Charles Cruse v. Rollins Truck Leasing, et al.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT JACKSON
March 23, 2009, Session
CHARLES CRUSE v. ROLLINS TRUCK LEASING ET AL.
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
No. 76456-4 T. D
Rita L. Stotts, Judge
No. W2008-02027-WC-R3-WC - Mailed June 18, 2009; Filed July 27, 2009
Employee had a heart attack in 1996. He and Employer entered into a court-approved settlement of
the claim, requiring Employer to provide future medical treatment for the injury. In 2000, Employee
experienced additional coronary problems, which required bypass surgery. The trial court denied
his petition to require Employer to pay for that medical care. We affirm the judgment.1
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) (2008) Appeal as of Right;
Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
WILLIAM C. COLE, SP . J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER , C. J., and
WALTER C. KURTZ, SR. J., joined.
M. Scott Willhite, Jonesboro, Arkansas, for the appellant, Charles Cruse.
R. Scott McCullough, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Rollins Truck Leasing and CNA
Insurance Company.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
Charles Cruse (“Employee”) had a heart attack in 1996 when a battery exploded near him
while he was at work for Rollins Truck Leasing (“Employer”). He underwent coronary bypass
surgery as a result. His workers’ compensation claim was settled in August 1997. The order
approving the settlement stated: “[Employee] will be reimbursed for all medical expenses related
to the work accident he has paid. Future medical treatment with Dr. Joseph Weinstein will remain
1
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special W orkers’ Compensation Appeals
Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a
report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
open for the remainder of [Employee’s] life pursuant to the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation
Statutes.” Some additional medical treatment was provided pursuant to that provision.
In October 2000, testing revealed additional or new blockage in two of Employee’s coronary
arteries. Dr. Weinstein referred Employee to Dr. Jerry Gooch, a cardiac surgeon. Dr. Gooch
performed bypass surgery. Employer denied that the procedure was related to the 1996 event and
declined to pay for it.
Dr. Weinstein did not testify. Employee filed an affidavit from Dr. Weinstein, however,
which states: “I am of the opinion that [Employee’s] coronary angioplasty and coronary artery
bypass graft surgery was causally related to his initial on the job myocardial infarction which
resulted from a battery exploding in 1996.” In addition, the record contains a letter of October 15,
2001, from Dr. Weinstein to Employee’s attorney, which states:
Following an accident at work when a battery exploded in 1996,
[Employee] suffered a myocardial infarction. This set into motion
multiple procedures, including but not limited to percutaneous
transluminal coronary angioplasty and coronary artery bypass graft
surgery. . . . I feel that the coronary artery bypass graft surgery was
causally related to the initial accident.
Employer placed Dr. Gooch’s deposition into evidence. Dr. Gooch opined: “The major
cause of [the need for bypass surgery] was [Employee’s] genetic history and his smoking. And I
also noticed he had hypertension and maybe high cholesterol, too.” Employee had smoked
approximately a pack a day for over thirty years and had continued to smoke after the 1996 heart
attack. On cross-examination, Dr. Gooch stated that he was aware of Employee’s previous heart
attack but not that the heart attack was a work injury. He stated that the blockages, which were the
cause of the bypass surgery, were not caused or precipitated by trauma. He further testified that the
arteries bypassed in 2000 were either not involved in the 1996 heart attack or were unobstructed,
as shown by testing done after the 1997 angioplasty. Therefore, Dr. Gooch concluded that the
blockages had developed after 1997.
The trial court denied Employee’s petition for payment of medical expenses, ruling that
Employee failed to meet his burden of proof. On appeal, Employee asserts that the trial court erred
by denying his petition.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in a workers’ compensation case de novo
with a presumption of correctness, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (Supp. 2006). When the trial court has seen the witnesses and heard
the testimony, especially where issues of credibility and the weight of testimony are involved, we
must extend considerable deference to the trial court’s factual findings. Whirlpool Corp. v.
Nakhoneinh, 69 S.W.3d 164, 167 (Tenn. 2002). We extend no deference to the trial court’s findings
when reviewing documentary evidence such as depositions, however. Id. As to questions of law,
2
our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Perrin v. Gaylord Entm’t Co.,
120 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Tenn. 2003).
Analysis
Employee argues that the trial court erred by ruling that his bypass surgery was not causally
related to his original injury. His argument has two basic premises. First, he argues that the trial
court improperly shifted the burden of proof to him to prove that the surgery was related to his
original injury. Second, he argues that Dr. Weinstein’s opinion, as expressed in his affidavit and
letter, should be given greater weight because he is the authorized treating physician.
Employee cites Carter v. Shoney’s, 845 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tenn. 1992), and Russell v.
Genesco, 651 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tenn. 1983), for the presumption that treatment furnished by
authorized physicians is necessary and reasonable. In this case, however, Employer presented
affirmative evidence, in the form of Dr. Gooch’s testimony, that the treatment at issue was not
related to the original injury. Employee’s position seems to be that the presumption described in
Carter and Russell cannot be rebutted. There is no authority to support this position. To the
contrary, an employer is not liable for post-judgment medical treatment made necessary by an
intervening cause. See Anderson v. Westfield Group, 259 S.W.3d 690, 698-99 (Tenn. 2008).
“Whether or not a particular medical treatment is ‘made reasonably necessary’ by Employee’s work
for Employer . . . is a question which must be answered based upon the proof presented at the time
the treatment is proposed.” Hegger v. Ford Motor Co., No. M2007-00759-WC-R3-WC, 2008 WL
4072047, at *4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Sept. 2, 2008) (citations omitted).
Dr. Weinstein’s status as a treating physician may be an appropriate reason for giving weight
to his testimony. However, Dr. Gooch was also a treating physician. Because Dr. Gooch’s opinions
were presented by means of an evidentiary deposition, the trial court was able to evaluate the
medical basis for those opinions. In contrast, Dr. Weinstein’s opinions were presented by means
of a letter and a short affidavit, which did not reveal the reasoning behind his conclusions. Having
reviewed the evidence de novo, we are unable to conclude that it preponderates against the trial
court’s findings.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are taxed to Charles Cruse and his surety,
for which execution may issue if necessary.
___________________________________
WILLIAM C. COLE, SPECIAL JUDGE
3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT JACKSON
March 23, 2009 Session
CHARLES CRUSE v. ROLLINS TRUCK LEASING, et al.
Circuit Court for Shelby County
No. 76456-4 T.D.
No. W2008-02027-WC-R3-WC - Filed July 27, 2009
JUDGMENT ORDER
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order
of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's
Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
are incorporated herein by reference;
Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the
Panel should be accepted and approved; and
It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions
of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment
of the Court.
Costs on appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Charles Cruse and his surety,
for which execution may issue if necessary.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM
4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
