PATRICK GLENN COLE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 6, 1989
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-88-00866-CR
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PATRICK GLENN COLE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F88-69775-RL
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OPINION PER CURIAM
Before Justices McClung, Lagarde and Ovard
        Patrick Glenn Cole appeals his conviction for burglary of a vehicle. Punishment, enhanced by two prior convictions, was assessed at thirty-five years' confinement.
        Appellant's attorney has filed a brief in which appellant's attorney has concluded that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). A copy of counsel's brief has been delivered to appellant and appellant has been advised that he would be given the opportunity to examine the appellate record and that he had a right to file a pro se brief. Appellant has filed a pro se letter brief, in which he contends that the trial court improperly considered in assessing punishment the fact that he "jumped bond" after he was found guilty but prior to the assessment of punishment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        Appellant relates that his bondsman and attorney both told him that the judge was very upset with him for jumping bond. He thus argues that the judge was biased and prejudiced when he assessed punishment. He contends that the record established that prior to his jumping bond, the trial court was inclined to allow deferred adjudication probation and drug treatment at Cenikor. After he jumped bond, the trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years' penitentiary confinement. Appellant's conclusion is that this sequence of events establishes the improper consideration of his jumping bond.
        We note initially that appellant did not object at the punishment hearing to any improper consideration of the fact that he jumped bond. Thus, any error has been waived. Angelle v. State, 571 S.W.2d 301, 302, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), overruled on other grounds, Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Tex. R. App. P. 52(a). Further, there is nothing in the record to support appellant's contention that the trial court was upset with him for jumping bond. Mere assertions in a brief not supported by evidence in the record will not be considered on appeal. Franklin v. State, 693 S.W.2d 420, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986).
        The record is also devoid of any evidence that the trial court considered the fact that appellant jumped bond in assessing punishment. See Batts v. State, 673 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Tex. App. -- San Antonio 1984, no pet.) (no error where record failed to establish improper consideration of parole law in court's assessing punishment). The trial court expressly stated that he was basing the sentence assessed on the presentence investigation and its evaluation of the case, and that "what happened between the last sentencing and today has nothing to do with the punishment I'm assessing." See Flowers v. State, 482 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (no error shown in considering allegedly improper evidence in assessing punishment where trial court stated in the record that he would disregard complained-of evidence).
        Lastly, contrary to appellant's belief that the trial court was inclined to allow deferred adjudication probation prior to his jumping bond, the record indicates that the trial court had serious reservations about allowing probation. Further, the range of punishment, in light of the two prior convictions alleged and proved, was twenty-five years to life confinement. Thus, appellant's punishment was on the low end of the appropriate range. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court was biased and prejudiced against appellant because he jumped bond. We overrule appellant's point of error.
        We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel's brief and agree that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
        The judgment is affirmed.
 
                                                          PER CURIAM
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
 
 
File Date[12-21-89]
File Name[880866F]