CRAIG ALAN COPELAND,FROM A DISTRICT COURT APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS
 
NO. 05-88-00401-CR
 
CRAIG ALAN COPELAND,FROM A DISTRICT COURT
 
        APPELLANT,
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
 
        APPELLEE.                                 OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
 
 
 
BEFORE JUSTICES STEWART, ROWE, AND BURNETT
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROWE
FEBRUARY 15, 1989
        Following a jury trial, Craig Alan Copeland was convicted of bribery. The jury sentenced Copeland to three years' confinement and recommended probation. In two points of error, Copeland complains that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and (2) the trial court erred in failing to submit to the jury a charge on specific intent to bribe a peace officer. For the reasons discussed below, we overrule both points of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
Background
        The record reflects that on April 25, 1987, Dallas police officer Ronald L. Herrington was on patrol with Terry Toth, a Dallas police explorer. Herrington was driving a marked patrol car and was wearing his police uniform. Toth was a uniformed volunteer acting through a program sponsored by the Boy Scouts of America. At approximately 4:30 a.m., Herrington stopped Copeland and issued him a traffic citation for speeding. During this stop, Copeland allegedly bribed Herrington.
        Herrington testified that after issuing Copeland the ticket, he returned to his patrol car. As Herrington completed the paperwork associated with the ticket, Copeland drove his motorcycle up beside the patrol car on the driver's side. Herrington rolled down his window and asked Copeland what he wanted. Herrington testified that Copeland responded, "I will pay you $100 if you will give me both copies of your ticket." Herrington stated that Copeland appeared very serious. Herrington asked Copeland if he was serious, and Copeland replied, "I am very serious. I have got the $100 on me right now. I will pay you right now." Herrington then said, "Are you seriously trying to bribe me?" When Copeland responded affirmatively, Herrington advised him he was under arrest for bribery. Copeland then quickly started his motorcycle, yelled "I am just kidding," and drove off. After pursuing Copeland for some distance, Herrington eventually caught and arrested him. Herrington stated that Copeland only had $60 in his possession at the jail.
        Toth testified that when Copeland pulled up beside the patrol car, he told Herrington, "I will make you a deal. I will give you $100 if you will give me both of your copies of that ticket." When Herrington asked if he was serious, Copeland answered, "Very serious." At that point, Toth stated that Herrington told Copeland he was under arrest for bribery. Copeland then said, "I am just kidding," started his motorcycle, and drove away. Toth described Copeland's tone of voice as deep and meaningful, like he really intended to bribe Herrington.
        Copeland testified that he pulled up beside the patrol car because Herrington had not returned his insurance card after issuing the ticket. Copeland claimed that he then said that he thought he would beat the ticket in court. Herrington asked Copeland if he wanted to bet. Copeland replied that he would like to bet $100 but he would not gamble on the law. Herrington then said, "Let me see a hundred." Copeland again responded that he did not want to gamble on the law and rode off on his motorcycle. Copeland denied that he ever bribed Herrington or offered $100 in return for the copies of the tickets, even as a joke.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
        The indictment in this case alleges that Copeland offered Herrington $100 as consideration for Herrington's violation of his duty to submit to the proper authorities the traffic ticket issued to Copeland. In his first point of error, Copeland contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he requested Herrington to not submit the traffic offense to the proper authorities. Instead, Copeland urges that the evidence shows that he merely asked for both of Herrington's copies of the ticket. Thus, Copeland argues that the evidence failed to show that the offer of $100 was for a violation of the duty set forth in the indictment. We disagree.
        In reviewing Copeland's first point of error, our standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Copeland offered the $100 as consideration for Herrington's violation of his duty to submit the traffic ticket to the proper authorities. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). If there is any evidence establishing this element of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt, we cannot reverse on the ground of insufficient evidence. See Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence and may believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness's testimony. Williams v. State, 692 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Johnson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
        The evidence in this case establishes that Copeland offered Herrington $100 for the officer's copies of the traffic ticket. Herrington testified that he had a legal duty to submit one of his copies of the ticket to his superiors. Herrington further stated that if he gave both of his copies to the citizen, he would be fired and charged with abuse of public office. Given this testimony, the jury could properly have inferred that if Herrington had given Copeland both his copies of the ticket, Herrington would have violated his duty to submit the ticket to the proper authorities. We conclude, therefore, that a rational juror could have readily found beyond a reasonable doubt that Copeland offered $100 as consideration for Herrington to violate his legal duty to submit to the proper authorities the traffic ticket issued to Copeland. We overrule Copeland's first point of error.        
Charge on Specific Intent
        In his second point of error, Copeland complains that the trial court failed to submit to the jury his requested charge on specific intent. The court's charge did include proper definitions of both "intentionally" and "knowingly". The additional charge which Copeland requested would have required that "before the jury can find the Defendant guilty of this offense of bribery, they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that. . .he acted with a specific intent to bribe a police officer. . . ." Copeland claims that his testimony that the $100 referred to a bet, not to a bribe, raised an issue as to whether he had a specific intent to bribe Herrington. Thus, he contends he was entitled to an affirmative submission of his requested charge.
        The indictment in this case charges Copeland with bribery pursuant to section 36.02(a)(3) of the Texas Penal Code. Under that section, a person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly offers another any benefit as consideration for a violation of a duty imposed by law on a public servant. In this case, Copeland's explanation that the $100 referred to a bet only challenged the State's evidence that Copeland offered the $100 as consideration for a violation of Herrington's duty. While we acknowledge that a defendant is entitled to an affirmative instruction on every defensive issue raised by the evidence, he is not entitled to such an instruction if the alleged defensive theory merely negates an element of the offense. Sanders v. State, 707 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We conclude that Copeland's testimony did not raise a defensive issue requiring an affirmative instruction, but rather that it merely attacked one element of the offense of bribery. Thus, we hold that the trial court's refusal to submit the requested charge was not error. We overrule Copeland's second point of error.
        We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 
                                                          __________________________
                                                          GORDON ROWE
                                                          JUSTICE
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90
 
 
88-00401.F
 
 
File Date[01-02-89]
File Name[880401]