TOMMY F. STONE, P.S. PROPERTIESFROM A DISTRICT COURT JOINT VENTURE AND T. F. STONE COMPANIES, INC., APPELLANTS, v. GRAHAM ASSOCIATES, INC., APPELLEE

COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS
NO. 05-88-00323-CV
TOMMY F. STONE, P.S. PROPERTIESFROM A DISTRICT COURT
JOINT VENTURE AND T. F. STONE
COMPANIES, INC.,
 
        APPELLANTS,
 
v.
 
GRAHAM ASSOCIATES, INC.,
 
        APPELLEE. OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
 
 
 
BEFORE JUSTICES WHITHAM, KINKEADE, AND LAGARDE
OPINION BY JUSTICE WHITHAM
JUNE 16, 1989
        The defendant-appellants, Tommy F. Stone, P.S. Properties Joint Venture and T. F. Stone Companies, Inc. appeal from a default judgment in favor of plaintiff - appellee, Graham Associates, Inc. In their nineteenth point of error, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in granting the default judgment against each of them because, in violation of rules 106 and 107 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the returns show that service was not made in accordance with the order authorizing alternative service. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a trial on the merits.
        The trial court authorized substituted service upon each defendant as provided by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106. The present case does not involve any alternative methods of service. As in Becker v. Russell, 765 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.--Austin 1989, n.w.h.), we are faced with specific orders authorizing substituted service from a trial court in response to a motion and based upon the unique facts of the case at hand. Such an order is presumably tailored by the trial court to be reasonably effective to give the defendant notice of the suit as required by rule 106(b)(2). Becker, 765 S.W.2d at 901.
        The order authorizing substituted service on Stone required that service be made by "attaching a copy of [the process] to the door of Defendant's residence at 3114 Cortez, Irving, Dallas County, Texas, or by leaving a copy of same with any person over the age of sixteen (16) years of age at said address." The return, however, failed to state (a) where service was effected, (b) who was served, (c) if the return is read to suggest a female person whose last name was Stone was served (the notation being ambiguous), whether a copy of the process was physically handed to her, or left on the doorstep, (d) whether the female person named Stone was at 3114 Cortez when she was delivered process as the order required, and (e) whether the female person named Stone was over 16 years of age as the order required. FN:1
        The order authorizing substituted service on T. F. Stone Companies, Inc. and P. S. Properties Joint Venture required the same kind of service as the Stone order, except that service was to be effected on "Defendant's registered agent, TOMMY F. STONE'S residence * * *" in the same manner. The returns do not show compliance with the orders. First, the returns show that service was made at the "principal office" of "T. F. Stone, Co., Inc." at 3114 "E. Cortez", instead at the residence of Tommy F. Stone at 3114 Cortez. Second, the returns fail to state (a) whether 3114 E. Cortez was, in fact, Stone's residence, (b) who was served (they are ambiguous at best), (c) if the citations suggest a female person named Stone was served, whether a copy of the process was physically handed to her or instead left on the doorstep, and (d) whether the female person named Stone was over 16 years of age. Third, the orders mandate that substituted service be effected on "Defendant's registered agent, TOMMY F. STONE'S residence, at * * *." Read strictly, as we must do, the orders say that the registered agent of Stone, Inc. is Tommy F. Stone's residence, not Tommy F. Stone. Hence, the returns, purporting to reflect substituted service on Tommy F. Stone, are inconsistent with the orders.
        We conclude, as did the court in Becker, that any deviation from the express terms of the trial court's order authorizing the substituted service of citation mandates the reversal of a default judgment based upon such service. Becker, 765 S.W.2d at 901. Under the established law of this State it is imperative and essential that the record affirmatively show a strict compliance with the provided mode of service. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965). While ordinarily presumptions are made in support of a judgment (including presumptions of due service of citation when a judgment so recites), no such presumptions are made in a direct attack upon a default judgment. McKanna, 388 S.W.2d at 929. The present case is a direct attack upon a default judgment. Hence, failure to affirmatively show strict compliance with the provided mode of service renders the attempted service of process invalid and of no effect. See Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985).
        We conclude that the trial court erred in granting default judgment against each defendant because the returns show that service was not made in accordance with the order authorizing alternative service. We sustain appellant's nineteenth point of error. We reverse the trial court's judgment. Where the judgment is reversed on appeal or writ of error for the want of service, or because of defective service of process, no new citation shall be issued or served, but the defendant shall be presumed to have entered his appearance to the term of the court at which the mandate shall be filed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 123. Therefore, we remand the cause to the trial court for a trial on the merits. See McKanna, 388 S.W.2d at 930.
        Reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.
                                                          
                                                          WARREN WHITHAM
                                                          JUSTICE
 
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90
 
88-00323.F
 
FN:1 Each of the three returns mention a person named "Stone". Two of the returns contain the name "Mrs. Tommy F. Stone". One of the returns contains the name "Mrs. T. F. Stone".
File Date[01-02-89]
File Name[880323]