In re Application of Roger I. Roots
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Supreme Court No. 2000-276-M.P. In re Application of Roger I. Roots. : Present: Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ. OPINION PER CURIAM. This case comes before us on an application by the petitioner Roger I. Roots (petitioner or Roots) seeking admission to the bar of the State of Rhode Island. Roots, who was born in October, 1967, is a 1999 graduate of the Roger Williams University School of Law. Following his law-school graduation, he took and passed the Rhode Island bar examination. In accordance with its usual procedures, this Court s Committee on Character and Fitness (committee) examined Roots s record and interviewed him after he had passed the bar examination. Because the committee had serious concerns relating to his character and fitness to become a member of the bar of this state, it conducted a number of hearings to determine whether it would recommend Roots s admission to the bar. As a result of these hearings, the committee in November 1999 voted on his application. The vote of the committee was five in favor of his admission and two opposed. After this vote, members of the committee circulated memoranda setting forth the views of the majority of the committee and also the views of the minority. The committee conducted a further investigation to determine whether additional information existed that should be taken into account. Upon determining that no additional information, other than that already obtained by the committee, was available, the committee called a meeting for April 12, 2000. Before the date of that meeting, the -1- membership of the committee had changed. One member had resigned and the Attorney General s designee had been replaced. The person who replaced the member who had resigned recused herself from participation in the vote on April 12. The Attorney General s new designee, however, did participate in the vote. The committee then voted, resulting in a recommendation by four members to admit the petitioner and a recommendation by two members to reject his application. Three members of the majority wrote a memorandum in support of their recommendation. One member of the majority presented a separate concurring memorandum that expressed serious doubts about the petitioner s candor and honesty, but nevertheless recommended his admission. The minority members submitted two separate memoranda. The chairman of the committee, who had voted against the admission of petitioner, wrote one memorandum; the Attorney General s designee wrote a separate memorandum. 1 To avoid an unduly long recitation of the pertinent facts concerning Roots s application, the various reports that the majority and minority members prepared are attached to this opinion and made a part hereof. The report of the majority is appended and marked as exhibit A. The concurring report recommending admission is appended and marked as exhibit B. The minority report that Chairman Steven M. McInnis wrote is appended and marked as exhibit C. The dissenting opinion of the Attorney General s designee is appended and marked as exhibit D. All these reports contain very similar accounts of the factual elements underlying the reports of the members of the committee. Nevertheless, 1 We acknowledge that the Attorney General s replacement designee did not participate in the hearings preceding the initial November 1999 vote of the committee. Nevertheless, in our opinion, he was sufficiently apprised of the pertinent and largely undisputed facts concerning Roots s application to permit him to express his opinion on this matter. In any event, given the advisory character of his recommendation, we have received and considered it fully mindful of his lack of participation in the hearings and in the initial November 1999 vote of the committee. -2- we shall attempt to set forth in this opinion the important facts and circumstances that we believe justify our conclusion. Through its hearings and by examining the material submitted in support of and in opposition to the application, the committee sought to resolve three major areas of concern about the petitioner: (1) his criminal record; (2) his candor and veracity; and (3) his ability to take and abide by the attorney s oath. Some of the evidence was documentary in nature. In addition, extensive testimony was taken from the petitioner himself. The three areas of concern shall be dealt with separately in this opinion. Standard of Review We will not overturn a recommendation of this Court s Committee on Character and Fitness (committee) unless it has abused its discretion or its decision is clearly wrong. In re Application of Capace, 110 R.I. 254, 259, 291 A.2d 632, 634 (1972). We will do so, however, if such recommendation is not well founded. In re Testa, 489 A.2d 331, 334 (R.I. 1985). Here, the committee s various opinions three-in-favor-of admission, one concurring, and two dissents show that the committee itself was sharply divided in its views about whether to recommend the admission of Roots to the bar. Indeed, the opinion of the concurring member who provided the decisive fourth vote in favor of admission (see exhibit B) contains strong reservations about whether Roots should be admitted to the bar at all. Thus, this is not a situation in which the committee was of one mind and then submitted a unanimous and unqualified recommendation to us concerning the admission of a candidate. On the contrary, the committee has submitted multiple opinions with only a bare majority of the committee favoring Roots s admission. And even that majority is tenuous, given the concurring member s strong reservations and the other members own misgivings about Roots s qualifications. After reviewing these submissions, we are persuaded that the dissenters succeed in showing why the -3- majority s recommendation in favor of admission is not well founded. In any event, the committee s troubled majority vote was far from a resounding endorsement of Roots s admission to the bar. Accordingly, we do not believe that the majority of the committee s recommendation merits the usual deference that we would give to one that was not as clouded by dissents and as hedged around by reservations as is this one. For these reasons and those discussed below, we are of the opinion that Roots s application should be denied without prejudice to Roots reapplying at some later date after he has proven that he has truly rehabilitated himself. I Petitioner s Criminal Record In 1985, when he was eighteen years old, Roots was charged with and convicted of shoplifting in the State of Florida. He had relocated there after leaving his home in Montana during his freshman year in high school. In his bar application, Roots admitted that, following his arrest for this crime, he failed to appear at [his] scheduled hearing on the matter. He conceded that he was aware that he needed to attend the hearing but claims that his immaturity at the time caused him to disregard the court s order. Within two months, however, the Orlando police rearrested him on the same charge. He was then detained until he could be presented to a judge. And even though the court still treated him with leniency, Roots shirked his responsibility to abide by the terms of his probation when he failed to perform the community-service condition of his sentence. (He admitted in his application to the bar that he just left Orlando without performing the community service. ) Within a year, however, he was arrested again in Florida and convicted of yet another crime, the felony of resisting arrest with violence. Generally, this crime involves disobeying, with the use of -4- force (as opposed to mere flight), a police officer s lawful attempt to arrest an alleged criminal. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 843.01 (West 2000). As reflected in the police report and in Roots s law school application, the alleged facts of the crime reveal that Roots s truck had collided with another vehicle. A police officer arrived at the accident scene and an argument ensued between Roots and the officer. When the officer learned that Roots had failed to pay two fines for separate moving violations and was driving on a suspended license, he attempted to take Roots into custody but Roots physically resisted the arrest. Although a federal sentencing judge would later characterize this incident as minor because, in attempting to subdue Roots, the police officer struck the only actual blow, a Florida sentencing judge, who presumably was more familiar with the relevant facts and circumstances, ultimately sentenced Roots to fifty-one weeks in prison following his nolo contendere plea after he again violated his initial three-year-probation sentence.2 The petitioner then left Florida and moved to Wyoming, where he attended the Northwest Community College in Powell, Wyoming. While there, he exhibited in class a homemade air gun that he had constructed. (This may have been part of a speech presentation.) Because the authorities knew that petitioner had a prior record, they searched his dormitory room. There, they found additional weapons, including an automatic pistol, an automatic rifle with approximately 500 rounds of ammunition, and an assault rifle described as an AK-47. The petitioner was charged in federal court with being a felon in possession of firearms and with the possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of various federal statutes. Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pled guilty to the registration count (relating to 2 Moreover, it should be noted that Roots now blames his plea to this felony on his naiveté and on his public defender, stressing that he spoke to his appointed counsel only for a total of five minutes, and the attorney advised him to plead guilty because the word struggle appeared in a witness statement and that it was illegal to struggle with an officer. -5- the air gun).3 The other counts were dismissed. A federal judge sentenced petitioner to twenty months in federal prison on January 10, 1992. This sentence terminated on April 4, 1993. As previously mentioned, the federal judge indicated that the petitioner s felony conviction for resisting arrest with violence in Florida was not as serious an offense as might appear on the surface since the only injury was to the officer s hand when he struck the petitioner in the face. Nevertheless, it was established that in purchasing the various weapons, the petitioner had filled out a number of forms in which he had misrepresented his status as a person convicted of a felony in Florida. The applicant s criminal record also includes the following: (1) On at least eight occasions from the spring of 1986 to as recently as the winter of 1997, Roots was caught speeding and ordered to pay fines. These moving-traffic violations occurred in Utah, Washington, and Montana. (2) Roots apparently ignored his previous driver s license suspensions and flouted these dispositions because he later was charged in Georgia not once but twice in 1989 for driving on a suspended license. On the first occasion he not only drove on a suspended license, but also was issued citations for driving without a license, without insurance, and without proper registration. On the second 3 Roots s law school application accounts for this conviction by claiming that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms targeted him in an investigation into a homemade firearm I had used in a speech presentation. Several firearms were seized without warrant from my apartment in Powell, Wyoming. I ultimately pled guilty to the charge of Possession of an unregistered firearm. Although Roots s self-serving statement regarding the authorities lack of and alleged need for a warrant at the time of the weapons seizure may have been correct, the fact remains that, when considering his moral character to be admitted to the bar in this state, warrant or no warrant, Roots possessed a cache of illegal firearms. Moreover, he did so after having been adjudged a felon when he failed to follow the terms of his second probation after his previous conviction for violently resisting his arrest. -6- such occasion, he was again driving on an expired registration plate and a suspended license. Roots s bar application explains his conduct thus: I was without sufficient money for insurance or registration. I made it to work for several days but was pulled over by another officer only a couple days later. Again, I was arrested for driving without a license, registration, or insurance. * * * To this day I do not know what became of the cases in Georgia. On the present record, we do not know whether Roots has satisfied whatever lawfully imposed fines he was obliged to pay in Georgia. Apparently, he has not inquired about what present responsibilities or possible warrants for his arrest based on his failure to resolve these matters he still may have outstanding in Georgia.4 Nothing in the record shows that Roots has resolved these matters. Moreover, even if Roots formerly lacked sufficient funds to pay for his automobile insurance or registration, he should have arranged to use public transportation or pursued other alternatives (for example, carpooling with friends or co-employees), rather than driving continuously on a suspended or revoked license as he did when he was caught doing so on three separate occasions. Every prospective attorney in this state must complete an application that asks for a listing of all the candidate s violations of * * * traffic law[s] or ordinance[s] other than parking offenses. Committee on Character and Fitness, Petition/Questionnaire for Admission to the Rhode Island Bar 13 (2000). See also S.Ct. R. Art. II, Rule 3(e) ( [p]ersons seeking admission to the practice of law shall * * * file with the Committee on Character and Fitness and with the Clerk of the Supreme Court the 4 Roots also has not accounted for his 1986 Utah speeding and reckless driving violations. His bar application lists the disposition or fine for these speeding and reckless driving violations as u/k, which we assume means unknown. Although Roots has not forgotten about these violations, he has neglected to determine for over fourteen years whether any sanctions remain outstanding against him in Utah for these transgressions. -7- petition and questionnaire on a form to be furnished by the Clerk ). This part of the application is not superfluous nor a mere incursion into the applicant s privacy, and it should not be so considered. Rather, it bears a logical and appropriate relationship to the ability of a prospective attorney in this state to maintain respect for and to uphold the law. And although repeated violations of various traffic laws, in isolation, may not preclude a candidate from admission to the bar, they certainly are relevant to the moral fitness and good-character determination that must be made when evaluating the qualifications of prospective attorneys. (3) In Florida, Roots was convicted of providing a false statement to the authorities. To be sure, Roots has admitted that he provided a false name, but it should go without saying that this crime also reflects upon a candidate s ability to serve the public as an attorney, as well as upon the applicant s candor and truthfulness. In their totality, these various citations, misdemeanors, and felonies that Roots has accumulated over the years present sufficient evidence to warrant, at minimum, a significant delay in acting favorably upon his application for admission to the Rhode Island bar, especially in light of the fact that Roots has admittedly ignored and violated the terms of his two previous probationary periods. Indeed, Roots s first probation required him to perform community services yet he chose to ignore that mandate from the Florida court. Instead, it was only after he scuffled with an arresting police officer itself a display of disobedience to the officer s attempt to effect a lawful arrest and again disobeyed the terms of his probation, that Roots was ultimately forced to serve time in prison. We recognize that Roots has not been convicted of violating any criminal laws since his conviction on the federal weapons charge and since his release from prison in 1993 after serving his federal jail sentence of twenty months. We also acknowledge and commend Roots s award-winning -8- writings, his law-school class rank, his position on the student newspaper, and his service on the Roger Williams University Law Review. On the other hand, while these more recent accomplishments are indeed praiseworthy, they are largely irrelevant in establishing his moral fitness and good character to practice as a member of our bar. Indeed, no one has sought to disqualify Roots based on his academic incompetency or lack of intelligence. On the contrary, his record in this regard is conceded to be outstanding. But even some notorious criminals can point with pride to their relative intelligence. Thus, mere intelligence and academic achievement do not necessarily equate to moral fitness and good character, both of which are preconditions to becoming a member of our bar. See S.Ct. R. Art. II, Rule 3(a) ( [a]ll persons who desire to be admitted to practice law shall be required to establish their moral character and fitness to the satisfaction of the Committee on Character and Fitness of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in advance of such admission, ); S.Ct. R. Art. II, Rule 3(f) ( [a]ny person who seeks to practice law in the State of Rhode Island shall at all times have the burden of proving his or her good moral character before the Committee on Character and Fitness and the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ). Notwithstanding these more recent positive factors, it is our belief that we have not yet had enough opportunity to conclude that Roots has totally rehabilitated himself, especially because his conduct during the years leading up to and including the filing of his bar application raises further questions about the depth, scope, and extent of his alleged rehabilitation. Indeed, his probationary status on the federal-weapons conviction expired only a mere four years ago, after which he then enrolled in law school and continued to engage in activities that cast doubt on his candor, truthfulness, and ability to take the attorney s oath in good faith. II -9- The Petitioner s Lack of Candor and Truthfulness It has been established that the petitioner was not truthful in applying for the purchase of firearms. It also has been established that petitioner was not truthful in answering a question on the bar application about the use of aliases, although he did admit to having used three aliases: Carl Davis, Rodger Roop, and Roger Bell. He indicated on his application that these aliases were used for the purpose of attending school, writing, and telephone fundraising. In his testimony before the committee, however, he admitted that the use of the alias Carl Davis was to help him evade the law after he was indicted for the weapons charge in Montana. When he assisted in a senatorial campaign, he also used another alias, Roger Bell, in order to hide his true identity when salary payments were made to him. The minority report that Chairman McInnis submitted concluded that Roots s lack of candor in this respect would not be consistent with allowing petitioner to practice law. We have recently affirmed that [t]he attorney-client relationship is one of mutual trust, confidence, and good will, in which the attorney is bound to * * * the most scrupulous good faith. DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc., 755 A.2d 757, 769 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Peirce v. Palmer, 31 R.I. 432, 450, 77 A. 201, 209 (1910)). A central purpose of requiring character review as part of the attorney-admission process is to protect those members of the public who might become clients of the practicing lawyer from those attorneys who are so morally or ethically challenged that they are unable to demonstrate the type of good character and moral fitness requisite to serving in a fiduciary capacity. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once observed, lawyers stand as a shield * * * in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as - 10 - moral character. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 247, 77 S.Ct. 752, 761, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 806 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale L.J. 491 (1985). The fiduciary position of trust that a lawyer assumes vis-à -vis his or her clients demands that individuals whom this Court admits to the bar should be worthy of the confidence that members of the public repose in them. An equal and complementary concern is to safeguard the administration of justice from those who might subvert it through misrepresentations, falsehoods, or incomplete disclosures when full disclosure is necessary. See Donald T. Weckstein, Recent Developments in the Character and Fitness Qualifications for the Practice of Law: The Law School Role; The Political Dissident, 40 Bar Exam. 17, 23 (1971). As we have noted previously, Roots was not truthful in applying to buy firearms. Indeed, he repeatedly checked a box indicating that he was not a convicted felon when he applied for his gun purchases, despite previously having been convicted of a felony. Thereafter, Roots was convicted for violently resisting arrest, and ultimately spent close to a year in prison for that offense after violating his initial three-year-probation sentence. He was also well aware of his convictions at the time he applied to buy his various assault weapons, yet he failed to disclose them. Furthermore, Roots admitted to the committee that he was less than forthcoming on his bar application about the reason for his use of the Carl Davis alias. Significantly, Roots submitted this untruthful application for admittance to the bar in 1999. When pressed about this discrepancy, Roots was unable to reconcile these contradictory statements. Moreover, as mentioned above, Roots already had been convicted criminally of providing a false statement to the authorities. Such a record of dishonesty, combined with Roots s other criminal - 11 - misconduct and recent fabrication on his bar application, appears to us to justify at least a several-year delay before Roots s application even should be considered again for his possible admission to the bar. And Roots s use of an alias to mask his unsavory connections to white supremacy groups while working for the Committee to Reelect Conrad Burns, and his use of false indorsements on his paychecks, are simply further reasons for this Court to deny Roots s application at this time. In sum, then, we agree with the minority report that this applicant s lack of candor is inconsistent with admitting him to practice law at this time. III Ability to Abide by the Attorney s Oath Pursuant to Article II, Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, [e]very person who is admitted as attorney and counselor at law shall take in open court the following engagement: You solemnly swear that in the exercise of the office of attorney and counselor you will do no falsehood, nor consent to any being done; you will not wittingly or willingly promote, sue or cause to be sued any false or unlawful suit; or give aid, or consent to the same; you will delay no man s cause for lucre or malice; you will in all respects demean yourself as an attorney and counselor of this court and of all other courts before which you may practice uprightly and according to law, with fidelity as well to the court as to your client; and that you will support the constitution and laws of this state and the constitution and laws of the United States. So help you God. Beginning in 1993 petitioner has published a number of articles including articles as recent as 1998 that express explicit racial and ethnic bias as well as contempt and disdain for the federal government as a Zionist [O]ccupation [G]overnment. His 1993 article is entitled 100 Truths and One Lie and purports to establish that members of the black race are inferior to members of the white race. Excerpts from this work are set forth in the minority report. Moreover, as recently as 1998, - 12 - Roots has written that he disavows the de[]facto regime of the United States government, its laws, and, apparently, its Constitution. Similarly, he has written in support of the bogus liens that the Freemen in Montana have attempted to place on federal officials who, in his opinion, have violated certain dictates that the Freemen espouse. It is noteworthy that Roots expressed these views in writing even while he was attending law school in 1998. Roots, however, now attempts to retreat from that stance. He would now have us believe that, consistent with the oath all prospective attorneys must take, he now can swear that he will support the constitution and the laws of this state as well as those of the federal government. This oath, as well as similar oaths that prospective attorneys across the United States must take, does not violate any individual constitutional right that Roots may have to express his contrary views. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 161, 91 S.Ct. 720, 726, 27 L.Ed.2d 749, 757 (1971) (holding that the requirement that an attorney be able to take and abide by the oath to uphold the constitution and the laws of the United States is constitutional). At the same time, the United States Supreme Court has stated that [c]itizens have a right under our constitutional system to criticize government officials and agencies. * * * Government censorship can no more be reconciled with our national constitutional standard of freedom of speech and press when done in the guise of determining moral character, than if it should be attempted directly. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 269, 77 S.Ct. 722, 731, 1 L.Ed.2d 810, 823 (1957). Thus, we have no intention or desire to censor or to punish Roots for his past or present political views or for exercising his rights of free speech. Nevertheless, when as here, a candidate for admission to the bar of a state has published writings that communicate his or her explicit refusal to accept our federal government as the legitimate government of this country, such a candidate raises - 13 - legitimate questions about whether he or she in good faith can take and abide by the attorney s oath to support the laws and the constitution of the United States while in the exercise of the office of attorney and counselor. For example, if a candidate for admission to the bar were to express the view that, in his or her opinion, the laws and constitution of the United States were illegitimate and, for that reason, unsupportable, but that in the exercise of his or her office as an attorney or counselor, he or she still could and, therefore, would swear to support that constitution and those laws, then the committee and this Court would be entitled, we believe, to view that candidate s professed oath-taking ability with some degree of skepticism especially if the candidate were a convicted felon with a history indicating a recurring lack of truthfulness and candor. While it is possible to draw and maintain a sharp line between a lawyer s personal beliefs and his or her professional conduct, a predictive assessment of a prospective lawyer s ability to take and abide by the attorney s oath is a fair subject for character review when considering an applicant for admission to the bar. Here, Roots bore the burden at all times to demonstrate his moral fitness and character to practice as a lawyer in this state. See S.Ct. R. Art. II, Rule 3(f). But his recent 1997-1998 publications and comments disavowing the legitimacy of our federal government especially when considered in light of his criminal record and history of other misconduct indicating a lack of forthrightness and candor give us pause in accepting his avowal to us that he can now in good faith take and abide by the requisite attorney s oath. Nevertheless, in reaching this conclusion, we agree with the majority of the committee that the First Amendment inhibits both the committee and this Court from denying membership in the bar to the petitioner because of his political beliefs and unorthodox political and social ideas. See In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 91 S.Ct. 713, 27 L.Ed.2d 657 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 702, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 - 14 - L.Ed.2d 810 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957). All of these cases related to applicants who either were or had been at one time members of the Communist Party or refused to answer questions relating to their membership in an organization (presumably the Communist Party) that advocated the violent overthrow of the government of the United States. We also recognize, as did the majority members of the committee, that neither a criminal record nor the political views of an applicant constitute an automatic bar to his or her admission. Yet both may be relevant in assessing (1) the applicant s candor, honesty, sincerity, and good faith in professing a willingness to take and abide by the requisite attorney s oath, and (2) the ability of the applicant, in the exercise of his or her office as an attorney and counselor, to support the constitution and laws of the United States. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council Inc., 401 U.S. at 156, 91 S.Ct. at 723, 27 L.Ed.2d at 751; In re Converse, 602 N.W.2d 500, 506 (Neb. 1999). The petitioner has stated to the committee and to this Court that he will not only take the attorney s oath if admitted to the bar, but that he will abide by it. He stated unequivocally under oath to this Court that he would not discriminate against any person for racial or ethnic reasons. He further stated that he would abide by the lawyer s oath in all respects without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. And he has stated to the committee that he no longer entertains his extremist views on the illegitimacy of the government of the United States. We are of the opinion, however, that the prior record of the petitioner including his criminal past and the other conduct referenced above demonstrating his lack of candor and truthfulness casts such doubt upon the sincerity of Roots s professed willingness to abide by the terms of the oath that he must take as a member of the bar of this state that his application should be denied at this time. - 15 - Conclusion For the above reasons, we conclude that Roots s application to the bar should be denied. The record in this case reveals far too many recent and past criminal acts, instances of untruthfulness, and a lingering inability of this candidate to take the requisite attorney s oath in good faith. Thus, we cannot endorse Roots s admission to the bar of this state at this time. Nevertheless, our denial of his application shall not preclude the possibility of Roots reapplying for and obtaining approval of his admission to the bar at some later time, but no sooner than two years from the date of this opinion. Moreover, if Roots reapplies for admission to the bar of this state within three years from the date of this opinion, he shall not be required to retake the bar examination. However, in addition to satisfying the committee s usual criteria, he shall be required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the committee and, ultimately to this Court, that, during the period between the date of this opinion and his reapplication: 1. He has secured and maintained gainful employment; 2. He has kept the peace and been of good behavior; 3. His writings and other conduct are consistent with his ability to take the attorney s oath in good faith; 4. His previous motor vehicle and driving violations and any resulting sanctions in the states of Georgia and Utah have been satisfied and are no longer outstanding; 5. He has performed pro bono publico services of a substantial and continuing nature; 6. His post-1993 conduct and achievements outweigh the misconduct and other detrimental factors detailed in this opinion and, thus, are better indications of his moral character and fitness to practice law than his previous misconduct. - 16 - Accordingly, we hereby deny Roots s application without prejudice to his reapplication at some later time (no sooner than two years) when a more accurate and adequate assessment of Roots s professed rehabilitation can be undertaken. - 17 - COVER SHEET ________________________________________________________________________________ TITLE OF CASE: In re Application of Roger I. Roots ________________________________________________________________________________ DOCKET NO.: 00-276 - M.P. ________________________________________________________________________________ COURT: Supreme Court ________________________________________________________________________________ DATE OPINION FILED: November 20, 2000 ________________________________________________________________________________ Appeal from SOURCE OF APPEAL: Board of Bar Examiners ________________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICES: Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, Goldberg, JJ. Concurring ________________________________________________________________________________ WRITTEN BY: PER CURIAM ________________________________________________________________________________ ATTORNEYS: Steven M. McInnis For Plaintiff ________________________________________________________________________________ ATTORNEYS: John D. Lynch For Defendant ________________________________________________________________________________
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