Dandrea McGree v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 363rd District Court of Dallas County

11th Court of Appeals

Eastland, Texas

Opinion

Dandrea D. McGree

Appellant

Vs. Nos. 11-02-00229-CR & 11-02-00248-CR B Appeals from Dallas County

State of Texas

Appellee

The jury convicted appellant, upon his plea of guilty, of evading arrest[1] and of possession of cocaine.[2] The jury assessed appellant=s punishment at confinement for 6 years for evading arrest and confinement for 15 years for possession of cocaine. We affirm.

In each case, appellant=s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief in which he conscientiously examines the proceedings both pretrial and during trial. Counsel correctly notes that a plea of guilty before the jury admits all the facts necessary to establish guilt. Wilkerson v. State, 736 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Waltmon v. State, 76 S.W.3d 148 (Tex.App. - Beaumont 2002, no pet=n); Addicks v. State, 15 S.W.3d 608 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet=n ref=d). Counsel also examines the performance of trial counsel and concludes that appellant was afforded reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Counsel further states that neither the indictment nor the trial on the merits present any arguable issues to be raised on appeal. Counsel states that he believes the appeals are frivolous and without merit.

Counsel has furnished appellant with a copy of each of the briefs and has advised appellant of his right to review the record and file pro se briefs. A pro se brief has not been filed in either case. Counsel has complied with the procedures outlined in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); and Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).

Following the procedures outlined in Anders, we have independently reviewed the record. Dallas County Sheriff=s Deputy Tim Ervin testified that he was Ashooting speed enforcement with the laser unit@ when he clocked the vehicle appellant was driving at 76 mph in a 60 mph speed zone. Deputy Ervin pulled out behind appellant=s vehicle, turned on his squad car=s lights, and attempted to stop appellant=s vehicle. A chase ensued with appellant reaching speeds above 100 mph. The chase ended when appellant drove into an empty house. Appellant kicked out the driver=s side window, crawled out, and ran off. Deputy Ervin pursued appellant and Atackled@ him. Appellant resisted. Deputy Ervin testified that he had to use pepper spray A[t]o gain control of the situation.@ Appellant stipulated that the substance retrieved from the vehicle he was driving was cocaine and that it had an aggregate weight of 90.52 grams.

We agree with appellate counsel that the record reflects that appellant received reasonably effective assistance from his trial counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Cr.App.1999). Trial counsel=s representations were within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, and the records do not reflect that there is a reasonable probability that, but for any error by counsel, appellant would have not pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. den=d, 525 U.S. 810 (1998). We agree that the appeals are without merit.

The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

PER CURIAM

April 17, 2003

Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and

Wright, J., and McCall, J.

[1]Cause No. 11-02-00229-CR.

[2]Cause No. 11-02-00248-CR.