ROBERT ZAMORA RAMIREZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion filed November 22, 1989
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-88-01058-CR
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ROBERT ZAMORA RAMIREZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from the 291st District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F88-78991-JU
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Howell, Baker, and Burnett
Opinion By Justice Baker
        As a result of a plea bargain, the trial court found appellant guilty of possession of cocaine and sentenced him to two years' confinement and assessed a $500 fine. Appellant asserts two points of error, contending the trial court erred: (1) by denying his motion to suppress the evidence because it was seized as a result of an unlawful arrest and search; and (2) by taking judicial knowledge of a Dallas city ordinance.
        In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the evidence because the arrest and search was illegal. Appellant's argument under this point fails to cite to the record or cite any authority. Nothing is presented for review. Melton v. State, 713 S.W.2d 107, 113-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 608, 627 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd); Tex. R. App. P. 74(f). We overrule appellant's first point of error.
        In his second point of error, appellant contends the trial court erroneously took judicial knowledge of the Dallas city ordinance of "burning off." In Texas, the state courts do not take judicial knowledge of the existence of city ordinances or their terms, and where they are relied upon, proof of them is essential. Lange v. State, 639 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Green v. State, 594 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
        The record reflects that the specific Dallas city ordinance was not proven. However, the record does not reflect that the court took judicial notice of such an ordinance, nor does the record reflect that such action was requested by either the State or the defense. The record also reflects that the officer who arrested appellant testified, without objection, that he observed appellant "applying acceleration" [burning off] to the car he was driving. He also stated that he initially stopped appellant for the reason that this action was prohibited by a Dallas city ordinance. Where testimonial evidence, unobjected to, proves up the municipal ordinance, it is properly admitted and considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence of the legality of the seizure. Lalande v. State, 676 S.W.2d 115, 116-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). We overrule appellant's second point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JAMES A. BAKER
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
 
881058F.U05
 
 
File Date[11-22-89]
File Name[881058F]