MARVIN DANIEL COOKS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED Opinion issued September 13, 1989.
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-88-00970-CR
............................
MARVIN DANIEL COOKS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.................................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F88-81384-TJ
.................................................................
OPINION PER CURIAM
BEFORE JUSTICES MCCLUNG, THOMAS AND WHITTINGTON
 
        After a jury trial, Marvin Daniel Cooks was convicted of burglary of a vehicle. The trial court sentenced appellant to thirty-five years' confinement. In his sole point of error, appellant complains that there was a fatal variance between the application paragraph of the court's charge and the proof as to the owner of the vehicle. We overrule this point and affirm the trial court's judgment.
        The record reflects that on or about April 15, 1988, Mae Nell Williams sold her 1978 Malibu to her daughter-in-law, Vivian McGee. McGee did not immediately pay for the automobile, and Mae Williams did not transfer title until June. On April 22, 1988, McGee loaned the car to her sister, Pearl Williams. The car broke down, and Pearl Williams was forced to leave the car alongside the road to call a tow truck. At about 11:15 a.m., officer Albert Mullins observed appellant burglarizing the vehicle. A certified copy of the title history of the automobile showed that Mae Williams was the title owner of the vehicle on the date of the burglary. In addition, Mae Williams testified that she had a greater right to possession of the vehicle than Appellant.
        In order to find appellant guilty of the offense, the application paragraph of the court's charge required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mae Nell Williams was the owner of the vehicle and that she had a greater right to possession of the vehicle than appellant. Appellant contends that the evidence unequivocally establishes that McGee purchased the vehicle from Mae Williams before the date of the offense and was, therefore, the owner of the vehicle on that date.
        The Penal Code expressly defines "owner" as follows:
    "Owner" means a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(24)(Vernon 1974). Thus, the Code provides three separate methods of establishing ownership: the alleged owner had (1) title, (2) possession, or (3) a right to possession superior to that of the accused. Alexander v. State, 753 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Turner v. State, 636 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982)(op. on reh'g). Since the trial court charged the jury on the "greater right to possession" form of ownership, the State was required to prove that Mae Williams had a greater right to possession of the vehicle than appellant in order to sustain its burden of proof. Ellis v. State, 714 S.W.2d 465, 472 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd).
        The evidence in this case clearly shows that Mae Williams was the title owner of the vehicle on the date of the burglary. As such, Mae Williams had a greater right to possession of the vehicle than appellant. While McGee may have had a greater right to possession than Mae Williams, such fact does not preclude a finding that Mae Williams had a greater right to possession than appellant. See Turner, 636 S.W.2d at 193. We overrule appellant's sole point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
                                                                  PER CURIAM
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90
880970.FU05
 
 
File Date[09-13-89]
File Name[880970F]