DAVID CHARLES ROWE,FROM A DISTRICT COURT APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

 
COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS
 
NO. 05-88-01014-CR
 
DAVID CHARLES ROWE,FROM A DISTRICT COURT
 
        APPELLANT,
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
 
        APPELLEE.OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
 
 
 
BEFORE JUSTICES STEWART, BAKER, AND WHITTINGTON
OPINION BY JUSTICE BAKER
JUNE 29, 1989
        This appeal involves appellant's conviction by the court for possession of methamphetamine. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to affirmatively link him to the methamphetamine that was seized, that the search and seizure of the drug were illegal because police lacked probable cause to detain appellant for investigative purposes, and that the drug should not have been admitted in evidence because it was the product of an illegal inventory search. We will affirm.                  At approximately 3:00 a.m. while driving by a large, open field belonging to the Dallas Independent School District, Dallas police officer Paul Turbyfill and his partner observed a car parked in the middle of the field. Turbyfill testified that because this was a high crime area and because a number of stolen cars had been recovered in that field, they determined to investigate the car they saw. As they came close to the car, they saw appellant seated in the driver's seat along with a female passenger in the adjacent passenger seat. The officer asked appellant for identification and asked him to step out of the car. Appellant presented a driver's license that was forged and not his. Turbyfill then conducted a computer check and learned that appellant had outstanding traffic warrants. Appellant was arrested and his companion removed from the car. Appellant's companion had no identification and did not have a valid driver's license.
        Following appellant's arrest, Turbyfill and his partner searched the car. In plain view on the floorboard on the driver's side where appellant had been seated they saw hypodermic needles. At least one of these needles contained a substance that the officer believed to be either cocaine or methamphetamine. They also saw a set of scales in the front seat identified by the other officer as scales used in connection with taking drugs. The officers also found another set of similar scales on the car's back seat. Underneath the front driver's seat, a small packet was found containing a white substance which the officer believed to be methamphetamine. The substance was subsequently identified as methamphetamine.
        The officer testified that it is an office policy when they cannot turn a car over to a validly licensed driver that the car will be impounded, and it is a further office policy that prior to impounding the car, an inventory search is conducted. Before having the car towed, the officers called for a female officer to take appellant's companion home. The car was removed to the pound and the appellant taken to jail.
        We first consider appellant's second point of error where he complains that the officers lacked probable cause to detain appellant for purposes of investigation. Appellant argues that there was no evidence to show any suspicious activity and that the police lacked specific articulable facts that would have justified the initial detention. Because of this contention, appellant argues that the subsequent search of the car and the seizure of the drug was illegal and the drug inadmissible at trial. We disagree.
        In order to justify a temporary detention of an individual, an officer must have specific articulable facts which, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant the intrusion on the freedom of the citizen stopped for further investigation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 870 (1986). There must be a reasonable suspicion by the officer that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, some suggestion to connect the detained person with the unusual activity, and some indication that the activity is related to a crime. Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
        In this case, the school district lot where appellant and his companion parked was in a high crime area where the officers had prior knowledge of stolen cars being abandoned, and it was 3:00 a.m. in the morning. The officer testified that when the car was first seen, they did not realize anyone was in it, and they felt that the car was stolen and went to investigate the circumstances. Viewing the knowledge of the police officers involved in the investigation and the totality of the circumstances, we find that the officers had a reasonable suspicion based upon specific articulable facts that justified the investigatory detention of appellant. See Davis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). We overrule appellant's second point of error.
        In his third point of error, appellant contends that the drug must be suppressed since it was seized pursuant to an illegal inventory search. Suffice to say that the facts previously recited reflect a lawful custodial arrest of appellant, a lawful impounding of the car, and a lawful inventory search. We hold that the State sustained its burden of proof vis-a-vis this search. See Daniels v. State, 600 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Evers v. State, 576 S.W.2d 46, 49-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In any event, contemporaneously with the lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a car, an officer may search the passenger compartment of that car. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We overrule appellant's third point of error.
        In his first point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to affirmatively link appellant to the seized drug. See Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Black v. State, 739 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no pet.). We disagree.
        Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to determining whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The same standard applies in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 328-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2858 (1988). In circumstantial evidence cases, the "reasonable doubt" portion of the sufficiency standard is not satisfied if the evidence does not exclude a reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant. Allen v. State, 651 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). In an unlawful possession of a controlled substance case, the State must prove that the defendant exercised care, custody, and management over the contraband, knowing that it was contraband. Humason, 728 S.W.2d at 365; Payne v. State, 480 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). However, when an accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the contraband is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of or control over the drug unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the drug. Cude v. State, 716 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The affirmative link can be established by showing additional facts and circumstances which indicate the accused's knowledge and control of the drug. Johnson, 658 S.W.2d at 627. Such additional facts and circumstances which have been held to establish the necessary affirmative link are: (1) the drug was in plain or open view; (2) the drug was conveniently accessible to the accused; (3) the accused was the driver of the car in which the contraband was found; (4) the drug was found on the same side of the car seat as the accused was sitting. See Hughes v. State, 612 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Hahn v. State, 502 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Aldridge v. State, 482 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Orosco v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 257, 298 S.W.2d 134, 136 (1957).
        The evidence shows that hypodermic syringes, at least one of which contained a drug similar to the drug found in the baggie under the driver's seat, were in plain view on the floor on the driver's side of the car, that scales similar to those used in drug transactions were in plain view in both the front and back seats of the car, that the drug was found on the same side of the car seat where the appellant was sitting and conveniently accessible to him, that he was in the driver's seat of the car where the drug was found, that the drug was not within easy reach of his female companion, and that the officers observed that she did not make any furtive gestures toward the driver's side of the car after appellant left the car.
        We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to permit the finding that the appellant exercised care, control, and management over the drug and that he knew that what was possessed was a drug. The evidence is sufficient to affirmatively link appellant to the drug seized. This conclusion is reasonable, consistent with the facts proved, and not out of harmony with the evidence. See Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). We hold in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution that any trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule appellant's point number one.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                                                                                    __________________________
                                                          JAMES A. BAKER
                                                          JUSTICE
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90
 
88-01014.F
        
 
 
 
File Date[09-07-89]
File Name[881014F]