 664, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); McNary v. State, 747 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988, pet. granted). In any event, a police officer may briefly stop a suspicious person in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). There is nothing in the record to suggest that the "Terry" stop was unnecessarily protracted and such a lawful detention is not rendered unlawful because an officer checks for outstanding warrants while confirming a person's identification. See Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1985, no pet.). Since a computer check revealed three outstanding warrants, the arrest was lawful. See Petty, 696 S.W.2d at 639. We overrule appellant's first point.
        In his second point, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. This contention is based upon the argument that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress, that the evidence should have been suppressed, and that without this evidence there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Appellant's legal premise is without merit because when reviewing the evidence on an insufficiency assertion, the reviewing court is required to consider all of the evidence, even that which may have been improperly admitted. See Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 111-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Collins v. State, 602 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh'g) (Roberts, J., concurring). The evidence shows that when appellant was being searched at the jail, a vial containing a powdery substance fell from his clothing. The substance was analyzed and identified as cocaine, and this evidence was admitted at trial. Appellant argues that he objected to the evidence on the drug analysis as hearsay because the person who actually conducted one of the tests did not testify. He relies on Neptune v. State, 679 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1984, pet. ref'd). Neptune is readily distinguishable from this case because the state failed to introduce the lab report on the analysis into evidence as a business record in Neptune, but the record here reflects that the evidence was admitted under the business records exception. See Armijo v. State, 751 S.W.2d 950, 952. App.--Amarillo 1988, no pet.); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 8O3(6). We hold that when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is such that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule appellant's second point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                                                                                    __________________________
                                                          JAMES A. BAKER
                                                          JUSTICE
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90
 
88-01171.F
 
 
File Date[09-07-89]
File Name[881171F]