Garfield Avenue Development LLC and The Stop and Shop Supermarket Company LLC v. Curtis Ponder, David Imondi, Joy Montanaro, Edward DiMuccio, and Frank Corrao, in their capacities as Members of the City of Cranston Zoning Board of Review
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC.
SUPERIOR COURT
(Filed: March 30, 2012)
GARFIELD AVENUE DEVELOPMENT
LLC and THE STOP & SHOP
SUPERMARKET COMPANY LLC
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
vs.
CURTIS PONDER, DAVID IMONDI,
JOY MONTANARO, EDWARD
DIMUCCIO, and FRANK CORRAO, in
their capacities as Members of the City
of Cranston Zoning Board of Review
C.A. No. PC 09-3675
DECISION
RUBINE, J., Before the Court is an appeal filed by Plaintiffs Garfield Avenue Development
LLC (“Garfield, LLC”) and the Stop & Shop Supermarket Company LLC (“Stop & Shop”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”). They appeal from a decision that the Cranston Zoning Board of
Review (“Zoning Board”) issued after remand from this Court. Said decision denied Plaintiffs‟
application for a special use permit and dimensional relief with respect to property located at 110
Garfield Avenue, Cranston, and otherwise known as Assessor‟s Plat 7, Lots 2561, 2562, 25932597 and 3768. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69.
I
Facts and Travel
Garfield, LLC, a Rhode Island limited liability company, owns the property that is the
subject of this appeal. It plans to consolidate vacant, undeveloped lots to form a single 33,083
square foot lot. The property is located within an M-2 zoning district with frontage on Garfield
1
Avenue and West Harry Street. (Hearing Transcript, dated May 13, 2009, at 45 and 63 (Tr. I)).
Garfield Avenue is a four-lane road that is located between two ramps leading to and from Route
10. (Id. at 63). According to the Zoning Ordinance for the City of Cranston (the Ordinance), M2 districts are designated for industrial uses and require a minimum lot size of 60,000 square feet.
Stop & Shop seeks to construct a gasoline fueling station on the Garfield Avenue
property. Gasoline service stations are permitted as an approved use in an M-2 district only by
way of a special use permit, and they are subject to the provisions contained in Section 17.48.010
of the Ordinance. In April 2009, Stop & Shop filed an application with the Zoning Board
seeking a special use permit pursuant to Section 17.92.020 of the Ordinance, as well as
dimensional relief from the requirements of Sections 17.48.010 (gasoline service station)1 and
17.72.010 (signs). Section 17.92.010 of the Ordinance governs the granting of variances.
1
Section 17.48.010 of the Zoning Ordinance for the City of Cranston, entitled “Gasoline service
stations,” provides:
A. Generally. Any gasoline service station, filling station, in any
district shall conform at least to the following regulations. Where
the intensity regulations for any district in which a gasoline service
station is located are more restricting than the regulations
contained hereinafter, all gasoline service stations or filling
stations shall conform to the more restrictive dimensional
requirements.
B. Frontage and Area. Every gasoline service station shall have a
minimum frontage of one hundred twenty (120) feet and a
minimum area of twelve thousand (12,000) square feet.
C. Setbacks. Every structure erected for use as a gasoline service
station shall have a minimum setback from the street right of way
of forty (40) feet and a minimum setback from all property lines of
ten (10) feet. Pump islands shall be permitted in front yard and set
back a minimum of fifteen (15) feet from all property lines.
D. Construction Standards. All vehicle service areas shall be
constructed to conform to the following standards:
1.
Suitable separation shall be made between the pedestrian
sidewalk and the vehicular parking or moving area with the use of
appropriate bumper, wheel guards or traffic islands. Where the
portion of the property used for vehicular traffic abuts a street,
2
In its application, Stop & Shop recognized that the lot “is undersized for an M-2
industrial zone parcel and is directly adjacent to Route 10.” (Application, dated April 1, 2009, at
2). The application further stated:
“The fueling facility will include five (5) double-sided fueling
dispensers, a kiosk with employee restroom and overhead canopy.
The site plan has provided for space for an ATM bank machine as
well as for an area for vending machines. In addition to the
dimensional variance for the pre-existing undersized lot, applicant
seeks relief from the requirement that a driveway be a minimum of
20‟ from a property line. . . . Applicant also seeks a dimensional
variance for signage for this location. An existing billboard that
has stood as a legal nonconforming use for decades will remain. It
contains 1,472 sq. ft. Billboards in an M-2 zone are allowed 500
sq. ft. The remaining proposed signage for the fueling facility
totals 122.8 sq. ft. The gasoline pricing sign will utilize LED type
lettering. The proposed signage for the fueling facility is necessary
to assist customers and to identify gas prices.” Id.
such portion shall be separated from the street line by a curb at
least six inches high.
2. The entire area used for vehicle service shall be paved, except
for such unpaved area as is landscaped and protected from vehicle
use by a low barrier.
3. Hydraulic hoist, pits, lubricating, greasing, washing and repair
equipment shall be entirely enclosed within a building. Tire and
battery service and minor automobile repair, excluding automobile
body repair and painting may be carried out within the premises.
4. The maximum widths of all driveways at the sidewalk shall be
thirty (30) feet.
5. Minimum angle of driveway intersection with the street from
the curb line to lot line shall be sixty (60) degrees.
6. The distance of any driveway from any property line shall be at
least twenty (20) feet.
7. The distance between curb cuts shall be no less than forty (40)
feet.
E. Wall Next to Residential Use. A wall or evergreen screening of
fence five feet high shall be erected along all property lines
abutting residential use.
3
Stop & Shop also submitted its proposition to the Planning Commission for the City of Cranston
(“Planning Commission”).2
The Site Plan Review Committee of the Cranston Planning Commission conducted a
preliminary site plan review of the proposal on March 5, 2009. At that hearing, the Acting
Deputy Fire Chief and the City‟s Traffic Engineer raised several traffic concerns that needed to
be addressed. Those concerns involved traffic speed, viability of spot traffic speed count, traffic
capacity from Route 10 to Garfield Avenue, and the frequency of vehicle accidents in the
immediate vicinity. On March 19, 2009, the Site Plan Review Committee recommended
approval of the preliminary proposal, provided, among other things, that the applicant address
the issue of accident prevention; work with the police department to determine if spot traffic
speed counts are viable; work with the Rhode Island Department of Transportation regarding
proposed detours or traffic rerouting that may affect the proposal; and document all coordination
efforts with certain water supply boards concerning project approvals.
On May 5, 2009, the Planning Commission issued its written report. After making its
findings of fact, the Planning Commission unanimously “recommend[ed] approval with the
condition that the applicant enters into the Zoning Board of Review‟s record of proceedings,
sufficient evidence satisfying the remaining standards for the granting of variances relating to
2
Section 17.92.020 of the Ordinance provides in pertinent part:
“No special permit shall be granted by the zoning board of review
until the application or request has been referred to the city
planning commission. The planning commission shall have thirty
(30) days following such referral in which to express its opinion
thereon. If within such period, the commission fails to express its
opinion or make a recommendation, the application or request
should be deemed to be recommended by the planning
commission. The opinion and recommendation should be
considered by, but shall not be binding upon, the zoning board of
review.
4
hardship, least relief necessary, mere inconvenience and reasonable use, as set forth in R.I.G.L.
§ 45-24-41.” (Emphasis in the original.)
After a duly noticed public hearing, the Board denied the application. The Plaintiffs
timely appealed the decision to this Court. By written Decision, the Court vacated the Board‟s
decision in light of its failure to make adequate findings and its failure to state the evidence upon
which it relied in reaching its conclusions. The matter was remanded to the Board for further
proceedings. The Court ordered the Board to confine its review to the facts in the record and to
the law that was applicable at the time of the Board‟s initial decision.
After remand, the Board conducted a hearing on September 8, 2010. No new evidence
was introduced at that hearing; instead, the Board confined its review to the established record.
For reasons set forth in a written decision, recorded September 30, 2010, the Board once again
denied the application. The Plaintiffs then timely appealed to this Court. In addition to their
appeal, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of the reasonable litigation expenses incurred after the
Board‟s denial of the application after remand, pursuant to chapter 92 of title 42, entitled the
Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act (“Equal Access to Justice
Act”).
II
Standard of Review
This Superior Court‟s review of a zoning board decision is governed by § 45-24-69(d),
which provides in relevant part:
“The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning
board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the zoning board of
review or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the Appellant[s] have
5
been prejudiced because of findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions which are:
(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance
provisions;
(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of
review by statute or ordinance;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence of the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”
Our Supreme Court requires this Court to “review[] the decisions of a . . . board of review
under the „traditional judicial review‟ standard applicable to administrative agency actions.”
Restivo v. Lynch, 707 A.2d 663, 665 (R.I. 1998). Furthermore, the Court “lacks [the] authority
to weigh the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, or to substitute [its] findings of
fact for those made at the administrative level.” Id. at 665-66 (quoting Lett v. Caromile, 510
A.2d 958, 960 (R.I. 1986)). Accordingly, in performing its review, the Court “may „not
substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact.‟” Curran v. Church Community Housing Corp., 672 A.2d 453, 454 (R.I. 1996)
(quoting § 45-24-69(d)).
Furthermore, as part of its review, the Court “must examine the entire record to determine
whether „substantial‟ evidence exists to support the board‟s findings.” Salve Regina College v.
Zoning Bd. of Review of City of Newport, 594 A.2d 878, 880 (R.I. 1991) (quoting DeStefano v.
Zoning Bd. of Review of Warwick, 122 R.I. 241, 245, 405 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979)).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, and means [an] amount more than a scintilla but less than a
preponderance.” Lischio v. Zoning Bd. of Review of North Kingston, 818 A.2d 685, 690 n.5
6
(R.I. 2003) (quoting Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 424 A.2d 646, 647
(R.I. 1981)).
Although this Court reviews a zoning board‟s decision with deference, such “deferential
standard of review, however, is contingent upon sufficient findings of fact by the zoning board.”
Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Bd. of Review, 875 A.2d 1, 8 (R.I. 2005). This is
because “[s]uch findings are necessary so that zoning board decisions „may be susceptible of
judicial review.‟” Id. (quoting von Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review of New Shoreham, 770
A.2d 396, 401 (R.I. 2001)). In situations where “a zoning board „fails to state findings of fact,
the [C]ourt will not search the record for supporting evidence or decide for itself what is proper
in the circumstances.‟” Id. (quoting Irish Partnership v. Rommel, 518 A.2d 356, 359 (R.I. 1986)).
III
Analysis
The Plaintiffs once again assert that they met all of the requirements necessary for the
granting of a special use permit and for dimensional relief under both Rhode Island Law and
under the Ordinance. They contend that they presented reliable and uncontested expert evidence
demonstrating that they met all of the necessary requirements, but that the Board ignored said
evidence and failed to adequately address the specific criteria for the grant of the special use
permit and dimensional variances. They further maintain that the Board addressed only one of
the requested variances; namely, deviation from the minimum lot area requirement, and failed to
address the other two dimensional variance requests. Finally, Plaintiffs aver that the Board‟s
actions were without substantial justification and, as a result, they are entitled to reasonable
litigation expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.
7
The Board counters that its decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
It further contends that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the requisite criteria for the issuance of a special
use permit, and that the proposal did not conform with the purpose and intent of the
Comprehensive Plan‟s Future Land Use Map. Specifically, the Board maintains that there was
competent evidence in the record concerning adverse traffic conditions at, or near, the property
to support its conclusion that the proposed facility would be injurious and obnoxious to the
neighborhood. The Board also contends that should Plaintiffs prevail in their appeal, they would
not qualify for relief under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Consequently, it reserves the right to
respond to this claim in the event that Plaintiffs prevail.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court distinguishes the three recognized categories of relief
that a zoning board may award; namely, a “true” variance (also known as a use variance), 3 a
deviation (also known as a dimensional variance),4 and an exception.5 With respect to said
categories,
“A „true‟ variance is relief to use land for a use not permitted under
the applicable zoning ordinance. A deviation is relief from
restrictions governing a permitted use such as lot-line setbacks,
limitations on height, on-site parking, and minimum frontage
requirements. An exception is relief expressly allowed by the
applicable zoning ordinance that is similar in nature to a deviation
in that it generally pertains to area and setback requirements of a
permitted use.” Bamber v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Foster, 591
A.2d 1220, 1223 (R.I. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
The instant matter involves requests for a special use permit and dimensional variances. These
are readily distinguishable from one another.
3
See 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Rathkopf‟s The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 58.4 (2009).
See Lischio v. Zoning Bd. of Review of North Kingstown, 818 A.2d 685, 691 (R.I. 2003).
5
Also known as a special use permit.
4
8
A “special use” is defined as “[a] regulated use which is permitted pursuant to the
special-use permit issued by the authorized governmental entity, pursuant to § 45-24-42 . . . .”
Sec. 45-24-31(57).
A specially permitted use “contemplates a permitted use when under the
terms of the ordinance the prescribed conditions . . . are met.” Kraemer v. Zoning Bd. of Review
of the City of Warwick, 98 R.I. 328, 331, 201 A.2d 643, 644 (1964). Accordingly, although the
use is permitted under the ordinance, the use is conditional and the criteria set forth in the zoning
ordinance must be established before a special use permit may be issued. See Roland F. Chase,
Rhode Island Zoning Handbook §§ 121, 122 (1993).
Rhode Island General Laws § 45-24-31(61) defines a “dimensional variance” as follows:
“Dimensional Variance. Permission to depart from the dimensional
requirements of a zoning ordinance, where the applicant for the
requested relief has shown, by evidence upon the record, that there
is no other reasonable way to enjoy a legally permitted beneficial
use of the subject property unless granted the requested relief from
the dimensional regulations. However, the fact that a use may be
more profitable or that a structure may be more valuable after the
relief is granted are not grounds for relief.” Sec. 45-24-31(61)(ii).
A dimensional variance, or “deviation, [is] a form of relief from an ordinance which regulates
the manner in which a permitted use may be implemented.” V.H.S. Realty, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of
Review of the Town of East Greenwich, 120 R.I. 785, 792, 390 A.2d 378, 382 (1978). A special
use permit carries a different burden of proof from a dimensional variance. Such respective
burdens will be discussed infra. See id.
In its decision after remand, the Board specifically incorporated the findings from its
previous decision, as well as its discussion from its September 8, 2010 deliberations.6
addition to those findings, the Board found:
6
In its May 13, 2009 decision, the Board made the following findings of fact:
9
In
“1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
The property is located in an M-2 industrial zone;
The application seeks to establish a commercial use within
the M-2 zone;
Gasoline fueling stations are an allowed use within an M-2
zone by grant of a special use permit;
A lot size of 60,000 square feet is required in an M-2
industrial zone;
The lot upon which the use is to be situated is
approximately 33,083 square feet;
The lot in question is triangular in its configuration;
The Property upon which the use is to be situated is an
undersized lot for an M-2 industrial zone;
The Property is directly adjacent to Route 10 south;
One block north of the Property is an exit ramp from Route
10 south;
Immediately south of the Property is an on-ramp to Route
10 South;
The Property is directly adjacent to Garfield Avenue;
The Property is located near commercial uses;
The Property is directly adjacent to a residential
neighborhood;
The Board received as evidence a petition signed by
neighbors who objected to the proposed use. Said petition
having been signed by 50% of all residents in the area;
The Board received into evidence the Applicant‟s traffic
study which found Garfield Avenue to be a high traffic area
“1.
The property‟s proposed commercial use is inconsistent
with the Comprehensive Plan‟s Future Land Use Map, which calls for Industrial
uses in this area of the City.
2.
Though zoned for industrial use, the existing lot size is ½
the required area needed to construct an industrial building in an
M-2 zone (60,000 sq. ft.).
3.
The triangular shape of the lot makes it difficult to
accommodate the placement of an industrial building on the lot
with sufficient parking and site circulation.
4.
The structures on the site (pump islands, canopy, kiosk)
meet the required yard setbacks.
5.
The proposed freestanding sign . . . conforms to the area
and height for freestanding signs in an M-2 zone.
...
7.
Total signage for the site . . . is less than the total signage
permitted . . . in an M-2 zone.
8.
There is a pre-existing non-conforming . . . billboard
located on the southerly end of the site that will remain. . . .”
10
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
in which the majority of cars regularly exceed the posted
speed limit;
The Applicant‟s traffic study further found that if the use
applied for were to be allowed it would increase the traffic
volume on Garfield Avenue;
The Board received lay testimony from objectors who
testified as to having regularly observed cars traveling at
excessive speed in the area as well as automobile
congestion;
Some of the Board members stated on the record that they
had personally observed the Property to have been situated
in a high traffic area;
The traffic engineer noted some safety issues;
Board members [sic] stated within the record that based
upon his personal knowledge, ingress and egress to the
parcel could present a danger to the neighborhood[.]”
Decision, recorded September 30, 2010, at 3-4.
Having set forth the Board‟s findings, the Court now will address the Board‟s
conclusions of law in denying the special use permit and dimensional variances. Additional facts
will be provided as needed in the Analysis portion of this Decision.
A
The Special Use Permit
The Plaintiffs assert that the Board improperly relied upon lay testimony when it found
that the proposal does not conform to the comprehensive plan and would be injurious,
obnoxious, and otherwise offensive to the surrounding area. They contend that this reliance was
error, especially in light of the favorable and unchallenged expert testimony that they presented
at the hearing.
The issuance of special use permits is governed by Section 17.92.020 of the Ordinance.
It provides in pertinent part:
“2. Special Permits Power. The zoning board of review shall
have the power in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate
conditions and safeguards to issue special permits as authorized by
this chapter in harmony with its general purpose and intent. In
11
issuing such permits, the board shall determine that the use meets
the following requirements:
a. It shall be compatible with its surroundings;
b. It shall not be injurious, obnoxious or offensive to the
neighborhood;
c. It shall not hinder the future development of the city;
d. It shall promote the general welfare of the city; and
e. It shall be in conformance with the purposes and intent
of the comprehensive plan.” Section 17-92-020.
In seeking a special use permit, “an applicant must preliminarily show that the relief
sought is reasonably necessary for the convenience and welfare of the public.” Salve Regina
College v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of Newport, 594 A.2d 878, 880 (R.I. 1991). In
addition, a zoning board “may not deny granting a special exception to a permitted use on the
ground that the applicant has failed to prove that there is a community need for its
establishment.” Id. (citing Toohey v. Kilday, 415 A.2d 732, 735 (R.I. 1980)). Accordingly,
“satisfaction of a „public convenience and welfare‟ pre-condition will hinge on a showing that a
proposed use will not result in conditions that will be inimical to the public health, safety, morals
and welfare.” Salve Regina College, 594 A.2d at 880 (quoting Nani v. Zoning Board of Review
of Smithfield, 104 R.I. 150, 156, 242 A.2d 403, 406 (1968)); see also Toohey, 415 A.2d at 736
(“To satisfy the prescribed standard, the applicant need show only that neither the proposed use
nor its location on the site would have a detrimental effect upon public health, safety, welfare
and morals.”) (Internal citations omitted.)
In the present case, the only expert evidence at the hearing was proffered by Plaintiffs.
Essentially, they contend that the Board was required to accept this evidence because there was
no contrary expert evidence in the record. The Court disagrees.
At the outset, “[a]n expert may not give an opinion without describing the foundation on
which his opinion rests.” Nasco, Inc. v. Director of Public Works, 116 R.I. 712, 712, 360 A.2d
12
871 (1976). Furthermore, “[i]f the expert fails specifically to set forth the factual basis for his [or
her] conclusion, the [board] must disregard his [or her] testimony.” Ferland Corp. v. Bouchard,
626 A.2d 210, 214 (R.I. 1993). In situations where there is “expert testimony before a zoning
board [that] is competent, uncontradicted, and unimpeached, it would be an abuse of discretion
for a zoning board to reject such testimony.” Murphy v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of
South Kingstown, 959 A.2d 535, 542 (R.I. 2008). However, although “uncontradicted testimony
may not be rejected arbitrarily . . . [it] may be rejected if it contains inherent improbabilities or
contradictions that alone or in connection with other circumstances tend to contradict it.”
Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 688 (2000) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Furthermore, while a zoning board may accept or reject expert testimony, it must do so
on the basis of clear and competent evidence in the record. See Restivo v. Lynch, 707 A.2d 663,
671 (R.I. 1998) (observing that expert testimony “may be . . . rejected by the trier of fact . . .
particularly when there is persuasive lay testimony” evidence in the record). Thus, even though
“lay testimony regarding traffic data [is] not competent and ha[s] no probative force[,]” lay
persons may give testimony “on actual observed effects” of events such as traffic congestion and
speed that tend to contradict the factual foundation upon which an expert‟s opinion is based. Id.
707 A.2d at 671 (citing Salve Regina College, 594 A.2d at 881-82).
Likewise, where there is no opposing expert testimony or evidence in the record adverse
to an applicant, the zoning board must accept that testimony as undisputed, unless the board can
demonstrate that it relied upon its own special knowledge. See Salve Regina College, 594 A.2d
at 882 and DeStefano, 122 R.I. at 247, 405 A.2d at 1171. However, if a board simply states that
its decision is based upon its special knowledge, it “will not be upheld . . . unless the record
13
reveals the underlying facts or circumstances the board derived from its knowledge of the area.”
Id.
To summarize:
“It should go without saying that expert testimony proffered to a
zoning board is not somehow exempt from being attacked in
several ways. See, e.g., East Bay Community Development Corp.
v. Zoning Board of Review of Barrington, 901 A.2d 1136, 1157
(R.I. 2006) (countenancing a challenge to expert testimony on the
basis of the personal knowledge and observations of the members
of the zoning board so long as there are adequate disclosures on the
record); Restivo v. Lynch, 707 A.2d 663, 671 (R.I. 1998) (noting
that expert testimony can be discredited through examination of
the expert by members of the zoning board or by counsel for an
interested party).” Murphy, 959 A.2d at 542, n.6.
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs‟ expert witnesses consisted of Certified Land Planner Lisa
Davis; Registered Professional Engineer Expert Robert Bragger; Registered Professional
Engineer and Chemical Engineering and Environmental Sciences Expert William Taber;
Transportation Engineer and Traffic Expert Robert Clinton; and Licensed Real Estate Broker and
Real Estate Expert Peter Scotti. Each of these witnesses testified in favor of the Application.
After remand, the Board considered the record and found that the property is situated on
Garfield Avenue and is directly adjacent to Route 10 between two ramps leading to and from that
highway. Garfield Avenue itself is a four-lane road located near both commercial and residential
uses. It also found that Plaintiffs‟ traffic study observed that the proposed use would increase
traffic volume in an already high-traffic area where the majority of vehicles regularly exceeded
the posted speed limit. This finding was buttressed by observations from lay persons who
testified that cars regularly travel at excessive speeds, and that the road also is congested on a
regular basis. Personal observations from board members also noted that the location is a high
traffic area. Some safety issues were noted by the traffic engineer.
14
In denying the special use permit application, the Board concluded in pertinent part:
“The nature of the proposed use, coupled with the existing high
traffic volume, the increase in traffic volume that would
accompany the proposed use, the Board‟s personal knowledge of
existing congestion issues on the off-ramp and on-ramp from and
to Route 10 south and on Garfield Avenue, the Board‟s personal
knowledge of vehicle [sic] consistently exceeding the posted speed
limits on Garfield Avenue (as corroborated by the Applicant‟s
traffic report and lay observational testimony), the unusual
physical lay-out of the Property and other safety related issues as
set forth in the record, would be injurious, obnoxious or otherwise
offensive to the surrounding neighborhood;
...
The proposed fueling station would not hinder the general welfare
of the city, except to the extent set forth above as related to safety
issues associated with existing traffic issues;
...
The proposal within the application does not conform with the
purpose and intent of the city‟s comprehensive plan because of the
nature of the proposed use, as coupled with the triangular
configuration of the property, and the undersized nature of the lot.”
Decision, recorded September 30, 2010, at 4.
The Plaintiffs‟ expert witnesses testified that the proposal satisfied the requirements for a
special use permit. In particular, Traffic Engineer Clinton testified that although the proposal
would result in an increase in traffic, the study area had adequate capacity to accommodate that
increase and that it would have no effect on traffic safety. However, he also testified that
although the area is “posted at 25 miles per hour, we observed speeds, obviously, higher than 25
miles per hour, 36, 37 miles per hour.” (Tr. I at 46). Lay witness observations supported a
finding that vehicles excessively speed in the area. Lay witness observations also noted that
there frequently is congestion in the area. These observations were supported by board member
observations of the traffic conditions in the area. Furthermore, Mr. Clinton‟s own traffic study
stated that over a three year period, there was an average of four vehicle accidents in the area per
year.
15
After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the record supports the Board‟s
conclusions. Furthermore, given that it is undisputed that traffic volume would increase with the
proposed use, coupled with the fact that there already exists traffic congestion, excessive speeds,
and frequent accidents in the area, the Court cannot conclude that the Board erred in denying the
special use permit.
B
The Dimensional Variances
The Plaintiffs maintain that the Board addressed only one of the requested variances;
namely, deviation from the minimum lot area requirement, and that it erroneously failed to
address the other two dimensional variance requests. It further asserts that the Board‟s denial of
that variance was not supported by reliable and probative evidence.
In order to obtain a deviation or dimensional variance, an applicant must satisfy the
requirements set forth in Section 17.92.010 of the Ordinance. It provides in pertinent part:
“B. In granting a variance, the zoning board of review shall
require that evidence to the satisfaction of the following standards
be entered into the record of the proceedings:
1. That the hardship from which the applicant seeks relief
is due to the unique characteristics of the subject land or
structure and not to the general characteristics of the
surrounding area; and is not due to a physical or economic
disability of the applicant;
2. That the hardship is not the result of any prior action of
the applicant and does not result primarily from the desire
of the applicant to realize greater financial gain;
3. That the granting of the requested variance will not
alter the general character of the surrounding area or impair
the intent or purpose of the zoning ordinance codified in
this title or the comprehensive plan upon which the
ordinance is based; and
4. That the relief to be granted is the least relief necessary.
C. The zoning board of review shall, in addition to the above
standards, require that evidence be entered into the record of the
proceedings showing that:
16
...
2. In granting a dimensional variance, that the hardship
that will be suffered by the owner of the subject property if
the dimensional variance is not granted shall amount to
more than a mere inconvenience, which shall mean that
there is no other reasonable alternative to enjoy a legally
permitted beneficial use of one‟s property. The fact that a
use may be more valuable after the relief is granted shall
not be grounds for relief.” Section 17.92.010.7
It is well settled that “[a] dimensional or area variance--also known as a „deviation‟-provides relief from one or more of the dimensional restrictions that govern a permitted use of a
lot of land, such as area, height, or setback restrictions.” Sciacca v. Caruso, 769 A.2d 578, 582
n.5 (R.I. 2001). The burden of proof remains at all times with an applicant. See Lischio, 818
A.2d at 693. Thus, in order “for an applicant to obtain a dimensional variance (also known as a
deviation), the landowner needed to show only an adverse impact that amounted to more than a
mere inconvenience.” Id. at 691. Furthermore, an applicant must demonstrate that the hardship
“does not result primarily from the desire of the applicant to realize greater financial gain.”
Section 17.92.010. Additionally, “[t]he fact that a use may be more valuable after the relief is
granted shall not be grounds for relief.” Id.
In denying the requested variances,
“The Board found that there was evidence in the record that the
applicant had applied for and was granted prior variances for this
property. The Board found that the prior allowed variances were
less intense than that of the requested variance. The Board found
that there was testimony that applicant had used the property in
furtherance of his business to store items and equipment. The
Board also discussed the remaining criteria for the issuance of a
variance . . . .” Decision, recorded September 30, 2010, at 5.
7
The Court notes that the Ordinance requires that “the dimensional variance is not granted shall amount to more
than a mere inconvenience, which shall mean that there is no other reasonable alternative to enjoy a legally
permitted beneficial use of one‟s property.” Section 17.92.010. However, § 45-24-41(d)(2) controls the standard of
review, which only requires an applicant to show that any hardship caused by the denial of a request for dimensional
relief amount to more than a mere inconvenience. See § 45-24-41(d)(2). In the instant matter, the Board applied the
correct standard, so the fact that the Ordinance sets a higher standard is of no relevance.
17
The Board then denied the application
“based upon the conclusion that the hardship created by the
applicant in requesting a variance to operate a gas service station in
an M-2 zone on a 33,000 square foot lot resulting primarily from
the desire of the applicant to realize greater financial gain and that
the record contained evidence that there are reasonable alternatives
for the applicant to enjoy a legally permitted use on the property.”
Id.
The record reveals that the Board previously approved a variance for the same property.
Indeed, one of the board members recalled during the September 8, 2010 deliberations (which
deliberations were incorporated into the Board‟s decision), that
“This lot here, was given a permit, okay, in 1998, I was on the
board then, to build an industrial—an office building. It was also
given a permit to build a building, a commercial building in 1989
. . . they‟ve come before this board twice and been approved for a
commercial building on that lot . . . .” (Transcript, dated
September 8, 2010, at 7).
Although Plaintiffs assert that the Board did not specifically address each variance
application, the above reasoning would apply equally to all three requests. The fact that the
Board previously had granted variances for the same property contradicts any claim of hardship
amounting to more than a mere inconvenience. Consequently, in light of this finding, the Court
cannot conclude that the Board erred in denying the dimensional variances.
18
IV
Conclusion
After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the Zoning Board‟s decision after
remand was not in violation of statutory and ordinance provisions, was not affected by error of
law, and was not characterized by an abuse of discretion. Substantial rights of the Plaintiffs have
not been prejudiced. Accordingly, this Court affirms the Zoning Board‟s decision. In light of
this conclusion, the Court need not address the Plaintiffs‟ request for the reimbursement of
reasonable litigation expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.
Counsel shall submit an appropriate Order for entry consistent with this Decision.
19
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.