Brenda Cole v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, et al.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT JACKSON
August 23, 2010 Session
BRENDA COLE v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY ET AL.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Obion County
No. 24,474
W. Michael Maloan, Chancellor
No. W2009-02222-WC-R3-WC - Mailed March 28, 2011; Filed April 29, 2011
An employee was struck in the back of the leg by a wooden pallet while at work. She alleged
that she sustained permanent injuries to her neck, back, and foot as a result of that incident
and filed a complaint against her employer in chancery court for workers’ compensation
benefits. Her employer denied that she had sustained any permanent impairment or
disability. The chancery court held that the employee sustained a compensable injury and
awarded 20% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed.1 We affirm
the judgment.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) (2008) Appeal as of Right;
Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
D ONALD P. H ARRIS, S R. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J ANICE M. H OLDER,
J., and T ONY A. C HILDRESS, S P. J., joined.
W. Lewis Jenkins, Dyersburg, Tennessee, for the appellants, Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
Jeffrey A. Garrety and Michael J. Cash, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Brenda Cole.
1
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred
to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
Brenda Cole began working for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”) in
August 1999. She was working as a tire inspector on February 7, 2005, when she was struck
on the back of her right calf by a wooden pallet being transported by a “towveyor.” She fell
to the ground as a result of the blow. She immediately went to Goodyear’s on-site clinic.
The record of her clinic visit states that she had two small marks on her right calf and
complained of pain in that area. The abrasion was cleaned and treated with Neosporin, an
adhesive bandage, and ibuprofen. Thereafter, she returned to work.
Ms. Cole returned to the clinic the next day. She reported that she had soreness in her
left rib cage. An appointment was made for her to see Dr. Shah at the on-site clinic on the
following day. Dr. Shah noted that Ms. Cole had left thoracic pain and mild swelling of her
right ankle. He ordered x-rays of the rib cage and prescribed ibuprofen and heat packs. Ms.
Cole returned to the clinic on February 10 and February 16. Her symptoms on those dates
were the same as her previous visit. The clinic provided additional conservative treatment.
Ms. Cole next returned to Goodyear’s clinic on April 7, 2005, and was examined by
Dr. Eason. She continued to have left thoracic pain. In addition, she stated that she
experienced increased pain when she raised her right arm or twisted her trunk to the left. On
April 10, she reported that her back pain was “much better” but that she had developed pain
on the left side of her neck and on the top of her left hand. Dr. Eason ordered physical
therapy. Dr. Eason continued to see Ms. Cole through the summer. In September, she
complained of right foot pain. Dr. Eason ordered additional tests including a Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) of her lumbar spine. In March 2006, Dr. Eason referred Ms. Cole
to Dr. LaVerne Lovell, a neurosurgeon.
On May 19, 2008, Brenda Cole filed a complaint against Goodyear in chancery court
in Obion County seeking workers’ compensation benefits for alleged injuries to her cervical
spine, lumbar spine, and right leg. The chancery court held a trial on Ms. Cole’s claim on
April 7, 2009.
Dr. Lovell testified by deposition. He examined Ms. Cole on March 6, 2006, and July
3, 2006. Ms. Cole told him “that about six months [after her injury], around Labor Day, she
noted the onset of sciatic distribution pain that radiated down to give her numbness in the
lateral aspect of the right foot.” Dr. Lovell also reviewed the MRI of her lumbar spine
ordered by Dr. Eason and an electromyophy (EMG) test. The EMG showed no
abnormalities, but the MRI showed degenerative changes at the L4-5 level. Because Ms.
-2-
Cole’s reported symptoms were in the S1 nerve distribution, Dr Lovell believed them to be
unrelated to the degenerative changes shown in the MRI. He also opined that the February
7, 2005 incident was unlikely to be the cause of her symptoms because the area of her leg
that was struck did not involve any branches of the S1 nerve route. He did not believe that
Ms. Cole had any permanent impairment and placed no restrictions on her activities.
Dr. Apurva Dalal, an orthopaedic surgeon, performed an independent medical
evaluation at the request of Ms. Cole’s attorney. Dr. Dalal noted “tenderness in the lower
cervical spine with paraspinal muscle spasms.” He also noted paraspinal muscle spasms on
his examination of Ms. Cole’s lower lumbar spine. He observed that Ms. Cole had a loss of
sensation on the lateral aspect of the right leg, in the fourth and fifth toes, and in the web
space between the fourth and fifth toes dorsally. Dr. Dalal diagnosed Ms. Cole as having a
lumbosacral strain, a cervical strain, and indicated “status post-contusion right leg with
numbness in the right foot.” He explained that “the sprains and strains – what we call a
sprain . . . is actually a torn ligament. And torn ligaments sometimes don’t heal on [their]
own and become a permanent problem.” In his opinion, all three conditions were caused by
the February 7, 2005 event. He assigned Ms. Cole a 5% anatomical impairment to the body
as a whole for each condition, a total of 15% impairment to the body as a whole. He
recommended that Ms. Cole “avoid prolonged walking, standing, stooping, squatting and
bending . . . overhead work and work away from the body. She should not lift more than
thirty pounds of weight.”
Ms. Cole was fifty-six years old at the time of trial. She was a high school graduate
with no additional education or specialized training. Prior to being hired by Goodyear, she
held various jobs in the textile industry. She had several different jobs for Goodyear. She
did not miss any time from work as a result of her injury, and she continued to work in the
same job at the time of the trial. She testified that she had back pain approximately two days
per week, that her neck often ached and became stiff, and that she had pain in her right foot
daily. Her right foot sometimes became stiff and swollen.
The trial court took the case under advisement. It issued its ruling by letter to counsel,
which is not in the record. The trial court found that Ms. Cole had sustained injuries to her
foot, back, and neck as a result of the February 7, 2005 event and awarded 15% permanent
partial disability to the body as a whole. Goodyear subsequently filed a motion requesting
specific findings of fact pursuant to Rule 52 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The
court granted the motion and adopted proposed findings submitted by Ms. Cole. Goodyear
appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by finding that Ms. Cole sustained a permanent
impairment as a result of her work injury.
-3-
Standard of Review
The standard of review of findings of fact is “de novo upon the record of the trial
court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance
of evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (2008). When credibility and
weight of given testimony are involved, considerable deference is given the trial court when
the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witness’ demeanor and to hear in-court
testimony. Whirlpool Corp. v. Nakhoneinh, 69 S.W.3d 164, 167 (Tenn. 2002). When the
issues involve expert medical testimony that is contained in the record by deposition,
determination of the weight and credibility of the evidence necessarily must be drawn from
the contents of the depositions, and the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions with
regard to those issues. Bohanan v. City of Knoxville, 136 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tenn. 2004);
Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg, 945 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tenn. 1997); Elmore v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 824 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tenn. 1992).
Analysis
Goodyear contends that the testimony of Dr. Dalal is insufficient to support a finding
of causation. Goodyear notes that Dr. Dalal conceded that the degenerative conditions in Ms.
Cole’s neck and back existed prior to the work injury. Goodyear argues that Dr. Dalal did
not specify how the work injury advanced or aggravated Ms. Cole’s degenerative conditions
but merely attributed subsequent “pain and symptoms” to the work injury. Goodyear argues
that this testimony places the case in line with Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
811 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 1991), in which the Court held that a mere increase in symptoms
is not compensable. In response, Ms. Cole points out that there is no evidence that any of her
degenerative conditions were symptomatic prior to the February 2005 event.
Goodyear also argues that the testimony of Dr. Lovell is more compelling than that
of Dr. Dalal in light of Dr. Lovell’s explanation that Ms. Cole’s symptoms did not appear to
match Dr. Lovell’s objective findings. Goodyear also points out that Ms. Cole’s low back
and right foot symptoms did not arise until September 2005, approximately six months after
the event. Dr. Dalal testified that there is a sural nerve in the calf which goes down to the
fourth and fifth toe, and he opined that a contusion of that nerve in the calf could reasonably
have resulted in the numbness experienced by Ms. Cole. Dr. Dalal testified that a time lag
between an injury and the onset of symptoms may occur. According to Dr. Dalal’s
testimony, an injured person will sometimes focus on the most acute injury and not realize
another injury until the former subsides. In other situations, Dr. Dalai testified, a patient
sometimes experiences but fails to report a condition she thinks will go away and later
reports the condition when it continues.
-4-
We have examined the medical evidence de novo, without any presumption of
correctness of the trial court’s findings. Bohanan, 136 S.W.3d at 624. We cannot say that
the evidence, taken as a whole, compels the conclusion reached by the trial court. In our
view, reasonable minds could arrive at differing conclusions based on the evidence in the
record. The trial court was required, as are we, to resolve all reasonable doubts as to the
causation of an injury and whether the injury arose out of the employment in favor of the
employee. Phillips v. A. & H Constr. Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tenn. 2004). A finding
that a workplace event caused an injury cannot be based on proof that is speculative,
conjectural, or uncertain, Clark v. Nashville Mach. Elevator Co., 129 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn.
2004). However, “absolute medical certainty is not required to establish causation.” White
v. Wertham Indus., 824 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tenn. 1992). We have determined based on the
testimony of Dr. Dalal that Ms. Cole’s injuries reasonably could have been caused by the
February 7, 2005 work accident, and we therefore hold that the evidence does not
preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the work injury was the cause of the
permanent injuries to Ms. Cole’s neck, back, and leg.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the chancery court. Costs are taxed to the appellant,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, and its surety, for which execution may issue if
necessary.
_________________________________
DONALD P. HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE
-5-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT JACKSON
August 23, 2010
BRENDA COLE v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY et al.
Chancery Court for Obion County
No. 24,474
No. W2009-02222-WC-R3-WC - Filed April 29, 2011
JUDGMENT ORDER
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order
of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's
Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
are incorporated herein by reference;
Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the
Panel should be accepted and approved; and
It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions
of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment
of the Court.
Costs on appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company, for which execution may issue if necessary.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.