JEROME ANTHONY JOHNSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion filed November 2, 1989.
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-88-00761-CR
No. 05-88-00762-CR
No. 05-88-00763-CR
............................
JEROME ANTHONY JOHNSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F88-92939-JK, F88-92703-K, and F88-92704-K
.................................................................
OPINION PER CURIAM
Before Justices Stewart, Lagarde and Burnett
        Jerome Anthony Johnson was convicted of two aggravated robberies, and attempted capital murder. Punishment, enhanced in each case by a prior conviction, was assessed at thirty-three years' confinement in each of the aggravated robberies, and at forty-seven years' confinement in the attempted capital murder. Appellant claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
        The record reflects that during the course of the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant informed the court that he wanted to "change counsel". Following some discussion of the charges against appellant, and what the court would expect from appellant if he chose to represent himself, the court established that appellant (1) could write, (2) graduated from high school and had two years of college, (3) had been reading the law during the pendency of the case, (4) had read the Texas Penal Code to ascertain the type of charges against him, (5) understood that he would be held to the same rules as the attorneys, (6) understood that he had a right not to testify against himself, and further that if he chose to testify, he would be open for cross-examination, and (7) that statements made by him might be introduced into evidence, and he would need to know when to object and when not to object. The court also offered appellant the opportunity to have his attorney ask some questions on his behalf; he chose to have the attorney present only as an advisor.
        An accused has a right to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-820 (1975). However, waiver of the right to counsel must be knowingly and intelligently made. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. When a defendant asserts his right to represent himself, analysis of whether the waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently focuses on whether the defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). There is "no formulaic questioning" which satisfies the requirement that the trial court determine that the defendant "knows what he is doing and [is making his choice] with his eyes wide open." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Johnson, 760 S.W.2d at 278.
        In the present cause, the trial court explained at great length the types of cases in which appellant was involved, the range of punishment for the offenses, and that he would have to abide by the same rules as the attorneys. In addition, she left counsel as an advisor for appellant, after offering to allow counsel to ask questions if appellant wanted her to do so; he declined this offer, and had counsel only as an advisor. We conclude that, based on the record before us, that appellant's waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently.
        Appellant claims that because the record reflects that he made numerous errors in representing himself, he did not knowingly and willingly waive his right to counsel. We cannot agree. The focus of our inquiry is not whether appellant was effective in representing himself; rather, it is whether his waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. Johnson, 760 S.W.2d at 278. Appellant's argument, that his conduct of the case shows that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary, amounts to no more than a claim that his representation amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. Appellant may not raise such an argument. Hawkins v. State, 613 S.W.2d 720, 728 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 919 (1981). Appellant's point of error is overruled.
        The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
                                        PER CURIAM
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
 
 
File Date[11-02-89]
File Name[880761F]