GENE B. COMPTON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED Opinion filed December 13, 1989.
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-88-01151-CR
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GENE B. COMPTON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F88-79286-SJ
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Stewart, Thomas and Kinkeade
Opinion by Justice Kinkeade
        Gene B. Compton appeals his conviction of gambling promotion. Following a jury trial, the court assessed punishment at ten years' confinement and a $5,000 fine. The court probated the sentence for a period of ten years. Compton argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash the indictment. Further, Compton argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Because Compton's indictment tracked the statutory language of the applicable statute, we overrule his first point of error. Since the police officers observed Compton handling the money used to cover and to match the bets placed by the participants, we overrule his second point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Statement of Facts
        On March 3, 1988, undercover vice officer Mike Mendez investigated a gambling complaint at a building known as The Rock. Officer Mendez entered the building twice that evening. Both times Officer Mendez observed several people playing dice. During the first visit, Officer Mendez observed Compton hold the bets of the participants until after the dice were thrown, and then extract a percentage of the winnings for the house before distributing the remaining money to the winners. After placing a bet and observing the action for approximately five minutes, Officer Mendez left the premises. Officer Mendez reported what he had observed to two other vice officers. Subsequently, Officer Mendez reentered The Rock and about one minute later his partner, Officer Dale Erves, also entered the building. At that time, both officers observed Compton handling the money used to cover and to match the bets placed by the participants. After about five minutes, a tactical unit entered the building. When the tactical unit entered the building Officer Erves observed Compton grab the money off of the table and stuff the money into his pockets. Officer Mendez identified Compton as the operator of the dice game. The police placed Compton under arrest and issued citations to the participants. Both Officer Mendez and Officer Erves testified that they never observed Compton place a bet or roll the dice, that they only observed him handle the money used to cover and match the bets. All of the defense witnesses testified that Compton did not operate the game.
 
Motion to Quash
        In his first point of error, Compton argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash the indictment. At trial, Compton objected solely on the ground that the gambling statute and the resulting charging instrument based on that statute were too vague and indefinite. On appeal, however, Compton alleges that the indictment failed to give him sufficient notice of the manner and the means in which he participated in a gambling establishment.
        An indictment must allege facts sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charged offense. However, unless a fact is essential for notice, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State. Rarely will an indictment drawn on the language of the penal statute be legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. Livington v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
        Compton's general allegation regarding inadequate notice fails to elaborate exactly how the notice is deficient. Compton also fails to show how more specific notice would have better informed him of the charges against him or have affected the preparation of his defense. The indictment tracks the applicable statute under which the State charged Compton. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 47.03(a)(1) (Vernon 1989). Further, the indictment charging Compton specifically alleged that he participated in the earnings "by receiving money that was lost by other players in a dice game." Because the indictment charging Compton tracked the statutory language and Compton failed to prove the State omitted an essential fact, we overrule his first point of error.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
        The State charged Compton with the offense of gambling promotion. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 47.03(a)(1) (Vernon 1989). Compton contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he operated or participated in a gambling establishment. When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Marroquin v. State, 746 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Garrett v. State, 682 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985).
        A person commits the offense of gambling promotion if he intentionally or knowingly operates or participates in the earnings of a gambling place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 47.03(a)(1) (Vernon 1989). The facts in the present case reflect that Officers Mendez and Erves conducted an investigation of a gambling complaint at The Rock. Officer Mendez testified that he participated in the dice game, observed Compton handle the money used to cover and to match the bets placed by the participants, and extract a percentage of the winnings. Although Officer Erves did not participate in the game, he testified that he also observed Compton handling the money used to cover and to match the bets. Officer Erves also testified that when the tactical unit entered the building, Compton grabbed the money from the table and stuffed the money into his pockets. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the jury could have found that Compton operated a gambling place as charged in the indictment. Accordingly, we overrule Compton's second point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          ED KINKEADE
                                                          JUSTICE
 
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90.
 
881151.U05
 
 
File Date[12-13-89]
File Name[881151]