Hughes v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
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In 2004, Plaintiffs Dalton and Sandra Hughes sued the city of Nashville and one of its employees under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). Mr. Hughes worked for the local fire department. He alleged that Defendant Frank Archey negligently revved the engine to a front-end loader. The loader dropped its bucket to the pavement and made a loud, scraping noise. Mr. Hughes jumped awkwardly over some guardrail to get out of the way of the loader. Mr. Hughes injured both shoulders and both knees in the fall, and ultimately had rotator-cuff surgery and a double knee replacement. Mr. Hughes incurred significant medical bills and missed work. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Mr. Hughes, and the city appealed, arguing that Mr. Archey acted outside the scope of his employment. Furthermore, the city characterized Mr. Archey's act as an "intentional tort", which absolved it from liability under the GTLA. The Supreme Court found that although Mr. Archey's conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted an intentional tort. The city could not be held liable under the GTLA. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to enter a judgment against Mr. Archey.
Court Description: After being injured when he jumped out of the path of a front-end loader owned by a governmental entity and operated by its employee, the plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the employee either was negligent in his operation of the equipment or had acted intentionally and that the governmental entity was liable under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff against the governmental entity and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The governmental entity sought permission to appeal, arguing first that the employee had acted outside the scope of his employment and, secondly, that he had committed an assault against the plaintiff, either of which would preclude liability under the Act. Although we hold that the employee s conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted the intentional tort of assault rather than negligence. The governmental entity cannot, therefore, be held liable under the Act absent proof of its negligent supervision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to the governmental entity, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment against the employee.
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