LARRY MAPLES, FROM A DISTRICT COURT APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

 
COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS
NO. 05-88-00010-CR
 
LARRY MAPLES,                                        FROM A DISTRICT COURT
 
 
        APPELLANT,
 
 
v.
 
 
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
 
 
        APPELLEE.                                          OF COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS
 
 
 
 
BEFORE JUSTICES STEWART, KINKEADE AND OVARD FN:1
OPINION BY JUSTICE KINKEADE
JANUARY 23, 1989
        Larry Maples appeals his conviction for burglary of a habitation. After a jury trial, the jury assessed punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction, at sixty years confinement. Maples argues six points of error: 1) the evidence is legally insufficient to support a conviction; 2) the conviction is void because the trial was not conducted before the presiding judge or a duly appointed district judge; 3) the judgment and sentence are void because they were not signed and entered by the presiding judge or a duly appointed district judge; 4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; 5) he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct; and 6) he was denied the right to a trial before a fair and impartial judge. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.
        The State charged Maples with the burglary of a house belonging to Wayne Browder. At trial, Browder testified that on January 22, 1987, someone broke into his home and stole several items. A watch with diamonds in the shape of the state of Texas and a Eureka vacuum cleaner were among the missing property. Browder related that, several months later, the Collin County sheriff's department returned the watch and vacuum cleaner to him after he had identified them as part of the property stolen from his house. At trial, Browder identified the watch and vacuum in some photographs which were admitted into evidence.
        Officer Allen Barnes of the Collin County sheriff's office testified that on March 4, 1987 he executed a warrant to search Maples's residence. Barnes stated that in the Maples residence he found, among other things, a watch with diamonds in the shape of Texas and a Eureka vacuum cleaner. When shown the photographs of the watch and vacuum previously identified by Browder, Barnes recognized the items as among those recovered from the Maples residence.
        Terry Winton, a codefendant in the burglary, testified at trial. Winton's written and signed statement was also introduced into evidence. In his written statement, Winton admitted that he and Maples had committed several burglaries. The confession stated that Winton and Maples had burglarized a house at a location corresponding to that of the Browder home. Both Winton and Officer Barnes testified that Officer Barnes and another Collin County officer had driven Winton by the Browder home. The officers had asked Winton if he and Maples had burglarized that house and Winton had answered "yes."
        Maples contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a conviction because the testimony of the accomplice witness Winton was uncorroborated. Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states:
                    A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.
In order to determine the sufficiency of corroborating evidence, we must eliminate from consideration the evidence of the accomplice witness and then examine the evidence of the other witnesses to ascertain whether there is any inculpatory evidence that tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. Tolley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Edwards v. State, 427 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). The corroborative evidence need not establish the guilt of the accused, as this would vitiate the value of accomplice witness testimony. Marrs v. State, 647 286, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Pinsor v. State, 598 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Rather, the evidence need only link the defendant with the offense. Cooper v. State, 631 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
        In the present case, the testimony of Winton, the accomplice witness, was sufficiently corroborated. Officer Barnes testified that he recovered a watch and vacuum cleaner, pictured in some photographs in evidence, from Maples's residence. Browder identified the watch and vacuum cleaner in the same photographs as his property which had been stolen from his house. This testimony constitutes evidence that Maples possessed stolen property. We hold that the evidence of Maples's possession of property, which was shown to be stolen by the non-accomplice testimony of Barnes and Browder, is sufficient to corroborate Winton's accomplice testimony in order to link Maples to the offense. See Tolley v. State, 717 S.W.2d at 336.
        Maples asserts that the watch and vacuum cleaner were recovered from an uninhabited mobile home located behind the mobile home where he lived. He contends that there is no evidence showing his ownership of that mobile home. However, Mrs. Maples, the appellant's wife, testified that they owned and had control over the mobile home where the items were recovered. We overrule the first point of error.
        Maples further contends that he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. He argues that the prosecutor "breached his duty of fairness" by introducing evidence allegedly seized without a proper warrant, hearsay evidence, extraneous offenses and opinion testimony. However, there was no objection to the introduction of any of this evidence. We know of no authority which holds that the mere introduction of evidence without objection is misconduct. We hold that there was no prosecutorial misconduct in the introduction of any evidence in this case.
        Maples states that the prosecutor acted improperly by making "numerous" groundless objections at trial. Maples cites no authority, and we know of none, which holds that it is error to make a groundless objection.
        Maples also argues that misconduct occurred when the prosecutor failed to produce a search warrant which was requested by the defense counsel. Maples never presented any motions to enforce his request, and the record does not show that the search warrant was not produced. No error was preserved for appellate review regarding the search warrant.
        Further, Maples contends that the prosecutor acted improperly during the punishment phase by arguing to the jury that Maples's "partner, Mr. Winton, got sixty years. . . Maybe that will give you something to gauge by." Proper jury argument includes summation of the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence. Franklin v. State, 693 S.W.2d 420, 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). During the trial, the prosecutor had elicited testimony regarding Winton's sentence without defense objection. Therefore, we hold that the prosecutor's allusion to Winton's sentence was within the scope of proper jury argument. We overrule the fifth point of error.
        Maples's asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct came within a wide range of reasonable assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). The Strickland case pronounced the standard for reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel:
            First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. . . .
 
            It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. . . . The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. . . .
 
            
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-97. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted this standard. Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 54-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc); Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 508-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc). Strickland sets out a two-prong test: the appellant must show 1) that his counsel's performance fell below the constitutional standard, and 2) how the trial outcome would have differed but for his counsel's substandard performance.
        Maples's brief details thirty-four instances of his trial counsel's failure to prepare thoroughly, failure to object, failure to preserve error, and introduction of evidence of his own client's extraneous offenses. However, the brief completely fails to show how Maples was prejudiced by these alleged errors. Strickland clearly requires more than merely pointing to errors or showing some conceivable effect on the trial's outcome. It requires Maples to make an affirmative showing that the results of the trial would have probably been different but for his counsel's failure to prepare, failure to object, or introduction of certain evidence. Maples has failed to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. He has not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for his counsel's mistakes. See Castillo v. State, 751 S.W.2d 521, 523-24 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1988, no pet.). Therefore, we overrule the fourth point of error.
        Maples contends that the conviction, judgment and sentence are void because the trial judge was not the presiding judge nor a district judge, nor was he duly appointed and authorized to sit for the presiding judge. He also asserts that the judge was not fair and impartial. Maples, however, fails to cite any authority to support any of these arguments. Failure to cite authority leaves nothing for this Court to review. McWherter v. State, 607 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). We overrule each point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          ED KINKEADE
                                                          JUSTICE
 
 
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90.
 
88-00010.F
 
FN:1 The Honorable John D. Ovard, Justice, succeeded the Honorable Joseph A. Devany, Justice, at the expiration of Justice Devany's term effective December 30, 1988.
File Date[01-02-89]
File Name[880010]