State vs. Steve Hill
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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE FILED AT KNOXVILLE August 10, 1999 APRIL SESSION, 1999 Appellate C ourt Clerk Cecil Crowson, Jr. STATE OF TENNESSEE, Appellee, VS. STEVE EUGENE HILL, Appe llant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9806-CR-00196 BLOUNT COUNTY HON. D. KELLY THOMAS, JR. JUDGE (Direct Appeal - Probation) FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: JULIE A. MAR TIN Contract Appellate Defender P. O. Box 426 Knoxville, TN 37901-0426 JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney General and Reporter ELLEN H. POLLACK Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243 MIKE FLYNN District Attorney General EDWARD P. BAILEY, JR. Assistant District Attorney 363 Court Street Maryville, TN 37804 OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE OPINION The appellan t, Steve Euge ne Hill, p led gu ilty in the Blount County Criminal Court to o ne (1) co unt of eva ding arre st, a Class E felony, and one (1) count of reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of one (1) year for evading arrest and six (6) months for reckless driving. The trial court further ordered that the appellant be placed on supervised probation upon his service of fifteen (15) days in jail. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to serve fifteen (15) days in jail before being placed on probation. After a thorough review of the record before this Cou rt, we conclude that there is no revers ible error and affirm the trial cou rt’s judgm ent. I On July 18, 1997, Officer James L. Wilson observed the appellant driving his automobile in speeds in excess of the posted speed limit on Highway 321 We st. He also observed the appellant unlawfully changing lanes and otherwise driving in an e rratic manne r in heavy traffic. W hen O fficer W ilson a ctivated his blue lights to stop the appellant’s vehicle, the appellant fled from the officer. The appellan t was later a pprehe nded a nd place d unde r arrest. Subseq uently, the appellant pled guilty to one (1) count of reckless driving and one (1) count of felony evading arrest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received concurrent sentences of six (6) months for reckless driving and one (1) -2- year for felony evading arrest, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing h earing, the app ellant admitted tha t he had bee n drag racing on Highway 321 when he was arrested. However, he denie d inten tionally evading the officer’s signal to stop. He testified that he was self-employed and did not drink alcohol or take illegal drugs. When the prosecutor questioned the appellant regard ing his prior convictions, he testified that he did not remember ever being arrested. The pre-sentence report indicates that the appellant has a prior criminal history including convictions for leaving the scene of an acc ident, public intox ication, ass ault and b attery and driving on a revoked license. At the co nclus ion of th e hea ring, the trial cou rt deter mined that the appellant should serve fifteen (15) days in jail before being placed on supervised proba tion. Fro m his sente nce, th e app ellant b rings th is app eal. II This Court’s review of the sentenc e impose d by the trial court is de novo with a presumptio n of co rrectn ess. T enn. C ode A nn. § 4 0-35- 401(d ). This presumption is conditioned upon an affirmative showing in the record that the trial judge considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W .2d 166 , 169 (T enn. 1991). If the trial court fails to comply with the statutory directives, there is no presumption of correctness and our review is simply de novo. State v. Poo le, 945 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 19 97). The burden is upon th e appe aling party to show th at the sente nce is improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) Sentencing Commission Comm ents. -3- In conducting our review, we are required, pursuant to Ten n. Cod e Ann. § 40-35-210, to consider the following factors in sentencing: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the pre senten ce repo rt; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating factors in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; and (6) any statement the defen dant w ishes to ma ke in h is own beha lf about s entenc ing. An especially mitigated or standard offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony is presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing in the absence of evidence to the con trary. Ten n. Cod e Ann. § 40-35-1 02(6). A tr ial court must presume that a defendant sentenced to eight years or less and who is not an offende r for whom inc arceration is a priority is subjec t to alternative sentencing. State v. Byrd, 861 S.W.2d 377, 379-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). It is further presumed that a sentence other than incarceration would resu lt in successful rehabilitation unless rebutted by sufficient eviden ce in the reco rd. Id. at 380. H owev er, although a defe ndan t may b e pres ume d to be a favor able candidate for alternative sentencing, the defendant has the burden of estab lishing suitability for total probatio n. State v. Boggs, 932 S.W.2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b). Even though probation must be autom atically con sidered , “the defend ant is not a utoma tically entitled to probation as a m atter of la w.” Te nn. C ode A nn. § 4 0-35- 303(b ) Sen tencin g Commission Com ments ; State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Tenn. Crim. -4- App. 1991). Indeed, a defendant seeking full probation bears the burden on appeal of showing that the sentence ac tually im pose d is imp roper and th at full probation will be in both the best interests of the defendant and the public. State v. Bingham, 910 S.W .2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1995 ). A trial court should consider the circumstances of the offense, the defen dant’s criminal record, the defendant’s social history and present condition, the need for deterrence, and the best interest of the d efend ant an d the p ublic in determining whethe r to grant o r deny pro bation. State v. Boyd, 925 S.W.2d 237, 244 (Tenn . Crim. A pp. 199 5); State v. Black, 924 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In d etermin ing if incarce ration is ap propriate , a trial court may consider the need to protect society by restraining a defendant having a long history of criminal conduct, the need to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense, whether con finement is pa rticularly appropriate to effective ly deter others likely to comm it similar offenses, and whether less re strictive measure s have often or recen tly been u nsucce ssfully app lied to the d efenda nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1); see also State v. Grigsby, 957 S.W .2d 541 , 545 (T enn. C rim. App. 1997 ). III The appellant argues that he is entitled to a presumption o f alternative sentencing becau se he w as con victed of a Class E felony and a Class B misdem eanor. Furthermore, he contends that a period of fifteen (15) day s in confinement is overly excessive under the facts of this case. The appellant received a sentence of split confinement, which is a form of alternative sentencing under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-104(c)(4). It is the -5- appe llant’s burden, how ever, to establish that total probation will be in both the best interests of the defendant and the pub lic. State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d at 456. In this case, the appellant has a prior criminal history consisting of convictions for leaving the scene of an accident, public intoxication, assault and battery and d riving on a revok ed lice nse. T he ap pellant did no t reme mbe r his convictions for these offense s and he d enied having a criminal history to the officer prep aring the pre-sen tence re port. The trial court m ade no findings w ith regard to its decisio n to confine the appellant for a period of fifteen (15) days. However, upon this Court’s de novo review, we conclude that a period of confine ment is w arranted in this case . Albeit somewhat mino r, the ap pellan t has a prior crim inal his tory extending ove r a period of ten (10) years. Moreover, the appellant committed and was convicted of the offens e for lea ving the scen e of an accide nt while on bond awaiting trial for the present offenses. This re flects n egative ly on his potential for rehabilitation. Additionally, it appears that the appellant was less than can did with the trial court in claiming that he did not recall ever being arrested. This Court has recognized that an appellant’s lack of candor with the trial court reflects negatively on the appe llant’s rehabilitation potential. State v. Zeolia , 928 S.W.2d 457, 463 (Tenn. Crim. App . 1996). After considering the nature of the offenses committed, the appellant’s prior record and the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation, we conclude that a period -6- of fifteen (15) days confinement is appropriate under the circumstances of th is case. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ____________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE CONCUR: ___________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE ___________________________________ NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE -7-
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