Suzanne Colwell v. Town of Coventry Zoning Board of Review and Bamford Lakeside Properties, LLC, C.A.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS KENT, SC. SUPERIOR COURT (FILED: June 10, 2015) SUZANNE COLWELL Plaintiff/Appellant : : : v. : : TOWN OF COVENTRY ZONING : BOARD OF REVIEW : Defendant/Appellee : : and : : BAMFORD LAKESIDE PROPERTIES, : LLC : Intervenor : C.A. No. KC-2014-0440 _______________________________________ THOMAS FORCIER Plaintiff/Appellant : : : v. : : TOWN OF COVENTRY ZONING : BOARD OF REVIEW : Defendant/Appellee : : and : : BAMFORD LAKESIDE PROPERTIES, : LLC : Intervenor : C.A. No. KC-2014-0441 DECISION STERN, J. Before this Court is an appeal from two decisions of the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Coventry (Zoning Board or Board) finding that certain modifications to a campground did not constitute an expansion or alteration of a nonconforming pre-existing use. Suzanne Colwell (Colwell) and Thomas Forcier (Forcier) (collectively Appellants) seek reversal of the Board’s decisions. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69. For the reasons set forth below, this Court remands the matter to the Board for further proceedings. I Facts and Travel Forcier is the owner of real property located at 30 Lori Lane, Coventry, Rhode Island, designated as Lot 22 on Assessor’s Plat 324. Colwell is the owner of real property located at 70 Lori Lane, Coventry, Rhode Island, designated as Lot 21 on Assessor’s Plat 324. The Appellants’ properties directly border a twenty-two acre campground, owned and operated by Bamford Lakeside Properties, LLC (Bamford), the intervenor in the current action. The campground, known as Water’s Edge Campground/Recreational Trailer Park (Water’s Edge), is designated as Lot 20 on Assessor’s Plat 324. Both Water’s Edge and the Appellants’ properties are located in a Rural Residential District (RR-2), intended for “low density single family residential development, large estates, and certain low intensity non-residential activities incidental to a rural environment.” (Town of Coventry Zoning Ordinance Art. 5 § 500(A)(3), Art. 6 § 600(A) Schedule of Zoning District Use Regulations). Camps and campgrounds are permitted in a RR-2 zone only upon the issuance of a special use permit. However, campgrounds are allowed to operate without the requirement of a special use permit as a legal nonconforming use if in existence prior to the zone being designated as an RR-2 zone. In 1999, the Town of Coventry adopted a Campgrounds and Trailer Parks Ordinance (Campground Ordinance) placing certain requirements on new or expanding campgrounds.1 See Town of Coventry Code Ch. 113-6(B). The Campground Ordinance requires existing 1 After its passage, new or expanded campgrounds now had to comply with the Campground Ordinance as well as the general provisions of the Town of Coventry’s Zoning Ordinance (Zoning Ordinance). 2 campgrounds to obtain a special use permit before being able to expand the number of sites, or construct or expand ancillary uses of the campgrounds. See id. Additionally, Ch. 113-8(C) of the Code of the Town of Coventry (the Code) provides that a new or expanded campground is required to designate no less than 25% of the total area of the campground as recreational area. Further, Ch. 113-8(E) of the Code states that a new or expanded campground must also include a one hundred foot wide landscape buffer along the exterior of the campground’s property lines. Bamford does not possess a special use permit; however, it is uncontested that Water’s Edge has been used for camping purposes prior to the campground being zoned in an RR-2 district and prior to the enactment of the Campground Ordinance and thereby constitutes a nonconforming pre-existing use.2 See § 45-24-40; Zoning Ordinance Art. 8 § 802(A). Bamford purchased Water’s Edge from the Colwell family, who had operated the campsites for generations prior. When the property was owned by the Colwells, and for all times subsequent, Water’s Edge consisted of a total of 106 campsites—102 campsites and four cabins. The instant appeal arises from the relocation of fifteen campsites from one portion of the campground to a 2.6 acre field located in the southeastern portion of the campground, which had been used primarily for recreational activities. The area where the fifteen campsites have been relocated to directly abuts with the Appellants’ properties. To facilitate the relocation of the fifteen campsites, Bamford constructed a new road, septic facilities, utility facilities, and earthworks through the 2.6 acre field. On November 15, 2013, in protest of Bamford’s actions, the Appellants complained to the Town of Coventry’s Zoning Enforcement Officer, Jacob 2 A nonconforming use is defined under the Zoning Ordinance as “[a] . . . structure . . . or use thereof, lawfully existing at the time of the adoption or amendment of this Ordinance and not in conformity with the provisions of such Ordinance or amendment. Nonconformance shall be of only two (2) types: (a) [n]onconformance by use: a lawfully established use of land, building, or structure which is not a permitted use in that zoning district. . . .” Zoning Ordinance § 210(92)(a). 3 Peabody (Peabody), alleging the development taking place in that portion of the campground was in violation of the Zoning Ordinance. The controlling provisions relating to the actions undertaken by Water’s Edge are found under Article 8 of the Zoning Ordinance and § 45-24-40.3 Particularly, § 861 of the Zoning Ordinance states: “[t]he expansion, extension or alteration of non-conforming uses so as to increase their nonconformity shall require a special-use permit from the Board.” The Zoning Ordinance also provides that “[a] nonconforming use shall not be enlarged or extended, unless with a special-use permit[,]” and “[a] nonconforming use shall not be moved in whole or in part to any portion of the land other than that occupied by such use at the time of adoption of this Ordinance.” Zoning Ordinance Art. 8 §§ 842, 844. The Appellants also complained that the development was taking place without Bamford first obtaining a special use permit and in violation of the Campground Ordinance.4 Peabody, in a written decision dated December 3, 2013, informed Colwell that reconfiguring campsites does not constitute an expansion. Peabody also informed Colwell that the Campground Ordinance’s requirement of a one hundred foot buffer is not necessary since that requirement applies only to new or expanded campgrounds, of which Water’s Edge was neither. Peabody then stated the Campground Ordinance did not apply in full to Water’s Edge since it “is not a new or expanded 3 Section 45-24-40 states that a zoning ordinance “may establish a special-use permit, authorizing the alteration [of a nonconforming development], which must be approved by the zoning board of review[.]” See § 45-24-40(a)(1). The provision further states that a local ordinance may require “that the alteration more closely adheres to the intent and purposes of the zoning ordinance.” See § 45-24-40(b). 4 The Appellants also complained to Peabody of alleged violations of Ch. 113-8(C), (E) of the Campground Ordinance. 4 facility.”5 See Certified R. Ex. A(4). In a similarly worded letter, Peabody responded to Forcier’s complaint. In his letter to Forcier, Peabody again did not find any zoning violations committed by Bamford. Further, Peabody explained that no expansion of the campground has taken place since there was no evidence found that Bamford had increased the number of campsites.6 Forcier and Colwell filed timely appeals from Peabody’s determinations to the Zoning Board pursuant to § 45-24-64. On March 5, 2014, at a properly advertised hearing, the Appellants made several arguments to the Zoning Board.7 The Appellants stated that Bamford had altered Water’s Edge when it developed in the 2.6 acre recreation area immediately adjacent to Lori Lane. The Appellants reasoned that expansion and relocation of campsites into this previously open area reduces the amount of recreation area that is required under the Campground Ordinance. Additionally, the Appellants contended that the development area is less than one hundred feet from their property lines, in violation of Ch. 113-8 of the Campground Ordinance. Lastly, the Appellants argued the relocation into the recreation area without applying for a special use permit constitutes an alteration that increased the nonconformity of the campground. Forcier testified and presented evidence at the hearing concerning the relocation of the campsites. First, Forcier acknowledged his family previously owned the campground and was aware that the camp was undersized and could not be expanded as it would be unable to comply with the requirements of the Campground Ordinance. Additionally, Forcier testified that no 5 The Appellants seem to have also complained about the installation of a new septic system; however, it appears from the record this argument was not included as part of the Appellants’ appeal to the Zoning Board 6 Peabody’s decision to Forcier includes the same conclusions found in Colwell’s decision. In both decisions, Peabody found Ch. 113-8 of the Campground Ordinance to be inapplicable since Water’s Edge was not a new or expanding facility. 7 Due to the fact that the two appeals involved the same set of facts and legal arguments, the Appellants’ appeals were heard as a consolidated matter. 5 vegetative buffer has been put in place by Bamford and that the relocated trailer sites are within one hundred feet of the Water’s Edge property line. Lastly, Forcier testified that the relocation of fifteen campsites into the recreational field significantly reduced the overall recreation area of Water’s Edge, which already fails to meet the Campground Ordinance requirement that 25% of a campground be considered recreational area. Near the end of the hearing, Bamford’s owner, Brian Bamford (Brian), testified regarding the state of his campground. Brian stated that he has realigned several campsites on the property, and had also put in place a State of Rhode Island approved $85,000 septic system. (Zoning Board Hr’g Tr. (Tr.) 50, Mar. 5, 2014.) Additionally, Brian stated he never had any intention of expanding the number of campsites since Peabody had informed him that any expansion would result in serious zoning issues. (Tr. at 53.) Brian went on to testify that Bamford was about to close on approximately four additional acres of land which would be used for recreational activities. He further testified that he had agreed, even though the Campground Ordinance did not apply to Water’s Edge, to install a fifty foot vegetative buffer between the new campsites and the Appellants’ properties. Lastly, Brian stated that the expansion into the 2.6 acre recreation area did not encompass the entire region, but rather only affected 1.1 acres of the field. (Tr. at 52.) At the hearing, Peabody also testified that the requirement of the 25% recreation area and the one hundred foot buffer only applies for new or expanded campsites and, since Bamford has kept the same number of campsites, he determined that there had not been an expansion. (Tr. at 23.) Peabody also testified that based on his own inspections of Water’s Edge, there had not been an increase in the number of campsites. (Tr. at 28.) Furthermore, Peabody stated that the expansion issue was reviewed by the Town of Coventry’s solicitor who determined that the 6 relocation of campsites, without increasing their numbers, does not constitute expansion under the Campground Ordinance.8 (Tr. at 22.) Members of the Board focused their inquiries to the number of campsites at Water’s Edge. In particular, Board Chairman Robert Crowe (Board Chairman Crowe) asked Peabody whether Bamford had exceeded the previously allowed number of campsites, which Peabody responded that it had not. The Board members primarily focused on the issue of what would constitute an expansion of Bamford’s nonconforming use. The Board members agreed that an expansion only occurs when there is an increase in the number of pre-existing campsites. On April 2, 2014, the Zoning Board presented its findings and on April 10, 2014, rendered two written decisions. At the April 2, 2014 hearing, Board Chairman Crowe initially noted that he inspected Water’s Edge twice before he gave his opinion on the appeals. Board Chairman Crowe found Water’s Edge to be an existing use that was not expanding and found the changes made by Bamford were benefitting the campground. (Zoning Board Hr’g Tr. (Tr. 2) 3, Apr. 2, 2014.) Board Chairman Crowe acknowledged that the open space area—the area where Bamford relocated the fifteen campsites to—has been “changed over” and that the campground has changed “quite a bit.” (Tr. 2 at 3.) Board Chairman Crowe concluded by stating that he could not see how Bamford was expanding the nonconforming use by merely making more use of the surrounding areas and by putting in a new septic system. (Tr. 2 at 4.) Each additional member of the Zoning Board also commented on the case and agreed that no additional campsites had been added. Board member Soucy commented that Colwell may be 8 It appears from the record that the Town of Coventry’s previous solicitor gave an unwritten opinion to Peabody that moving campsites within Water’s Edge does not constitute an alteration of its legal nonconforming use. It cannot be determined by this Court whether the opinion of the Town of Coventry’s previous solicitor is based on the Campground Ordinance or the general provisions of the Zoning Ordinance. 7 upset at the changes to Water’s Edge because she believed the campground would remain in the exact state as it was when it was sold to Bamford. Board member Soucy also stated that Peabody will continue to monitor the campground to ensure the number of campsites remains at the correct amount. However, the Board did not recite any of the evidence presented at the March 5, 2014 hearing. In fact, Board member Lacaillade stated that he believed “[Peabody] did his job, due diligence, and counsel looked at everything that was going on and said they deemed it an existing campground; it was [not] a new campground; it was [not] expanding. And I stand by his decision based on the evidence that was presented before us.” (Tr. 2 at 5.) Board member Studley commented that the installment of a new septic tank was necessary and that there was no expansion to Water’s Edge as long as Bamford did not add new campsites. Board member D’Onofrio stated that Bamford’s realignment of an existing use does not constitute an expansion. The Board failed to address whether this constitutes an alteration. Expressing the same sentiments as her fellow Board members, Board member DeGraide stated that no expansion had taken place since the campsites were realigned with no additions. The Zoning Board voted unanimously to uphold Peabody’s determination. In its written decisions, the Zoning Board made the following findings of fact: “1. [t]hat the modifications of the campground do not constitute an expansion nor and [sic] unlawful alteration of a pre-existing use; [and] 2. [t]hat the Zoning Enforcement Officer made the correct determination in his written decision dated December 3, 2013.” (Decision at 2.) Zoning Board concluded by finding that the Appellants “did not meet their burden to set aside the Zoning Enforcement Officer’s determination . . . .” Id. The Appellants each filed a timely Complaint and Appeal of the Zoning Board’s decisions. 8 II Standard of Review Review of a zoning board’s decision is governed by § 45-24-69(d) of the Zoning Enabling Act, which provides: “[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the zoning board of review or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because of findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which are: “(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions; “(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of review by statute or ordinance; “(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; “(4) Affected by other error of law; “(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record; or “(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Sec. 45-24-69(d) During its review of a zoning board decision, the Court “lacks authority to weigh the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, or to substitute [its] findings of fact for those made at the administrative level.” Lett v. Caromile, 510 A.2d 958, 960 (R.I. 1986) (citing E. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Rocha, 118 R.I. 276, 285-86, 373 A.2d 496, 501 (1977)). Deference must be given to the findings of a zoning board since “‘a zoning board of review is presumed to have knowledge concerning those matters which are related to an effective administration of the zoning ordinance.’” Pawtucket Transfer Operations, LLC v. City of Pawtucket, 944 A.2d 855, 859 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Monforte v. Zoning Bd. of Review of E. Providence, 93 R.I. 447, 449, 176 A.2d 726, 728 (1962)). Review of questions of fact “‘is confined to a search of the record to ascertain whether the board’s decision rests upon ‘competent evidence’ or is affected by an error 9 of law.’” Munroe v. Town of E. Greenwich, 733 A.2d 703, 705 (R.I. 1999) (quoting Kirby v. Planning Bd. of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I. 1993)). If the findings of the zoning board are insufficient, the court can remand the matter to allow the zoning board to make the proper findings of fact. See Sciacca v. Caruso, 769 A.2d 578, 585 (R.I. 2001). Such deference given to the findings of the local zoning board is “contingent upon sufficient findings of fact by the zoning board.” Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Bd. of Review, 875 A.2d 1, 8 (R.I. 2005). A zoning board must make findings of facts and apply legal principles “‘in such a manner that a judicial body might review a decision with a reasonable understanding of the manner in which evidentiary conflicts have been resolved and the provisions of the . . . ordinance applied.’” Cullen v. Town Council of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900, 904 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Thorpe v. Zoning Bd. of Review of N. Kingstown, 492 A.2d 1236, 1237 (R.I. 1985)); see May-Day Realty Corp. v. Bd. of Appeals of Pawtucket, 107 R.I. 235, 239, 267 A.2d 400, 403 (1970). In order for the Superior Court to conduct a proper review, the zoning board must “disclose the reasons upon which they base their ultimate decision because the parties and this court are entitled to know the reasons for the board’s decision in order to avoid speculation, doubt, and unnecessary delay.” Hopf v. Bd. of Review of Newport, 102 R.I. 275, 288, 230 A.2d 420, 428 (1967). III Analysis Appellants challenge the Zoning Board’s decisions on grounds that the Zoning Board’s decisions ignore the great weight of the evidence because the modifications taking place at Water’s Edge constitute an unlawful expansion and alteration of a nonconforming use. Further, the Appellants argue that the Zoning Board’s decisions contain conclusory statements lacking in 10 sufficient factual findings and, as a result, are made upon unlawful procedure. This Court does not reach the substantive arguments the Appellants raise since the decisions contain errors that warrant remanding to the Zoning Board for further consideration. A The Zoning Board’s Decisions Section 45-24-61(a) of the Zoning Enabling Act provides that a decision rendered by a zoning board of review must include all findings of fact and conditions. (Emphasis added.) The Town of Coventry incorporates this statutory provision into its own Code. See Zoning Ordinance § 424. Zoning boards are also required to include as part of its decision specific findings of fact and conclusions of law “‘in order that such decisions may be susceptible of judicial review.’” Bernuth v. Zoning Bd. of Review of New Shoreham, 770 A.2d 396, 401 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Cranston Print Works Co. v. City of Cranston, 684 A.2d 689, 691 (R.I. 1996)); see Sciacca, 769 A.2d at 585. Zoning board findings must be factual “‘rather than conclusional, and the application of the legal principles must be something more than the recital of a litany.’” Zammarelli v. Beattie, 459 A.2d 951, 953 (R.I. 1983) (quoting May-Day, 107 R.I. at 239, 267 A.2d at 403). When a zoning board fails to address and make findings of fact on a certain issue, this Court ‘“will not search the record for supporting evidence or decide for itself what is proper in the circumstances.”’ Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 8 (quoting Bernuth, 770 A.2d at 401). Without the requisite findings being made by a zoning board, judicial review of the board’s decision becomes impossible. Bernuth, 770 A.2d at 402 (citing Irish P’ship v. Rommel, 518 A.2d 356, 358 (R.I. 1986)). To understand the issues presented to the Zoning Board, this Court finds necessary a review of select provisions of the Zoning Ordinance. A campground is defined under the Zoning 11 Ordinance as “[o]ne (1) or more lots used for seasonal overnight residential occupancy in permanent or semi-permanent structures . . . .” Zoning Ordinance § 210(24). The Zoning Ordinance defines a structure as “[a] combination of materials to form a construction for . . . occupancy . . . .” Id. at § 210(115). A use is defined under the ordinance as “[t]he purpose or activity for which land or structures are . . . occupied or maintained.” Id. at § 210(122) (emphasis added). Critically, the Zoning Ordinance defines an alteration as “[a]ny change, addition, or modification in construction or occupancy of an existing structure.” Id. at § 210(9). A use that is classified as a pre-existing nonconforming use may not be enlarged or extended under the Zoning Ordinance unless a special use permit is issued by the Zoning Board. See Zoning Ordinance § 842. Furthermore, the Zoning Ordinance prevents a nonconforming use from being moved “in whole or in part to any portion of the land other than that occupied by such use at the time of adoption of this Ordinance.” Id. at § 844. The Zoning Ordinance provides that any alteration of a nonconforming use, which increases its nonconformity, requires a special use permit. Id. at § 861. The Appellants argued at their appeal to the Zoning Board that the relocation of fifteen campsites to an area of the campground that had been used previously as a recreational area is prohibited under the Zoning Ordinance without first obtaining a special use permit. The Zoning Board’s decisions made the factual finding that the “modifications of the campground do not constitute an expansion nor and [sic] unlawful alteration of a pre-existing use.” (Decision at 2.) This represents the complete findings by the Zoning Board concerning whether the relocation of the campsites altered the nonconforming pre-existing use. The only other finding of fact made by the Board was that Peabody made the correct determination in his written decision. However, upon review of that written determination, Peabody never addressed whether relocating 12 campsites constituted an alteration requiring a special use permit.9 The Board’s written decisions fail to point to the evidence which support its basis to uphold Peabody’s previous determinations. In fact, the Board never stated which provisions of the Zoning Ordinance were being applied. Although it can be implied that Article 8 of the Zoning Ordinance formed the basis of the Board’s decisions, a review of the hearing transcripts reveals that the Zoning Board also took into consideration certain provisions of the Campground Ordinance. The Board appears to have relied upon § 113-6(B) of the Campground Ordinance when it determined that Water’s Edge did not meet the definition of an expanded campground since it had not increased the number of campsites. However, the Zoning Board did not address the issue of whether a nonconforming use can be moved to a different portion of the campground without first obtaining a special use permit as required by § 844 of the Zoning Ordinance. It is clear that no findings of fact were ever made regarding whether the relocation of these campsites constitutes an alteration of a nonconforming use. Rather, the Board blindly held that there was no unlawful alteration without providing the basis for reaching such a conclusion. The decisions issued by the Board disregard our Supreme Court’s mandate that zoning boards make factual as opposed to conclusional findings. Bernuth, 770 A.2d at 401 (quoting Irish P’ship, 518 A.2d at 358-59). The lack of factual findings by the Board concerning the issue of whether relocation of the campsites constitutes an alteration under the Zoning Ordinance creates a defect in the decisions as rendered. The purpose of this Court is not to cure the Zoning Board’s defects and “‘search the record . . . [and] decide for itself what is proper in the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Irish P’ship, 518 A.2d at 359). The Zoning Enabling Act as well as the Zoning Ordinance requires the Zoning Board to include all findings of facts. See Zoning Ordinance § 424; § 45-249 As stated in n.8, supra, Peabody’s conviction that no alteration had occurred was based on the unwritten opinion of the Town of Coventry’s previous solicitor. 13 61(a). Here, the decisions lack the requisite findings of fact as to whether relocating fifteen campsites, implementation of a new septic system, and construction of a new road constitute an alteration of a nonconforming use that requires a special use permit before being able to proceed. Our Supreme Court has held in the past that to determine the extent of a nonconforming use, “we only look to the uses actually existing at the time the property became nonconforming, not to any plans or intended uses for the property.” Town of Richmond v. Wawaloam Reservation, Inc., 850 A.2d 924, 934 (R.I. 2004). In this case, Forcier put forth evidence demonstrating that campsites never existed in the region of the campground to which campsites have been relocated. See Tr. at 39. Without passing on the weight or credibility of the evidence presented, there clearly seems to be an evidentiary conflict regarding whether camping activities taking place in the disputed recreational area amounts to an alteration of a nonconforming use. This important issue remained undecided, except for the Board’s boilerplate recitation of § 861 of the Zoning Ordinance. See Sciacca, 769 A.2d at 585 (finding zoning board’s decision cannot stand when the record fails to disclose evidence to support the board’s determinations). Without an express finding of fact on the issue of whether the relocation of campsites constitutes an alteration under the Zoning Ordinance, it makes it impossible for this Court to review the Zoning Board’s decisions. Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 8. The assertion that campsites could not be relocated without a special use permit was clearly raised by the Appellants at the hearing in front of the Zoning Board. See Tr. at 9. In order for this Court to properly review the decisions of the Board, there must first be findings of fact on the alteration issue. Further, since the Appellants have not caused the deficiency in the record, remanding this matter to the Zoning Board is appropriate. See Roger Williams Coll. v. Gallison, 572 A.2d 61, 63 (R.I. 1990) (stating a remand “should be based upon . . . the fact that 14 there is no record of the proceedings upon which a reviewing court may act.”). Without ever reaching this factual issue in its decisions, this Court cannot determine if competent evidence exists that supports the Appellants’ position. Therefore, this case is remanded to the Zoning Board “to state the reasons for its decision . . . [,] make express findings of fact and . . . pinpoint the specific evidence upon which they base such findings.” Hopf, 102 R.I. at 288, 230 A.2d at 428. Here, the Zoning Board should make findings of fact regarding whether the relocation of the fifteen campsites, along with the accompanying construction, is an alteration of a pre-existing nonconforming use. Without factual findings, this Court is left to speculate as to how the Zoning Board determined that the modifications to the campgrounds did not constitute an unlawful alteration. See Beaudoin v. Petit, 122 R.I. 469, 473, 409 A.2d 536, 538 (1979) (stating courts should not have to speculate as to the basis for an administrative decision). IV Conclusion After a review of the entire record, this Court finds the decisions of the Zoning Board to be conclusory and inadequate. As a result, the Zoning Board’s decisions violate both statutory and ordinance provisions. Accordingly, this Court remands the matter to the Zoning Board to make sufficient findings of fact consistent with this Decision. jurisdiction. Counsel shall submit the appropriate order for entry. 15 This Court shall retain RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT Decision Addendum Sheet TITLE OF CASES: Colwell v. Town of Coventry Board of Review and Forcier v. Town of Coventry Board of Review CASE NOS: KC-2014-0440 and KC-2014-0441 COURT: Kent County Superior Court DATE DECISION FILED: June 10, 2015 JUSTICE/MAGISTRATE: Stern, J. ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: William R. Landry, Esq. Matthew J. Landry, Esq. For Defendant: Dianne L. Izzo, Esq. 16

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