JORGE LICOURT,FROM A DISTRICT COURT APPELLANT, v. OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

 
COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS
 
NO.05-88-00214-CR
 
JORGE LICOURT,FROM A DISTRICT COURT
 
        APPELLANT,
 
v. OF
 
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
 
        APPELLEE.DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
 
 
BEFORE JUSTICES HOWELL, LAGARDE AND WHITTINGTON
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAGARDE
JULY 10, 1989
        Jorge Licourt appeals his conviction by a jury for aggravated unlawful possession with intent to deliver cocaine. The jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment and a fine of $250,000. In nine points of error, Licourt claims that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to consider his motion for change of venue as untimely filed; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on affirmative link; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to apply the law of parties to the facts of the case; (5) and (6) the trial court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction; (7) the trial court erred in admitting the fruits of an illegal search because the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient; (8) the trial court erred in overruling Licourt's objection to the introduction of prejudicial hearsay evidence; and (9) the trial court erred in overruling Licourt's objection to the prejudicial argument of the prosecutor.
        Licourt was arrested on August 28, 1987 in a drug raid at a house located at 7406 Hundley in north Dallas, Texas. The five-bedroom, 3,300 square-foot house had been leased to Hugo and Humberto Lopez on July 21, 1987 for $1,700 per month for a period of six months. Licourt neither negotiated the lease nor signed the lease agreement.
        On the afternoon of August 27, 1987, law enforcement officials arrested an individual for selling a controlled substance. Based on information obtained from an informant, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) set up surveillance of the house on Hundley between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. on August 27. The informant drove DEA special agent Timothy Stover past the house and specifically pointed out the house. DEA set up surveillance in such a way that they could observe cars coming and going from the house. From the time surveillance began until the time of the raid, a period of approximately four hours, they observed no traffic to or from the house.
        To assist in the raid, the DEA called in the tactical squad of the Dallas Police Department (DPD). The tactical squad waited at the DEA office until agents obtained a search warrant, then assembled at a school on Whitehurst that was near the house at 7406 Hundley. Sergeant Raymond Beaudreault, who was the sergeant in charge of the operation, did a "drive-by" of the house to map out a strategy for conducting the raid. The raid began at approximately 12:45 a.m. on August 28, 1987.
        As the officers entered, Sergeant Beaudreault saw Licourt getting up from a chair in the living room where he had been talking on the phone. Immediately adjacent to where Licourt had been sitting was a loaded .22 caliber rifle and a notebook with Licourt's name on the front cover. In the kitchen, the officers discovered a woman later identified as Tamara Gomez. A semi-automatic machine pistol was located in a drawer in front of Gomez. A triple beam scale, capable of measuring in grams, was on the counter in the kitchen.
        After securing the residence, law enforcement officials entered and conducted a search of the premises. Assisting in the search were DEA officer L.T. Smith and a dog, Josh, who was specially trained to detect drugs. Josh detected drugs in the drawers and cabinets of a waterbed stand located in one of the downstairs bedrooms. Officers opened one drawer beneath the waterbed and discovered three "bricks" FN:1 of what appeared to be cocaine. Also, the officers found a white powdery substance, believed by them to be cocaine, in plain view on a chest three feet from the waterbed. Twenty "bricks" of cocaine were recovered from underneath the bed.
        In the bedroom where the cocaine was discovered, there was a waterbed, a chest-of-drawers, a dresser, a brass coat rack, and a television set. There were men's clothes in one closet and women's clothes in another. The bed was made, and the room appeared to be "lived in." The chest-of-drawers contained papers bearing the name of Jorge Licourt. One such paper was a receipt made out to Licourt for the purchase of the semi-automatic machine pistol found in the kitchen. Another paper was a delivery order for the big screen television in the living room; the delivery order, reflecting a different address, was signed by Jorge Licourt with the notation "received in good condition." The television set was four and one-half feet tall and three feet wide. It was not easily transportable, and it took four police officers to move it.
        As for the rest of the house, no other drugs were found. FN:2 Of the three other bedrooms, only two were furnished, and the two furnished bedrooms contained no clothes or personal items of any kind. From moving boxes in the dining room, the kitchen, and another room in the back of the house, other papers and documents were found bearing Licourt's name. One such document was entitled "Southwest Land Title Company Sellers Statement." This document recorded a "sale from" Jorge Licourt and wife Myra Granados.
        At trial, one of the owners of the house, Jack Alexander, testified that during the thirty-nine day period in which the house was leased to the Lopezes, he went to the house on five or six different occasions. On four or five of these visits, including the day after the lease went into effect, Alexander saw Jorge Licourt at the house.
        Guillermo Galinda, an interpreter, testified regarding the notebook that was found next to Licourt. The notebook mentioned Cozumel, Mexico, and Havana, Cuba; it detailed travel and related expenses for various people; and it contained a list of cars and their apparent prices. The notebook also contained the notation of $71,300 "brought by Hugo." It also contained the name, phone numbers, and beeper number of the individual whose arrest for sale of a controlled substance on August 27 eventually culminated in the raid at 7406 Hundley. One page of the notebook, as admitted with the interpreter's comments, appears as follows: The name of Hugo also appears on this document which apparently lists household, travel, and other possible "business" expenses.
        Finally, Charles Teer testified that, in cases involving large quantities of drugs, it is DEA's practice to test only a portion of the drugs seized. If the portions analyzed are all determined to be the same type, the remainder of the drugs are not tested. In this instance, five of the twenty "bricks" were tested, and the lab determined that each brick tested was cocaine. Each brick would sell in Dallas at a price between $21,000 and $26,000. With these facts in mind, we now address Licourt's nine points of error.
        In Licourt's first point, he claims that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for change of venue as untimely filed. During a pretrial hearing, the trial court granted the requests of Licourt and the codefendant, Tamara Gomez, to adopt the objections and motions of the other. Later, Licourt and Gomez each filed a motion for severance and received separate trials. When Licourt's trial began on December 7, 1987, he reminded the trial court that, during the pretrial hearing, the court had permitted him to adopt the motions and objections of his codefendant, presumably including the codefendant's motion for change of venue. Licourt pointed out that he had separately verified the motion, and he requested a hearing on that motion. Based on untimeliness of the motion, the trial court denied Licourt's request.
        As the State concedes, a motion for change of venue is of constitutional dimension and is immune to the time limits set out in article 28.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Revia v. State, 649 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). However, even if the express theory for the trial court's ruling was incorrect, the action of the trial court will be upheld if it was correct on any theory grounded in the record. See Dugard v. State, 688 S.W.2d 524, 530 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Miles v. State, 488 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
        Article 31.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as set out below, governs motions for change of venue. In pertinent part, article 31.03 states:
        (a)        A change of venue may be granted in any felony or misdemeanor case punishable by confinement on the written motion of the defendant, supported by his own affidavit and the affidavit of at least two credible persons, residents of the county where the prosecution is instituted, for either of the following causes, the truth and sufficiency of which the court shall determine:
 
        1.    That there exists in the county where the prosecution is commenced so great a prejudice against him that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial; and
 
        2.    That there is a dangerous combination against him instigated by influential persons, by reason of which he cannot expect a fair trial.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.03 (Vernon 1989).
        Based on this rule, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that it is reversible error to deny to hear a motion for change of venue when the motion: (1) has not been controverted by the State; (2) contains the appropriate statutory language; and (3) is sworn to by the defendant and two credible residents of the county. See Revia v. State, 649 S.W.2d at 627. See also Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). In this case, Licourt filed his affidavit; however, the only other affidavits filed were on behalf of Licourt's codefendant. Those affidavits, which are identically worded, state:
                I am a resident of Dallas County, Texas, the county in which the case of the State of Texas v. Tamara Gomez, Cause No. F87-85734-U, is currently pending. I am aware of the contents of the defendant's motion for change of venue in the above styled cause, and it is my opinion that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in Dallas County, Texas. My opinion is based on the news coverage regarding the Cuban inmates who rioted and took hostages in two federal penitentiaries recently and the accompanying articles regarding Cuban immigrants in general. In my opinion these news stories were prejudicial and inflammatory to the defendant and, additionally based on conversations I have had with other citizens of Dallas County, Texas, the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial Dallas County, Texas.
        Licourt is not mentioned, and there is no indication that the affiants are aware of the contents of Licourt's motion for change of venue; consequently, no affidavits were filed that show prejudice against him or a dangerous combination against him. Without the proper affidavits of two credible residents of the county where the prosecution is instituted, we hold that the motion is not in proper form. If the motion is not in proper form, the trial court may overrule it without a hearing. See Lundstrom v. State, 742 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Stuart v. State, 456 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). Thus, we overrule Licourt's first point of error.
        In his second point of error, Licourt argues that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish an affirmative link between him and the cocaine found. Licourt concludes that a rational trier of fact could just as easily have found that he was merely present where the cocaine was discovered as opposed to finding that he exercised care, control, and management over the cocaine.
        In deciding a sufficiency of the evidence question on appeal, the familiar standard is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2889 (1988), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard for review of sufficiency of the evidence is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Castillo, 739 S.W.2d at 287. In a circumstantial evidence case, if there is a reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, then it cannot be said that guilt has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). However, the rules of circumstantial evidence do not require proof to a moral certainty that the circumstances presented actually exclude every hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused; it must only exclude every reasonable hypothesis raised by the evidence that would tend to exculpate the accused, and it is enough that the conclusion of guilt is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating evidence. See Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
        Where an accused is charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove two elements: (1) that the accused exercised care, control, and management over the contraband; and (2) that the accused knew the matter was contraband. Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d at 387; see Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, §§ 4.04(a), 1.02(36) (Vernon Supp. 1989). It is not necessary to prove that the accused had exclusive possession of the narcotics in question; evidence showing that the accused possessed it jointly with others is sufficient. See Martin, 753 S.W.2d at 387. However, the defendant's mere presence at a place where the contraband is being used or possessed by others does not justify a finding of joint possession or constitute one a party to an offense. Id.
        When the defendant does not have exclusive possession over the place where the controlled substance is found, there must be proof of additional affirmative links between the defendant and the contraband. See Cude v. State, 716 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Flores v. State, 650 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). We conclude that even though appellant was not the sole occupant of the house at the time of his arrest, the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction for possession with intent to deliver. Appellant was affirmatively linked to the contraband by a number of factors: (1) he had easy access to the cocaine; (2) a portion of what appeared to be cocaine was in plain view on the chest-of-drawers in the bedroom where the cocaine was found; (3) papers and documents bearing his name were found in the chest-of-drawers in the bedroom where the cocaine was found; (4) the bedroom where the cocaine was found was the only bedroom that contained men's clothing, personal effects, and appeared to be lived in; (5) Licourt's notebook linked him with the individual whose arrest prompted the raid on the house at 7406 Hundley; (6) Licourt's notebook contained detailed records of transactions that a rational trier of fact could easily infer to be drug transactions; (7) on four or five occasions Licourt was present when the owner visited the house on Hundley during the thirty-nine day period that the house was leased; (8) Licourt had keys to the car parked in the garage; (9) the large television set that Licourt apparently purchased and had sent to another residence had been moved to the house on Hundley; (10) moving boxes in the dining room, kitchen, and another room contained items belonging to Licourt; (11) a machine pistol which Licourt purchased was in a drawer in the kitchen, and the receipt for this pistol was in the chest-of-drawers in the bedroom where the drugs were discovered. See Behring v. State, 739 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1987, pet. ref'd), and cases cited therein; see also Hughes v. State, 612 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Pollan v. State, 612 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Nickerson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Tex. App.--Dallas), aff'd, 660 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). We hold that the circumstantial evidence was more than sufficient for a rational finder of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidence excluded all reasonable hypotheses other than appellant's knowing possession of the controlled substance with intent to deliver. Thus, we overrule Licourt's second point of error.
        In his third point of error, Licourt argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on affirmative link. Licourt, however, cites absolutely no authority for this proposition. Failure to cite authority leaves nothing for this Court to review. See McWherter v. State, 607 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 608, 626-27 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd); TEX. R. APP. P. 74(f). We overrule point of error three.
        In his fourth point of error, Licourt asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the law of parties to the facts of the case. Despite this assertion, we find that the trial court did apply the law of parties to the facts of this case. The trial court's charge instructed the jury on the law of parties in the abstract. FN:3 Immediately following that instruction, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
        Now, bearing in mind the foregoing instruction, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Jorge Licourt, either acting alone or with another as a party to the offense, as that term is herein defined, on or about the 28th day of August, 1987, in the County of Dallas State of Texas, did then and there knowingly or intentionally possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine, by aggregate weight including any adulterants or dilutants of 400 grams or more, you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, as charged in the indictment, and you will make no finding in your verdict as to punishment.
 
        If you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, then you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict "not guilty."
In applying the law of parties to the facts, reference may be made to an abstract instruction in another part of the charge. See Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939, 944-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Minor v. State, 476 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). We overrule Licourt's fourth point of error.
        In his fifth and sixth points of error, Licourt complains that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury not to consider, for the truth of the matter asserted, papers, documents, and a notebook seized pursuant to a search warrant. When this evidence was admitted, Licourt did not request a limiting instruction. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 105(a) controls this issue. It provides:
        When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly; but, in the absence of such request the court's action in admitting such evidence without limitation shall not be a ground for complaint on appeal.
This rule provides a basis for the trial court to instruct the jury on the limited admissibility of certain evidence at the time it is admitted. McNeil v. State, 757 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, n.p.h.). The rule provides no support for the contention that error is preserved by a request for a limiting instruction made, not during the presentation of evidence, but as an objection to the court's charge. Id.; see U.S. v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 155-56 (8th Cir. 1987). As a general principle of law, in order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 52(a). The specific grounds were not apparent from the context, and Licourt failed to present a timely request for a limiting instruction when the evidence was admitted; thus, Licourt has failed to preserve error. We overrule Licourt's fifth and sixth points of error.
        In his seventh point of error, Licourt asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence resulting from a search of 7406 Hundley because the supporting affidavit was insufficient to show probable cause and, thus, made the search illegal. Assuming, arguendo, that Licourt had standing to contest the legality of the search, we hold that the supporting affidavit was sufficient to support the search warrant. Licourt argues that the trial court should have suppressed all physical evidence and testimony stemming from the search of the house pursuant to both the federal and state constitutions and article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. FN:4 Specifically, Licourt claims that the supporting affidavit did not provide sufficient information for a detached magistrate to make a probable cause determination because: (1) the affidavit did not state that the informant described the house; (2) the affidavit did not specifically state that the exchange of two "bricks" of cocaine occurred in the kitchen of the house on Hundley; (3) the affidavit did not state whether the informant observed cocaine stored in the house or whether the cocaine was merely brought there for exchange; (4) the affidavit did not state that the informant had the ability to determine if the substance was in fact cocaine; and (5) the affidavit did not show whether the informant had given previous information and, thus, was reliable.
        We disagree with each of Licourt's assertions. Texas has recently adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test as set out in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See Bower v. State, Nos. 69,323--69,336, slip op. at 28-29 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 1989). As a result, probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant exists where the facts submitted are sufficient to justify a conclusion that the object of the search is probably on the premises to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. Id. at 26. It is only necessary that the facts and circumstances described in the affidavit would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the articles sought were located at the place where the search was to occur. Id. at 27. Additionally, because the magistrate is not bound by such finely tuned standards as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, the magistrate's determination of probable cause should be given great deference by reviewing courts. Id.
        In this instance, the supporting affidavit reads as follows:
                On August 27, 1987, at approximately l:40 P.M., [Seller] met with undercover D.E.A. Agent T. Stover [Affiant] at the Shell Service Station at the intersection of Maple Ave. and Inwood Rd. in Dallas where Special Agent Stover negotiated with [Seller] to purchase one kilogram of cocaine for $25,000.00. This negotiation was conducted under the surveillance of Dallas Police Officers and other D.E.A. Agents. [Seller] instructed Special Agent Stover to follow him to another location so as to enable [Seller] to contact his source. [Seller] drove his 1988 Chevy black Beretta to the corner of Cedar Springs and Inwood where he parked in the parking lot of a 7-11 store. Special Agent Stover followed [Seller] and parked beside his vehicle. [Seller] counted the money that Special Agent Stover provided and [Seller] then went to a pay phone to call his source and have the kilo delivered. At approximately 2:35 P.M., [Supplier] arrived at the 7-11 store parking lot driving a 1985 Olds Toronado, 2 door, TX 174HGH. [Seller] walked over to the driver's side and talked with [Supplier] momentarily. Special Agent Stover exited his vehicle and observed [Supplier] hand [Seller] a large plastic sack. Suspect [Seller] approached Special Agent Stover and handed Special Agent Stover the same package.
 
                Special Agent Stover is a Narcotic Special Agent with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration and has seen cocaine hundreds of times in the past, and based on his training and his eight years experience with the Dallas Police Department, Vice Division, recognized cocaine when he opened up the package. He observed approximately one kilogram of cocaine therein. At this time, a surveillance/arrest team contained the lot and arrested [Seller] and [Supplier] without incident. The Cocaine had a gross weight of 1054 grams and field tested positive for cocaine.
 
                At 3:45 P.M., August 27, 1987, [Seller], after being read his statutory Miranda warnings, understanding and waiving same in a knowing and voluntary manner, told Special Agents T. Stover and D. Delitta that the source of the kilo of cocaine was at a place later determined to be 7406 Hundley Blvd. in the City of Dallas, in Dallas County, Texas. Said premises are further described as being on the northeast corner of the intersection of Hundley Blvd. and Hundley Court. The mail box of the suspected place has the numbers 40 on it only. The house is a two story brick structure, the upper story being painted material. The driveway is around the rear of the premises. The front door is extremely distinctive, seventy-five percent glass with etched design, clear in color and said door faces west. There are no shutters on the windows. The bottom of the front door is covered by a brasscolored kick plate.
 
                [Seller] said that this kilo came out of an eighty kilo shipment airdropped in Dallas County, Texas. He was told this by a Columbian he referred to as "Padrino" (Godfather) the first time he met same for the purpose of picking up two (2) kilos of cocaine with Padrino. [Seller] heard [Supplier] tell Padrino that the cocaine had broken up into little rocks. Padrino told [Supplier] that ordinarily in an eighty kilo drop normally five to six kilo bricks break up into small pieces. [Seller] than saw [Supplier] give Padrino the two kilo packages of cocaine powder and Padrino take possession of same and in return give [Supplier] two fresh kilo bricks. The two kilo bricks where [sic] then weighed and examined on a small scale in the kitchen of the premises. Several large stacks of money where [sic] placed sideways out in the open in the said kitchen.
 
                "Padrino" is described by [Seller] as a Columbian male, light complected, 35 years old, between 5'7", clean shaven, of stocky build, and wears lots of gold jewelry. [Seller] further told Special Agents Stover and Delitta that cars drive into the attached double garage and the kilos are placed in the engine compartments of transport vehicles.
 
                Upon being informed of the above facts by [Seller] at 3:45 P.M. on August 27, 1987, Special Agents Stover and Delitta thereafter accompanied by [Seller] went to the above described location to verify and corroborate the information provided by [Seller]. All the information regarding the identifying features of the premises proved to be true and correct. Additionally a dark blue Buick Regal previously described by [Seller] was parked on the street out in front of the premises. Moreover as the undercover vehicle containing the Special Agents and [Seller] went by the premises [Seller] began to visibly shake and perspire heavily.
 
                Special Agent Stover believes the above facts given by the above named person [Seller] to be true and correct because the information given is directly against [Seller's] penal interest; as a result of giving said information [Seller's] life is directly now placed in danger of death; and [Seller's] description of the place said to be the source of the cocaine proved to be true and correct.
 
 
We find that the facts submitted in the affidavit are sufficient to justify a conclusion that the object of the search was probably on the premises at the time the warrant was issued. Furthermore, the facts and circumstances described in the affidavit would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the articles sought were located at the place where the search was to occur. In light of Bower and its adoption of the "totality of the circumstances" test, it is not necessary to specifically address the five alleged deficiencies raised by Licourt. We overrule Licourt's seventh point of error.
        In his eighth point of error, Licourt claims that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the admission of prejudicial hearsay evidence contained in State's exhibits thirty-two and fifty-one. Specifically, Licourt complains of the admission of receipts for the machine pistol and the big-screen television set. Both receipts had Licourt's name on them and were found in the chest-of-drawers in the bedroom where the cocaine was discovered. Documents found bearing the defendant's name are admissible as circumstantial evidence to show possession of contraband at the location where the items were found without violating the hearsay rule. Pheniz v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759, 765-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); see also Ellerbee v. State, 631 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Attwood v. State, 509 S.W.2d 342, 344-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). As a result, we overrule Licourt's eighth point of error.
        In his ninth point of error, Licourt claims that the State made an improper jury argument during the punishment phase of the trial. In pertinent part, the State argued:
        You need to deter the people that he [Appellant] is going to be associating with as soon as the bus gets him to the Texas Department of Corrections. You tell them what the citizens of Dallas County think of 23 kilos of dope or 32 or 44, any huge amount of cocaine, even a kilo of cocaine. That you as citizens of Dallas County absolutely will not stand for it, period. It is unacceptable, it robs us of our money, thousands of dollars of our productivity. It puts in our society by ingestion or inhalation or whatever method it gets into the individual it gets from there into the body of our society.
 
        See, that's the problem here. We are not talking about this guy selling cocaine which affects a few dopers. If there were a few people on the streets who were basically worthless doper types who are not productive citizens and it harm [sic] them you might say it's not that major of an offense. That's not where it stops. You see, we have to live in a society with the people that he supplies the cocaine to, their loss of productivity on the jobs, their money, the money from our society that goes to pay for this garbage.
 
        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm going to object to his argument about society as a large as being outside the record.
 
        THE COURT: Overruled.
 
        [PROSECUTOR]: Well, it's not sitting in his house; it's going somewhere and it's as a profit motive. It's being sold. It's an open market. It's a law of supply and demand. The supply is here with him. The demand is in the streets and the effect is on society, our society because of him.
 
        Now what do you do about that? What do you 12 people think should be the price of doing to our society what he has done?
Proper jury argument must fall within at least one of the following four areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; or (4) plea for law enforcement. Modden v. State, 721 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied; 108 S. Ct. 1603 (1988); Jones v. State, 725 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd). We hold that the prosecutor's jury argument was merely a plea for law enforcement. Furthermore, an improper argument will not constitute reversible error unless, in light of the record as a whole, the argument is extreme or manifestly improper, violative of a mandatory statute, or injects new facts, harmful to the accused, into the trial proceedings. Jones, 725 S.W.2d at 771; see also Franklin v. State, 693 S.W.2d 420, 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986). We have reviewed the argument of the prosecutor in the case at bar and, in light of the record as a whole, we do not find it to be so manifestly improper as to constitute reversible error. We overrule Licourt's ninth point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
SUE LAGARDE JUSTICE
 
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90
99-00214.1/me
 
 
 
 
FN:1 According to testimony at trial, a "brick" is a "rock type form," resembling a brick, in which cocaine is usually packaged.
FN:2 Josh, the drug dog, did "alert" to possible drug residue in a car parked in the garage. Licourt had the keys to this vehicle.
FN:3 The trial court's instruction on the law of parties states, "All persons are parties to an offense who are guilty of acting together in the commission of an offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both. Mere presence alone will not make a person a party to an offense. A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense."
FN:4 By referring to federal and state constitutional grounds, we presume that Licourt refers to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. Texas interprets its constitution in harmony with the United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting the fourth amendment; Texas does not apply a more restrictive standard of protection. Bower v. State, Nos. 69,333--69,336, slip op. at 28-29 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 1989).
File Date[01-02-89]
File Name[880214F]