Penny Wells v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT NASHVILLE
June 23, 2008 Session
PENNY WELLS v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL.
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Rutherford County
No. 06-1766WC
Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor
No. M2007-02657-WC-R3-WC - Mailed - March 4, 2009
Filed - April 7, 2009
This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme
Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008). An employee who sustained
a workplace injury in 1997 but who did not miss any work filed suit in the Chancery Court for
Rutherford County in 2006 seeking a reconsideration of the 2003 settlement of her workers’
compensation claim arising out of that injury. In response to the employer’s motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the suit was time-barred under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2)
(2008) because it was not filed within four hundred weeks following her return to work, the
employee insisted that the time for seeking reconsideration should begin to run from the date in 2003
that she reached maximum medical improvement, rather than from the date she returned to work in
1997. The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, and the employee
appealed. We affirm the trial court based on the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6241(a)(2).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) (2008) Appeal as of Right;
Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
WILLIAM C. KOCH , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JON KERRY BLACKWOOD and
WALTER C. KURTZ, SR.JJ., joined.
Larry R. McElhaney II, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Penny F. Wells.
Randolph A. Veazey and Thomas W. Tucker, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Nissan
North America, Inc. and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Ms. Penny Wells began working for Nissan North America, Inc., (“Nissan”) in 1995. In June
1997, she sustained a workplace injury to her lumbar spine. Dr. George Lien evaluated and treated
Ms. Wells for her injury. While Dr. Lien restricted Ms. Wells’s duties following the injury, he did
not completely restrict her from working, and Nissan was able to accommodate her work restrictions.
Ms. Wells did not miss any days of work as a result of her injury.
Dr. Lien placed Ms. Wells at maximum medical improvement in June 2003. He determined
that Ms. Wells had sustained a 5% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole, all of which
he attributed to her work injury. Dr. Lien released Ms. Wells to work with a restriction of no
bending at the waist more than thirty degrees, and again Nissan accommodated this restriction.
Ms. Wells and Nissan settled her workers’ compensation claim in 2003. Nissan agreed to
pay certain medical expenses incurred by Ms. Wells as a result of her workplace injury and to
compensate her for permanent partial disability of 10% to the body as a whole. The settlement also
expressly provided that any reconsideration of the award would be pursuant to the terms of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2) (2008). The Rutherford County Chancery Court approved the
settlement in October 2003.
Nissan terminated Ms. Wells in September 2006 after she sustained injuries to her heels that
prevented her from working. There is no indication in the record that her heel injuries were workrelated. In November 2006, Ms. Wells filed a complaint seeking reconsideration, pursuant to Tenn
Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2), of her workers’ compensation award related to the 1997 injury. Nissan
and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that
Ms. Wells’s application for reconsideration was time-barred.
The trial court found that Ms. Wells returned to work on the day of or within a few days
following her June 1997 injury,1 which was more than four hundred weeks before her loss of
employment in September 2006. For injuries arising prior to July 1, 2004, an employee may seek
reconsideration “if the loss of employment is within four hundred (400) weeks of the day the
employee returned to work.” Tenn Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2). Having concluded that Ms. Wells
returned to work more than four hundred weeks before her employment with Nissan was terminated,
the trial court concluded Ms. Wells’s claim for reconsideration was time-barred and awarded
summary judgment to Nissan and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company.
Ms. Wells appeals from this determination. She maintains that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 506-241(a)(2) an employee has not returned to work until he or she has reached maximum medical
improvement. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
II.
Courts reviewing an award of workers’ compensation benefits must conduct an in-depth
examination of the trial court’s factual findings and conclusions. Wilhelm v. Krogers, 235 S.W.3d
122, 126 (Tenn. 2007). When conducting this examination, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2)
1
The parties agree that Ms. Wells did not miss any days of work. Whether M s. Wells missed zero days or only
a few days of work is immaterial to the resolution of this case.
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requires the reviewing court to “[r]eview . . . the trial court’s findings of fact . . . de novo upon the
record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the
preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” The reviewing court must also give considerable
deference to the trial court’s findings regarding the credibility of the live witnesses and to the trial
court’s assessment of the weight that should be given to their testimony. Whirlpool Corp. v.
Nakhoneinh, 69 S.W.3d 164, 167 (Tenn. 2002). However, the reviewing courts need not give similar
deference to a trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence such as depositions, Orrick
v. Bestway Trucking, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tenn. 2006); Bohanan v. City of Knoxville, 136
S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tenn. 2004), or to a trial court’s conclusions of law, Perrin v. Gaylord Entm’t Co.,
120 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Tenn. 2003).
III.
An employee may seek reconsideration “where the employee is no longer employed by the
pre-injury employer and makes application to the appropriate court within one (1) year of the
employee’s loss of employment, if the loss of employment is within four hundred (400) weeks of
the day the employee returned to work.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2). Ms. Wells contends
“the day the employee returned to work” means the date an employee reaches maximum medical
improvement. Nissan and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company argue that the phrase means
precisely what the plain language suggests.
When called upon to construe a statute, courts must first ascertain and then give full effect
to the General Assembly’s intent and purpose. Auto Credit of Nashville v. Wimmer, 231 S.W.3d
896, 900 (Tenn. 2007); State ex rel. Pope v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 145 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (Tenn.
2004). We must construe statutes as we find them, Jackson v. Jackson, 186 Tenn. 337, 342, 210
S.W.2d 332, 334 (1948), and therefore, our search for a statute’s meaning and purpose must begin
with the words of the statute. Blankenship v. Estate of Bain, 5 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tenn. 1999). When
interpreting the Workers’ Compensation Act, the court is to give a liberal construction in favor of
compensation and resolve any doubts in the employee’s favor. Wait v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill.,
240 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tenn. 2007). However, construing its provisions liberally in favor of
employees “does not authorize courts to amend, alter, or extend its provisions beyond its obvious
meaning” Wait v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 240 S.W.3d at 224-25.
The General Assembly has provided that an employee may seek reconsideration based upon
loss of employment where the “loss of employment is within four hundred (400) weeks of the day
the employee returned to work.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2). In Lay v. Scott County Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 109 S.W.3d 293, 297-99 (Tenn. 2003), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an employee
may be deemed to have made a meaningful return to work even though he or she has not yet reached
maximum medical improvement. The trial court’s determination that the four hundred week period
began running on the day of or within a few days of the injury, rather than on the date the employee
reached maximum medical improvement, is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute and the
Court’s decision in Lay v. Scott County Sheriff’s Dep’t. To embrace Ms. Wells’s argument would
be to improperly amend or alter this provision beyond its obvious meaning. See Wait v. Travelers
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Indem. Co. of Ill., 240 S.W.3d at 225. A contrary resolution would also produce extraordinarily
anomalous outcomes.
IV.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are taxed to Ms. Penny Wells and her
surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
___________________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUSTICE
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
JUNE 23, 2008 SESSION
PENNY WELLS v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., ET AL
Chancery Court for Rutherford County
No. 06-1766WC
No. M2007-02657-WC-R3-WC - Filed - April 7, 2009
JUDGMENT
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the
Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference.
Whereupon, it appeals to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the Panel should be
accepted and approved; and
It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted
and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court.
Costs will be paid by Ms, Penny Wells and her surety, for which execution may issue if
necessary.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM
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